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Digital security threats may impact governments, businesses, and consumers
through intellectual property theft, loss of physical assets, economic damages, and
loss of confidence. Significant effort has been placed on technology solutions that
can mitigate threat exposure. Additionally, hundreds of years of literature have
focused on non-digital, human-centric strategies that proactively allow organiza-
tions to assess threats and implement mitigation plans. For both human and
technology-centric solutions, little to no prior research exists on the efficacy of how
humans employ digital security defenses. Security professionals are armed with com-
monly adopted “best practices” but are generally unaware of the particular artifacts
and conditions (e.g., organizational culture, procurement processes, employee train-
ing/education) that may or may not make a particular environment well-suited for
employing the best practices. In this thesis, I study proactive measures for security
operations and related human factors to identify generalizable optimizations that
can be applied for measurable increases in security. Through interview and survey
methods, I investigate the human and organizational factors that shape the adoption
and employment of defensive strategies. Case studies with partnered organizations
and comprehensive evaluations of security programs reveal security gaps that many
professionals were previously unaware of — as well as opportunities for changes in
security behaviors to mitigate future risk. These studies highlight that, in exemplar
environments, the adoption of proactive security assessments and training programs
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The digital-security threat landscape necessitates that organizations employ
defensive strategies to mitigate risk exposure. Experts estimate that intellectual
property and sensitive data theft due to digital espionage range from $1 to $2 trillion
annually and can impart irreparable damage to affected businesses [13,129,183].
For these reasons, numerous complex security paradigms exist that offer near-
term assistance for shoring up an organization’s risk mitigation efforts. A subset
of solutions includes investments in “next-generation” defense technologies, hiring
additional security staff, or outsourcing specialized labor to identify and mitigate
threats [49]. While new technology platforms might provide an added benefit, or-
ganizations also must optimize the use of existing resources.
Proactive measures for security operations involves three factors: (1)
planning to mitigate likely threats, (2) establishing a baseline of security for sus-
tained operations, and (3) implementing security controls that can prevent adver-
sarial access or reduce the impact of an intrusion.
Proactive planning involves assessing critical assets, building plans to protect
those assets, and investing in the cognitive skills of security technicians to reduce
digital-security risk [66]. Threat modeling frameworks present a methodology for
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evaluating complex threats and breaking them into modular components to allow
humans to reason about the threat, understand risk, and develop mitigating strate-
gies [184].
Proactive baselining ensures digital systems are operating at a minimum level
of security to defeat common threats and ensures administrators strictly adhere to
practices that sustain security. In many cases, proactive baselines are mandated by
various laws, policies, or regulations through compliance programs [75,108,159,169].
The third and final component of proactive security involves implementing var-
ious security controls that mitigate adversarial impact. Incident response playbooks
present security practitioners with a strategy for handling an imminent threat and
reducing adverse organizational impacts by providing practitioners with pre-planned
actions [150]. These pre-planned actions are intended to help reduce stresses that
technicians may face during a security incident, allow them to gain momentum
during response efforts, and ensure organizations are prepared for likely adversar-
ial situations. Additionally, organizations can implement security measures that
complement mandated baselines to either address security gaps or repair security
complications caused by compliance programs.
Proactive measures for security operations are standard practices within the
security industry, but little to no research portrays the efficacy of these defensive
strategies in practice.
This situation suggests that opportunities exist to improve upon how orga-
nizations design and implement proactive measures. To this end, this dissertation
empirically studies how security professionals and organizations proactively employ
2
defensive strategies in practice and identify gaps that inhibit their effectiveness.
The resulting findings identify methods to measurably improve proactive security
measures in real-world environments.
This thesis measures the efficacy of defensive strategies in practice to improve
proactive measures for digital security operations. Specifically, the study of proac-
tive measures for security operations and related human factors will lead
to optimizations that can be applied for measurable increases in security.
My colleagues and I investigate this hypothesis by studying each component of
proactive measures: planning, baselining, and implementing. Understanding these
components individually will allow us to analyze commonalities, understand par-
ticular nuances that may apply to certain situations, and understand adaptations
that were required for anecdotal “best practices” to be translated into practice for
security operations.
Comprehensive evaluations reveal that, oftentimes, the efficacy of defensive se-
curity controls relies on numerous complementary organizational and human-centric
factors. Chapters 3 and 6 highlight the need for educational interventions, the adop-
tion of reinforcing training programs, and changes in communication channels for
security behaviors to take hold. Chapters 3 and 4 show that even foundational secu-
rity practices can result in security concerns if not correctly integrated into existing
security paradigms. Chapter 7 focuses on the steps organizations take to implement
security solutions that address threats not mitigated by baseline security paradigms.
This thesis evaluates the three components of proactive measures and identifies
methods for optimizing through a series of research studies. Using a case study in
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Chapter 3, we conduct an end-to-end analysis on the efficacy of an exemplar threat-
modeling planning framework within an enterprise environment. We ask security
professionals proactively to consider threats to the networks and systems, allow
them to design security mechanisms that can mitigate risk, implement those controls
within a production network, and measure the change in security posture over the
span of 120 days. Additionally, we attempt to understand the particular aspects of
threat modeling that are well-suited for the partnered organization and isolate the
organizational factors that assisted in reinforcing adoption.
The results suggest that threat modeling may provide valuable benefits in an
enterprise setting. After 30 days of using threat modeling, 20 employees reported
that they had adopted its concepts in their daily routine and 23 employees believed
threat modeling provided tangible benefits to their security jobs. These positive
perceptions shaped the adoption metrics observed over the next 90 days. NYC3 em-
ployees implemented participant-designed defensive plans to mitigate threats across
eight newly-identified threat categories.
As a result, these defensive strategies prevented five privileged account hi-
jackings, mitigated 541 unique intrusion attempts, and remedied three previously
unknown web-server vulnerabilities. These positive outcomes were supported and
enabled by integrating threat modeling into existing processes; developing new train-
ing and mentorship programs; and improving how security professionals communi-
cate with one another and executive-level leaders.
The study with NYC3 in Chapter 3 revealed that, prior to using threat mod-
eling, compliance programs played a foundational role in how the organization and
4
its security technicians implement baseline security controls. Chapters 4 and 5
focus on potential security concerns that may exist despite perfect adherence to
compliance standards. These studies feature a novel systematic methodology for
evaluating the risks that organizations may inherit as a result of baseline security
and compliance with various policies, laws, and regulations. In Chapter 4, a group
of researchers evaluate programs that affect everyday citizens, ask industry experts
to validate/reject their findings, and partner with relevant organizations to disclose
their findings. This study reveals that when compliance standards are used literally
as checklists, perfect compliance can result in sub-optimal security conditions. This
study highlights that hundreds of issues with varying severity exist across credit
card, taxpayer, and electric grid security standards. More problematic, no clearly-
defined process exists for reporting security concerns associated with compliance
standards. Overall, results suggest that auditing compliance standards can provide
valuable benefits to the security posture of compliant organizations.
Chapter 5 extends lessons learned from Chapter 4 and identifies 46 issues
that may present security threats to organizations that use FedRAMP-approved
programs in cloud-based infrastructures. Additionally, thematic analysis reveals four
threat models that appear to be neglected throughout the FedRAMP framework and
could pose significant threats if not properly handled.
Chapter 3 revealed that while technicians were aware of security issues, their
operations center did not always have a response plan codified for when the issue
manifested. Chapter 6 details two case studies designed to evaluate an end-to-end
implementation of incident response playbook frameworks within a security opera-
5
tions center. Security professionals used two exemplar incident-response playbook-
design frameworks to design their own response plans for specific threats their or-
ganization may encounter. Industry experts, in turn, assessed the validity of the
designed playbooks. Using the best-scoring playbooks, technicians implemented se-
lect playbooks within a partnered security operations center and conducted a series
of incident response exercises to measure users’ ability to perform response actions
while following the prescribed response plans.
Findings suggest that playbooks, in some cases, simplify and support incident
response efforts. However, designed playbooks often lacked sufficient detail for real-
world use, particularly for more junior technicians. This study shows that incident
response playbooks may be valuable tools for increasing preparedness against a
threat, but often require extensive planning and threat modeling to determine which
playbooks should be prioritized for development and customization. Additionally,
baseline security mechanisms, such as the ones discussed in Chapter 4, may constrain
or alter playbook design efforts to ensure compatibility with applicable compliance
programs.
From Chapters 4 and 5, we understand that digital security compliance pro-
grams help organizations establish baseline security levels, but also are laden with
their own security issues. As a result, security professionals are left to assess the
impact of compliance on their organization and to identify ways to extend secu-
rity beyond compliance mandates to fill known security gaps. Chapter 7 reports
on organizations’ use of complementary measures — policies and technical controls
enacted to mend known security gaps and exceed compliance requirements. Af-
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ter surveying 40 security professionals from across multiple essential-service sectors,
thematic and content analysis reveal (1) numerous complementary measures that
organizations use to address security gaps, (2) identification of the measures that
worked particularly well (or poorly), (3) how organizations prioritize and evaluate
the complementary measures they adopt.
Findings suggest that compliance programs are insufficient and that 37 of
40 organizations implement complementary measures as a result. Although the
specifics of how and why organizations implement complementary measures vary, we
find that organizations often adopt complementary measures in response to security
incidents, to reduce costs, when recommended by external experts, or requested by
(sometimes non-technical) executives. Participants found complementary measures
to be beneficial, but far from perfect. Participants reported numerous instances
of poorly-managed complementary processes that impact organizational security.
Overall, improving compliance programs and organizational culture that supports
digital security may provide valuable insight into improving security for organiza-
tions as a whole.
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Chapter 2: Related Work
Prior work has focused on various methods for improving digital security pos-
tures. In this section, I review related work that focuses on threat modeling to
anticipate future risk; various legal and policy frameworks that impact security; and
incident response playbooks that assist with readiness for when a security breach
occurs.
2.1 Human factors in threat modeling adoption
The following is a review of prior work on digital-security threat-modeling
techniques and empirical studies of these models. Current research in digital security
threat-modeling frameworks focuses on providing structured processes for dynamic
situations and insight into possible threats to systems.
Threat-modeling frameworks are often ported into digital security from the
military domain. The digital-security adaptation of the military OODA Loop frame-
work focuses on improving situational awareness and serves as a decision-making
model that allows defenders to rapidly observe the situation, orient themselves to
the problem, decide on a course of action, and act effectively [86]. In this con-
text, a failure to understand threats will ultimately lead to an incorrect decision for
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defenders and responders — but success will allow defenders to preempt attackers
and improve their likelihood of success. Relatedly, the Cynefin framework aims to
manage cybersecurity risk and provide a process for structuring uncertainty to re-
veal context, develop situational awareness, and illuminate appropriate responses to
complex problems [61]. The five Cynefin domains help describe problems; framing
problems as terms of disorder, obvious, complicated, complex, and chaotic provide
defenders with a guide for action and assist with risk management. Both of these
frameworks enable defenders to reactively implement defenses against active threats
while understanding their tactics, techniques, and procedures but are not structured
for planning proactive defense plans. Proactive plans serve to mitigate threats before
an adversary is able to enact an attack.
The cyber kill chain assists defenders in recognizing the essential tasks that
an adversary must complete before accomplishing their goals [103, 147]. From this
perspective, defenders have an advantage over adversaries; attackers must complete
all stages of their kill chain for success, whereas defenders only need to thwart an
adversary once at any stage. Much like OODA loop and the Cynefin frameworks,
these frameworks enable defenders to reactively implement defenses against active
threats while understanding their tactics, techniques, and procedures but they are
not structured for planning proactive defense plans. Additionally, they heavily rely
upon threat intelligence and situational awareness for response actions. However,
one significant deficiency of this framework is its exclusive focus on external threats:
it considers neither insider nor inadvertent threats.
The National Security Agency produced a threat modeling framework for
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adversarial mitigation techniques using the output of an internal wargame exer-
cise [154]. This framework provides an enumeration of common threat attack vec-
tors and proposes defenses based on observed offensive tactics from the wargame.
While these guidelines represent the agency’s best practices, they do not account
for tailoring threats to individual organizations.
A multitude of other threat-modeling techniques have origins within industry
and academia. Denning et al. developed Security Cards, a brainstorming framework
for modeling threats in four areas: human impact, adversary’s motivations, adver-
sary’s resources, and adversary’s methods [57]. Through the use of a deck of cards,
users are prompted to consider common scenarios and contemplate how those sce-
narios may apply to their own situation. Persona Non Grata, another brainstorming
framework, also focuses on attacker motivations and capabilities through the lens
of an attacker’s perspective [47]. By understanding motivations and intent, PNG
users can build a list of ways an adversary may affect a digital system [47]. Microsoft
developed STRIDE, a step-by-step framework for determining how threats may af-
fect a particular system or component [136, 137]. STRIDE automatically generates
likely threats within the following areas: spoofing identity, tampering with data,
repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service, and elevation of privilege. By
identifying how an adversary may affect a system, defenders may plan defenses.
STRIDE delegates threat priority determination to its users based on specific re-
quirements. Both these approaches promote brainstorming, but security cards and
PNG do not propose threat mitigations nor do they prioritize identified threats by
criticality. As with any brainstorming approach, the output of these methodologies
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is dependent on the insight, experience, and creativity of its users.
The attack tree methodology provides a formal structure for representing at-
tacks on a system [179]. The root of an attack tree is typically the adversarial goal,
and each leaf represents different ways to achieve it [177]. Defenders can traverse the
tree to identify which leaves require action and which are adequately mitigated [184],
allowing defenders to narrow their mitigation focus. This allows defenders to nar-
row their scope and focus on mitigating a subset threat vectors. Yet prior work
has identified a key weakness of attack trees: without a complete set of root nodes,
defenders will fail to account for a large number of potential attacks [184].
The Center of Gravity (CoG) framework focuses on both internal and external
threats [103, 147], helping users identify critical threats in a structured way rather
than leaving them to assign threat priority without guidance [136, 137]. It requires
that defenders define their environment in a top-down approach, ensuring that they
build a comprehensive set of adversarial “root nodes” [179, 184]. Prussian military
theorist Carl von Clausewitz coined CoG in his 19th century book On War [222].
As an analysis of Napoleon I’s military strategy and tactics, On War introduced
the concept weight of effort, a term whose definition varied but is most commonly
defined as “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends” [219].
Today, military theorists use Schwerpunkt synonymously with the modern concept
of CoG. The U.S. Department of Defense, which expands upon Clausewitz’s origi-
nal definition, defines CoG as “the source of power that provides moral or physical
strength, freedom of action, or will to act” [79]. Taking into account lessons learned
from unconventional and guerrilla warfare, military theorist Joe Strange defines CoG
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as “the primary sources of moral or physical strength, power, and resistance” [196].
Finally, Dale Eikmeier offers a nuanced approach, stating that the CoG is the “pri-
mary entity that possesses the inherent capability to achieve the objective” [64].
Modern military theorists have expanded the idea of Schwerpunkt to account for
the moral and mental components of warfare [79] and unconventional and guerrilla
warfare [196]. Eikmeier defines the modern, nuanced concept of the CoG as the
“primary entity that possesses the inherent capability to achieve the objective [64].”
Military strategists have proven the effectiveness of CoG as a proactive framework
for conducting and winning real-world military operations. For example, the United
States decisively defeated the Iraqi Army in Operation DESERT STORM by de-
veloping campaign plans using the CoG framework [198]. By identifying the Iraqi
centers of gravity at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, the United States
optimized the use of its military strength to find and exploit Iraqi weaknesses and
swiftly defeat the world’s fifth largest military [52]. CoG is applicable within any
contested domain [198] and its various definitions are synonymous with the concept
of centrality, which appears in network theory for social groups [115] and network
theory in the digital domain [206]. CoG can be used for offensive cyberspace oper-
ations [46] and internally prioritizing digital defenses [50].
While a number of threat-modeling frameworks and approaches have been
defined, few have been empirically evaluated, and none have been assessed at the
enterprise level. Sindre and Opdahl compared the effectiveness of attack trees and
misuse cases, an integrated approach for viewing security issues within a system’s
architecture for discovering threats, using groups of students [166,185]. They found
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that attack trees were more effective overall, especially in cases where participants
were asked to describe threats without an existing model. Similarly, Karpati et al.
compared two misuse cases approaches: traditional misuse cases and misuse case
maps, again with student participants [114]. Labunets et al. conducted an empirical
study with groups of student participants [121] to measure the effectiveness and
perception of CORAS [128], a visual framework for modeling risk-based security,
and SREP [134], a textual framework. In this study, the researchers asked groups
of students to discover threats and security requirements. CORAS allows users
to develop brainstorming diagrams, showing relationships between assets, threats,
risks, and security requirements. SREP allows users to describe similar information
using table-based templates or structured paragraphs. They found that the visual-
ization method aided in identifying threats, yet there was no statistically significant
difference between either model for enumerating security requirements. Massacci
et al. [131] used small groups of industry practitioners and students to compare
the performance of four threat models [77, 85, 128, 146] against fictional scenarios
in a classroom environment. They found CORAS to be generally the most useful,
with participants citing comfort with its step-by-step methodology and easy-to-
understand terminology.
2.2 Compliance programs
The following is a review of prior work on digital-security compliance programs
and studies of their impact on security and organizations. Current research on com-
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pliance programs focus on assisting organizations with better achieving compliance.
Digital security compliance programs within the United States date back to the
Computer Security Act of 1987, which required agencies to protect sensitive systems
and conduct security training [156]. Many programs implement a “carrot-and-stick”
approach to compliance, in that organizations are rewarded for successful programs
and levied with sanctions for compliance deviations. This section briefly reviews
past studies involving digital security compliance and its impact on organizations.
Compliance audits force organizations to balance being “inspection ready”
and sustaining daily operations, such as providing essential services or selling goods.
Because of this careful balance, many organizations choose to perform compliance
actions only before a pending audit, and then neglect further security maintenance
until another audit requires them to repeat the process [170]. This behavior meets
the security minimums for compliance standards, but fails to adhere to the spirit of
secure practices. Moreover, evidence shows that fully-compliant organizations can
still suffer data breaches. Auditors certified Target as PCI-compliant in September
2013, just before it suffered a massive data breach in November 2013 [170]. These
factors show that organizations must have periodic security checks in place that
exceed compliance minimums and proactively reduce risk beyond baseline technical
controls and implementation processes.
Previous studies highlight cultural disconnects between developers, engineers,
and compliance officials that create issues when digital security measures are “bolted
on” after software development is complete [17, 45]. Clark highlights institutional
changes that had to occur in his organization to incorporate NIST security guide-
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lines and cybersecurity framework to ensure security was measurable, effective, and
individuals at the organization took ownership of their role in security [45]. Clark
recommended changes such as embedding compliance experts within development
teams to encourage grass-roots-style compliance integration [45]. Assal and Chi-
asson discuss the importance of integrating security throughout the software de-
velopment process, the sometimes necessary organizational restructuring that may
need to occur to support integration, and other organizational optimizations that
need to occur to support more secure behaviors [17]. Thomas et al. conducted a
systematic study of application developers to understand how they reason about
compliance and security to identify ways to overcome organizational behaviors and
improve tools for secure software development [209].
Other organizations found that threat modeling could proactively identify se-
curity gaps that may exist in compliant solutions [11,45]. Some organizations have
even overhauled their physical network topology to meet federally-mandated re-
quirements, restructuring their teams and network architecture to limit the scope
of auditable systems within their environment [101]. In practical terms, there are
significant impacts on service availability, financial resources that may be required
for redundancy during re-engineering, and even contractual considerations for reor-
ganizing employees and contractors.
Numerous studies focus on how humans perceive compliance standards and
modify their behaviors based on those perceptions. Julisch highlighted numer-
ous factors that shape organizational decision-making when investing in compliance
measures, often seeking new security technologies that are out-of-the-box compliance
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ready [113]. This creates a market that offers solutions to administrative require-
ments but these solutions are not plug-and-play; extensive research is required for
the integration of these security technologies so that that the security controls are
fully utilized and that new gaps are not created. Beautement et al. describe the
“compliance budget,” the human factors behind the implementation of compliance
controls; their research illuminated ways to improve security and compliance readi-
ness through resource allocation optimization [23]. In their research, they highlight
approaches that managers can use to influence employees and improve security be-
haviors. Much like a financial budget, Beautement et al. advocates for prioritization
of efforts as to not exceed the compliance budget, or reach a point that investments
begin to have a diminishing return. Building upon previous works, Puhakainen and
Siponen found that training employees to better understand compliance standards
can improve organizational behaviors and shift employees toward implementing more
secure practices [172]. Their research finds that motivation is key for intervention
training and employees need to be shown the direct correlation between their habits
and system security. The study further highlights the importance of communication
between organizational leaders and employees to reinforce better security practices.
Additionally, Hu et al. found that managers who “lead by example” and im-
plement top-down management initiatives encourage employees’ compliant security
behaviors [98].
Correctly understanding and implementing legal obligations in compliance pro-
gram texts have been studied by many researchers. Breaux et al. focused on the
difficulty of implementing compliance programs, specifically the ambiguity and com-
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plexity of the legal language that is used to describe rights and obligations that com-
pliance programs require [31–34]. Similarly, Agarwal et al. proposed a flexible and
modular compliance assessment framework that would help companies understand
their legal obligations [5].
2.3 Incident Response Playbooks
The following is a review of prior work on digital-security incident response
playbooks and other types of incident preparedness. Current research on playbooks
focuses on identifying likely vulnerabilities, likely threats, best practices for response,
and ways to better prepare organizations and employees for threats.
Digital security playbooks — a structured action plan for incident response —
are designed to help organizations prepare for security breaches and enable them
to respond quickly and appropriately. High-stress situations such as an ongoing
data breach may disrupt technicians’ cognitive abilities [60, 97, 125]; playbooks are
designed to present documented best practices to prompt action and momentum
during incident response, as well as supporting post-incident root-cause analysis. A
local instance of a playbook is specifically tailored to a particular site and should
include fine-grained controls and actions for responding to specific events.
The following works represent types of playbooks in other domains that may
be applicable to digital security, previous crisis readiness proposals, and a look at
two exemplar frameworks used for designing incident response playbooks.
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2.3.1 Crisis preparedness in other domains
Business continuity plans (BCPs) help minimize financial losses, ensure the
continuation of core functions, ensure resource availability, and prepare employees
through training. Many organizations are required by insurance or regulations to
have BCPs. Numerous references provide reporting templates for communicating
essential information and how-to guides for audits [27, 94]. BCP training varies,
but typically involves walk-through rehearsals to prepare for disruption events [94].
Other researchers have focused on aggregating lessons learned and training scenarios
for a vast array of situations that may cause damage to a business: terrorist attacks,
supply chain disruptions, and even managing negative media coverage [80]. BCPs
typically contain fine-grained detail to assist with implementation and auditing.
Federal government agencies maintain playbooks for natural disaster conti-
nuity and health emergency preparedness, among other crises [224]; libraries of
pre-made disaster response playbooks are available for reference [67,148,227].
In the medical field, crisis resource management combines standard medic-
inal practices with non-technical skills to ensure exposure to best practices for
likely emergency situations [41]. Crisis resource management includes fuses stan-
dard medicinal practices with non-technical skills such as labor distribution (who
should be doing what and when), communication (who needs to know what and
when), and anticipation and planning (understanding the likely steps that should
follow) [41]. Studies found that simulated rehearsals allowed participants to re-
hearse their response action “playbooks” and that participants felt confident that
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the lessons learned would transfer to real-life situations [175].
Pilot training uses simulation to allow aviators to prepare for dangerous situ-
ations (and even cyber attacks) prior to ever entering a real cockpit [68, 186]. This
readiness and preparedness also extends beyond the cockpit, with much emphasis
placed future readiness when presented with large-scale disruptions such as natural
disasters or acts of terrorism [59,92]. Allowing international organizations and pilots
alike to rehearse and refine their playbooks improves their ability to handle threats
when they arise.
2.3.2 Threat exposure and readiness
Previously, I proposed an incident response readiness concept known as digi-
tal calcification [189]. The premise of this proposal was that data breaches, insider
threats, and other forms of cyber attacks are pervasive enough that organizations
must be prepared to response to likely security incidents. Unprepared organizations
can exacerbate the impact of these threats, leading to a loss of consumer trust and
confidence. Organizations should allow trusted entities to attack systems and de-
velop a comprehensive understanding of security gaps; repeated exposure to these
attacks may lessen the stress for incident responders over time and improve the se-
curity of the environment overtime by implementing lessons learned from the events.
This “calcification” concept — the development of stronger structures that can bet-
ter withstand damage — fused together concepts like the Netflix “Chaos Monkey”
with incident response playbooks. The Chaos Monkey concept is that no system is
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off-limits during stress testing and that critical resources should be resilient enough
to withstand cyber attacks, power outages, and system failures [24]. Calcification
should include all personnel at an organization, from technicians to C-level execu-
tives, so that each individual can understand the role they play in crisis readiness
and lessen the effect of successful attacks in the future.
Additionally, at the International Conference on Cyber Conflict, I proposed
novel methods for exposing the U.S. military to many modern-day threats posed by
the integration of digital networks within lethal combat platforms [190].
2.3.3 Incident response playbooks
Playbook frameworks allow security professionals to (1) design playbooks that
can be tailored to their unique environment, (2) engineer solutions that fulfill se-
curity requirements, and (3) describe the actions that defenders should take during
incident response events. Additionally, playbooks guide responders towards execut-
ing root-cause analysis using industry best practices and providing essential “first
steps” that help prevent inaction during the early phases of an incident response
effort.
Bollinger et al. highlight using playbooks to secure high-value systems, de-
fend against various threat models, conduct investigations, generate reports based
on findings, and modernizing your technologies to remain relevant against emerging
threats [28]. In their book, Bollinger et al. present lessons learned from their creation
of an incident response team at Cisco and share their insights into organizational
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planning, adaption, training, and integrating lessons learned iteratively. Other re-
searchers discuss playbook benefits such as preparing incident response checklists
that identify “must-do” tasks, report templates, and communication templates to
share with stakeholders as part of business continuity plans; they also identify play-
books playing an essential role in education and helping professionals adjust to a
new program or responsibility [89, 138]. Others advocate for using playbooks to
prepare an entire organization for incident response. C-level executives and net-
work defenders alike have a critical role to play during an incident; playbooks allow
each individual to proactively understand their role and prepare responses before
an incident occurs [138].
Security professionals may use playbook frameworks during cybersecurity train-
ing exercises to design playbooks and prepare for future incident response events
that may occur within their corporate networks [116]. These cybersecurity exer-
cises immerse technicians within developed scenarios to measure and evaluate their
ability to perform their security functions [116]. While some scenarios pit teams of
professionals against one another, nearly all exercises involve notional events within
practice networks that are not truly representative of the real-world incidents or en-
vironments [190]. Using cybersecurity exercises to train technicians with non-native
tools or networks may coach “exercise-isms” that do not translate into real-world
scenarios and may significantly inhibit the transfer of knowledge from training into
reality. Executing cybersecurity exercises organically at organizations may require
extensive time and financial resources, but it helps ensure lessons learned from the
exercises are tailored to the networked environments within which participants nor-
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mally operate.
Numerous playbook frameworks exist [15,28,116,138,165], but we focus on the
following two frameworks given their support from the United States Government
and they have no-cost, openly-available guides for use.
IACD. The IACD framework is the result of collaboration between the U.S. Depart-
ment of Homeland Security, National Security Agency, and Johns Hopkins Applied
Physics Laboratory to leverage automation within incident response [104]. The
defining feature of IACD playbooks is a visual approach for capturing essential re-
sponse actions that both humans and automated systems must take to handle an
incident. The IACD website has numerous, publicly available guides and examples
for practitioners to reference [105].
Through case studies, IACD provides a method by which defenders can (1)
conduct proof-of-concept evaluations of new sensors and technologies; (2) provide
insights to potential challenges that an organization may face; (3) identify gaps in
technology, policies, or standards; and (4) gather requirements to facilitate standards
development [104]. IACD playbooks are intended to capture security processes that
reflect governance or regulatory requirements as well as industry best practices [105].
The IACD framework breaks playbook design into 10 steps. The first step is to
identify the initiating condition: the event or situation that triggers use of the play-
book (e.g., a database breach) and how that event is detected (e.g., an automated
email alert sent to an administrator). The second step involves listing all possible
actions that could occur in response to the initiating condition, typically via mind
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mapping. Practitioners should reference existing best practices to identify possible
actions. Next, playbook designers designate each identified action as required or
optional. For example, generating a written report that details the incident from
beginning to end — which may provide invaluable insight after the event but does
not contribute directly to response efforts — should be labeled optional. Optional
tasks are aggregated in an action options box : a menu of available tasks that can
assist with the investigation but may not be required. Steps 4-7 involve grouping
actions by function, ordering required actions sequentially, and interleaving optional
actions where appropriate. The designer produces a diagram showing these ordered
relationships.
Next, update the action options box. Listed items in the action options box
typically involve designing automated-system prompts for humans-in-the-loop to
authorize a follow-on action or designing actions that humans will manually queue
for automated execution. An example would include an automated prompt asking
for human confirmation to disconnect a system from a specified network. In step 9,
the designer verifies that the playbook terminates either in a desired end state or in
a new initiating condition that flows into another playbook. The final step ensures
that the playbook satisfies applicable regulatory controls and requirements.
NIST. The NIST Computer Security Incident Handling Guide (hereafter referred to
as the NIST framework) focuses on expeditious recovery after a security incident [44].
Using this framework, designers break a security incident down into three
phases, creating playbook content for each phase. The preparation phase occurs
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before an incident occurs and requires analysts to identify critical assets that must
be protected during the incident of the type under consideration. Playbook content
for the detection and analysis phase should help defenders identify the incident’s
entry point, breadth of impact, potential consequences, and containment methods.
Content for phase three — containment, eradication, and recovery — should guide
defenders in patching or isolating the attacker’s entry point and other similar po-
tential entry points, increasing monitoring, and safely bringing services back online.
Each phase of a NIST playbook should emphasize communication and metrics track-
ing: ensuring essential personnel are informed, victims are notified, and the scope of
impact is thoroughly documented. While playbook designers may or may not deem
communications as required actions in IACD playbooks, communication is required
throughout NIST playbooks.
Unlike IACD, the NIST guide does not typically result in a visualization of
response actions (although it could). Instead, a NIST playbook typically provides
detailed textual descriptions, intended to be drawn from institutional procedures or
best practices, for each phase.
2.4 Human factors in security operations
The following is a review of prior work on human factors within security op-
erations centers and their overall impact on security.
János and Dai found that organizational behavior and culture impacted the
efficacy of security operations [110]. Kokulu et al. similarly found numerous de-
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ficiencies within SOCs stemming from insufficient training, poor communication,
and evaluation criteria disconnected from meaningful performance metrics [117].
Research from Alomar et al. discusses breakdowns in trust, communication, and
resourcing that inhibit the effectiveness of vulnerability disclosure programs [8].
Furnell et al. identified multiple usability concerns in incident response tools as
well as the occasional need for internally-developed tools [72]. Sundaramurthy et al.
highlight the consequences of “build-once-sell-to-everyone” security vendor models
on SOCs and also found that in-house, tailored solutions may best support analysts’
needs [203].
Focusing on security analyst performance, Sundaramurthy et al. observed
burnout rates within SOCs and identified possible solutions for sustaining morale
and completion of security tasks [202]. Dykstra and Paul found that analysts’ fa-
tigue and stress levels increase throughout the day, affecting their ability to perform
security tasks and suggesting analysts’ tools and environment need to offset frus-
tration where possible [60]. Other researchers focused on reducing the impacts of
information overload to help incident responders improve mitigation efforts against
true-positive attacks [87].
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Chapter 3: Planning for Security: Human Factors in Threat Model-
ing Adoption
In this chapter1 I present the first case study of threat modeling as a proactive
planning framework in a large, high-risk enterprise environment. During proac-
tive planning, threat modeling frameworks present a methodology for evaluating
complex threats and breaking them into modular components. This is intended to
allow humans to reason about the threat, understand risk, and develop mitigating
strategies [184].
Through a partnership with New York City Cyber Command (NYC3), I in-
troduced 25 employees to an exemplar threat-modeling approach through group
training sessions. I tracked the impact of this threat modeling training on NYC3’s
security posture quantitatively, through analysis of 120 days of log data, and quali-
tatively, via pre-, post-, and 30-day-post-training surveys with participants.
The results suggest that threat modeling may provide valuable benefits in an
enterprise setting. Participants’ perceptions of threat modeling were very positive:
after 30 days, 23 participants agreed that it was useful in their daily work and
20 reported that they have adopted its concepts in their daily routine. Collectively,
1Published as [191,195]
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participants developed 147 unique mitigation strategies, of which 64% were new and
unimplemented within NYC3. Additionally, participants identified new threats in
eight distinct areas within their environment, such as physical access-control weak-
nesses and human configuration errors. Within one week of developing these plans,
NYC3 employees started implementing participant-designed plans to mitigate these
eight newly-identified threat categories. In the 120 days following the study, NYC3
implemented participant-designed defensive strategies that prevented five privileged
account hijackings, mitigated 541 unique intrusion attempts, and remedied three
previously unknown web-server vulnerabilities. The observations and metrics from
this study provide a scaffolding for future work on threat modeling and enterprise-
employee security training.
With regard to proactive measures as whole, Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 show
that threat modeling is insufficient independently as it does not provide practitioners
with action plans for when incidents are underway — although this study shows that
threat models reveal likely areas of vulnerability and help develop plans to optimize
current resources to lessen risk. Threat models and risk mitigation strategies must
also be compatible with applicable baselines for integration into real-world security
operations centers.
3.1 The Center of Gravity framework
In this study, I introduced NYC3 employees to the Center of Gravity (CoG)
framework, which originated in the 19th century as a military strategy [222]. As
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Figure 3.1: Step-by-step process for threat modeling with CoG, using participant
P17’s responses as an example.
a military concept, a center of gravity is the “primary entity that possesses the
inherent capability to achieve the objective [64].” As a threat modeling approach,
CoG focuses on identifying and defending this central resource. This approach is
applicable within any contested domain [198] and is synonymous with centrality,
which appears in network theory for social groups [115] and network theory in the
digital domain [206]. CoG supports planning offensive cyberspace operations [46]
and prioritizing digital defenses [50].
The constraints of the partnership with NYC3 — in particular, the require-
ment to minimize employees’ time away from their duties — only allowed researchers
to introduce and examine one threat modeling framework. I selected CoG because it
incorporates many key characteristics from across more pervasive frameworks: CoG
provides practitioners with a top-down approach to identifying internal points of
vulnerability, similar to STRIDE [136,137], and it assists with assessing vulnerabil-
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ities from an adversarial perspective, similar to attack trees, security cards, persona
non grata, and cyber kill chain [47, 57, 103, 179]. Uniquely among popular threat
modeling approaches, it allows organizations to prioritize defensive efforts based on
risk priority.
It is essential to understand the process of applying the CoG approach. Fig-
ure 3.1 illustrates these steps using an example provided by one participant.
To begin using CoG, analysts must start by codifying the long-term organiza-
tional objective, or “end state,” of defensive measures. An end state provides the
why for implementing defenses and allows an individual practitioner to understand
their own specific security objective with respect to the organization.
Once the practitioner understands their objective, the next step is to identify
all of the assets currently in use that support accomplishing the objective. In this
context, an asset can be a system, a service, a tool, or anything relevant to ac-
complishing the objective (not just security-specific assets). The practitioner then
identifies the CoG as the pivotal asset on which all other assets depend for accom-
plishing the objective.
Once the practitioner identifies the CoG, they can deconstruct it into three
components: critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabili-
ties [64]. Critical capabilities (CC) are distinguished by two key features: they
support the practitioner’s objectives, and the CoG would cease to operate without
them [79]. For each CC, there are one or more critical requirements (CR), defined
as supporting resources that enable the CC to function [79]. Eikmeier distinguishes
between capabilities and requirements using a “does/uses” litmus test [64]: If the
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CoG does something, that something is a capability, and if it uses something, that
something is a requirement. Critical vulnerabilities (CV) are directly related to
critical requirements; CVs are thresholds of diminished CRs that make the CoG in-
operable [181]. Practitioners identify CVs by asking the following question for each
CR: what would cause this requirement to no longer function as intended? Some
CVs are binary, such as the complete loss of a CR, but others may cause a reduced
functionality beyond some threshold, preventing the CoG from accomplishing the
objective.
Building a thorough list of critical vulnerabilities allows the practitioner to un-
derstand how their objectives can be threatened. The practitioner should consider
both malicious and accidental threats to collectively describe the worst-case situ-
ation for their organization and objectives. The CoG approach models all threats
with a singular, unified motivation: exploiting critical vulnerabilities. This allows
practitioners to develop a list of threats that can encompass nation-state hackers,
insiders, poorly trained users, and others. The practitioner iterates over the list
of critical vulnerabilities to develop a corresponding list of threat capabilities (TC).
For each CV, they ask: what could take advantage of this vulnerable condition?
From the list of TCs, they enumerate all of the threat requirements (TR) needed to
support each capability.
The final step in the CoG analysis process is building an actionable defense plan
(ADP) that can neutralize identified threat capabilities and requirements, mitigate
critical vulnerabilities, and protect the identified CoG. Each component of an ADP,
designed to dampen or eliminate one or more potential risks, is referred to as a
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Figure 3.2: The six-part study protocol and metrics.
mitigation strategy.
3.2 Methods: Threat modeling at NYC3
To evaluate the impact of introducing threat modeling to an organization
that had not previously used it, I partnered with NYC3 to introduce a specific
threat-modeling framework (CoG) and observe the effects. NYC3 is responsible
for protecting the most populous city in the U.S. and its government from cyber
attacks. The Government of the City of New York (GoNYC) includes 143 separate
departments, agencies, and offices with more than 300,000 employees that support
8.6 million residents and 60 million yearly visitors [161]. It maintains nearly 200,000
external IP addresses and has its own Internet Service Provider, with hundreds
of miles of fiber-optic cable and dozens of major points of presence. Further, the
city is responsible for maintaining industrial control and mainframe systems. The
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participant pool consisted of civil servants and private-sector contractors who work
directly with NYC3.
This study focuses on the efficacy of threat modeling, which in this context is
defined as the ability to achieve a desired outcome. Both effectiveness, the ability
to successfully achieve an outcome, and efficiency, the ability to reduce effort to
achieve an outcome, comprise efficacy.
Because of introducing threat modeling in NYC3’s operational environment,
a comparative experiment was not possible; instead, I designed a primarily ob-
servational study to obtain as much insight as possible — both qualitative and
quantitative — into the effects of introducing threat modeling within an enterprise
environment. The study includes six components (as shown in Figure 3.2), that
occurred from June through November 2017, and was approved by the University
of Maryland Institutional Review Board. Due to the study’s sensitive nature, some
details are generalized about defenses and vulnerabilities to protect NYC. Addition-
ally, sensitive information is redacted when quoting participants and generalized job
descriptions so as to not deanonymize participants.
3.2.1 Recruitment
NYC3 leadership sent all of its employees an email that outlined the volun-
tary nature of the study as well as the motivation and goals. The email informed
NYC3 employees that they would be introduced to new techniques that could po-
tentially streamline their daily duties, and that the findings from the study would
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be directly applied to defending NYC3 systems and networks. The study occurred
during participants’ regularly scheduled work hours and participants did not receive
any additional monetary incentives for participating.
3.2.2 Study protocol
The multi-part study protocol is described as follows.
Protocol pilot. Prior to deploying the protocol with participants, researchers
conducted three iterations of the study using non-NYC3 employees (two security
practitioners and one large-organization chief information security officer) to pre-
test for relevance, clarity, and validity. The study protocol was updated based on
pilot feedback and overall study flow. The final protocol described below, derived
from three pilot iterations.
Baseline survey. Establishing a baseline for NYC3 defensive practices allows re-
searchers to compare the security posture before and after the training intervention.
Participants were asked about their specific work role, responsibilities, and demo-
graphics; their understanding of organizational mission statements; which assets
they use to accomplish their daily duties; their sentiment towards NYC3’s current
security posture; and their perceived self-efficacy for performing digital security
tasks.
The 29-question online survey (App. A.1) used a combination of open-ended,
close-ended, and Likert-scale questions. All self-efficacy questions were based on
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best-practices and question-creation guides from established educational psychology
studies [20]. The post-training survey and 30-day follow-up survey used an identical
structure . Capturing self-efficacy before, immediately after, and 30 days after
receiving the educational intervention allowed measurements of how each participant
perceived the model’s efficacy. Measuring efficacy perceptions is important, as self-
efficacy has been shown to be an important component of individual success at
performing job duties in enterprise settings [19]; one key component of self-efficacy
is belief in the efficacy of the tools you use to complete tasks.
Educational intervention. After completing the initial survey, groups of partici-
pants received in-person instruction on the history of CoG, its application as a threat
modeling technique, the CoG process outlined in Section 3.1, and two examples of
applying the framework. Participants completed one of three independent sessions
based on what was most convenient to their work schedule.
The 60-minute educational intervention was based on on fundamentals from
adult learning research and the experiential learning theory (ELT) [118]. Kolb and
Kolb found that adults learn new concepts better through ELT by (1) integrating
new concepts into existing ones, (2) accommodating existing concepts to account for
the new concepts, and (3) “experiencing, reflecting, and acting” to reinforce the new
concepts [118]. Social learning theory (SLT) further supports this process, indicating
that adults learn new patterns of behavior best through direct experience [21]. Thus,
the class was designed to reinforce each concept with a hands-on exercise using
scenarios relevant to the audience and their domain knowledge.
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During the class, the instructor introduced participants to tabular and graph-
based methods performing CoG analysis [197]; both examples are provided in App. B.1.4.
The tabular tool allows users to record their responses to each subtask of the
CoG framework; each section supports data in follow-on sections. The graph-based
method provides users with an alternative, complementary method for eliciting the
same data. Previous research indicates that various learning styles benefit from
multiple forms of data elicitation [118].
During the first classroom example, the instructor guided participants through
a scenario drawn from the Star Wars movie franchise to determine the CoG for the
Galactic Empire. The instructor provided step-by-step instructions for using the
tabular and graphical tools throughout. In the second example, the participants
worked together without instructor guidance to apply CoG and framework tools to
a fictional e-commerce scenario. Both fictitious scenarios are described in App. B.1.
Prior to providing the intervention, the instructor observed NYC3 employees
at work for four days to better understand their operating environment. The in-
structor developed the fictitious scenarios so that they did not reflect any specific
conditions within NYC3. These scenarios served as better tools in lieu of NYC3-
specific scenarios to reduce bias during training that would inadvertently coach
participants towards providing “approved solutions.”
To control for variations in instruction, each group had the same instructor.
The instructor is a member of the research team with extensive subject-matter
knowledge and experience, including six months of formal university training on
threat modeling. The instructor communicated this experience prior to each class
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to establish a baseline of credibility with the group. During each class, participants
could ask questions at any time, and the instructor maintained a running log of these
questions. To maintain consistency across class sessions, the instructor incorporated
answers to these questions at relevant points in future sessions, and emailed the
answers to participants who had attended previous sessions.
Performance evaluation session. After all participants finished the educational
intervention training, they each completed a 60-minute individual session where they
applied CoG to their daily duties. For example, P17 used the framework in his role as
a security analyst to develop plans for better defending NYC endpoint workstations
(See App. B.1.3). This phase of the study provided hands-on reinforcement learning,
as recommended by ELT and SLT [21,118].
Each session was audio recorded and the interviewer provided participants
with clean worksheets and whiteboards for brainstorming (App. B.1.4), and allowed
participants to bring in any notes from the previous educational intervention train-
ing. Without notifying the participants, the interviewer logged task completion
times for each step, in an effort to measure the efficiency of the framework without
putting undue pressure on participants.
The interviewer used the constructive interaction method for communicating
with the participants, asking them to openly communicate throughout each subtask
in Section 3.1 [144]. During each step, the instructor re-stated participants’ previous
verbal comments or documented responses to assist with data elicitation but did
not introduce any new concepts to prevent data bias. For consistency, the same
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interviewer completed all performance evaluation sessions.
At the completion of each session, the interviewer retained a copy of the com-
pleted worksheets, photographed the whiteboards, and returned the original work-
sheets to the participant to help guide their responses for the second online survey.
The aggregated worksheets and time logs support measurements for the actual effi-
cacy of the CoG framework (See Section 3.3.3.2).
The performance evaluation interviewer transcribed responses to the open-
ended questions after each session using the audio recordings. Two researchers
jointly analyzed all open-ended survey questions and each transcription using it-
erative open-coding [199]. In alignment with this process, researchers coded each
research artifact and built upon the codebook incrementally. Researchers resolved
all disagreements by establishing a mutually agreed upon definition for coded terms.
From here, researchers re-coded previously coded items using the updated codebook
and repeated this process until all responses were coded, all disagreements resolved,
and the codebook was stable.
Post-training survey. In this 27-question online survey (App. A.1), conducted
immediately after the performance evaluation session, surveys collected responses
measuring the framework’s actual and perceived efficacy. The survey asked partici-
pants to re-apply CoG to their daily duties, which allowed them to account for any
new details they might have considered since the previous session. Additionally,
surveys asked them to re-evaluate their perception of the NYC3 baseline security
posture and their ability to complete digital security tasks. Using this information,
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it is possible to measure changes in how participants view the organization and their
own abilities [71]. Further, the survey asked participants to evaluate their ability to
complete digital security tasks solely using the CoG framework and and to answer
comprehension questions measuring their current understanding of the framework.
Follow-up survey. The 13-question follow-up survey (App. A.1) measured frame-
work adoption, knowledge retention, and perceived efficacy 30 days after researchers
departed. To measure the extent to which participants adopted CoG analysis with-
out instructor stimulus, surveys asked participants to describe whether and how
they used the information derived from CoG analysis or the framework itself within
their daily duties. These questions allow researchers to understand participants’
ability to apply output from the framework, measure their adoption rates at work,
and measure their internalization of CoG concepts. The survey also continued to
use self-efficacy questions supplemented with survey questions from the technology
acceptance model (TAM) [55].
Long-term evaluation. After 120 days, researchers evaluated the efficacy of
adopted defense plans for protecting NYC3 systems. The evaluation used a com-
bination of NYC3 incident reports and system logs extracted solely from defensive
measures that participants recommended and implemented because of their use
of CoG threat modeling. NYC3 deployed these new defensive measures in “blind
spots,” so each verified intrusion attempt or vulnerability clearly links an improved
security posture to these new defensive measures.
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3.2.3 Limitations
All field studies and qualitative research should be interpreted in the context
of their limitations.
One threat-modeling framework was used in this study: although the sample
represents 37% of the NYC3 workforce, 25 participants (in many cases with no
overlap in work roles) would not have been sufficient to thoroughly compare multiple
approaches. Testing multiple models within participants was impractical due to the
strong potential for learning effects and the need to limit participants’ time away
from their job duties. As such, it is possible that other threat-modeling or training
approaches would be equally or more effective. However, the results still provide
insight as to how threat modeling in general can benefit a large enterprise.
Described in Section 3.3.3.2 below, two NYC3 leaders to jointly evaluated the
defense plans produced by the participants. More, and more independent, evalua-
tors would be ideal, but was infeasible given confidentiality requirements and time
constraints on NYC3 leadership.
The results may be affected by demand characteristics, in which participants
are more likely to respond positively due to close interaction with researchers [96,
167, 212]. This is mitigated through (1) anonymous online surveys that facilitated
open-ended, candid feedback, (2) removing researchers from the environment for
30 days before the follow-up survey, and (3) collecting actual adoption metrics.
Further, there may be selection bias in which those NYC3 personnel most interested
in the topic or framework were more likely to participate because the purpose of
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the study was explained during recruitment,; this is mitigated by asking NYC3
leaders to reinforce that (non-)participation in the study would have no impact on
performance evaluations and by recruiting a large portion of the NYC3 workforce.
NYC3’s mission, its use of pervasive defensive technologies, and its adherence
to common compliance standards indicate that NYC3 is similar to other large orga-
nizations [108,150,151]; however, there may be specific organizational characteristics
of NYC3 that are especially well (or poorly) suited to threat modeling. Nonetheless,
the results suggest many directions for future work and provide novel insights into
the use of threat modeling in an enterprise setting.
TAM has been criticized (e.g., by Legris et al. [123]) for insufficient use cover-
age. Additionally, the positive framing of TAM questions may lead to social desir-
ability biases [62]. To address coverage, surveys use TAM in conjunction with the
Bandura self-efficacy scales for a more complete picture. Moreover, reusing validated
survey items and scales in this study is a best-practice in survey design that has
been shown to reduce bias and improve construct validity [69, 83]. Lastly, surveys
elicited participant feedback with a negative framing explicitly after each perfor-
mance evaluation session, and implicitly when assessing threat modeling adoption
at the 30-day evaluation. Eliciting feedback through negatively-framed mechanisms
allowed participants to provide their perceptions from both perspectives.
For each qualitative finding, a participant count indicates prevalence. How-
ever, participants who did not mention a specific concept during an open-ended
question may simply have failed to state it, rather than explicitly disagreeing. Sta-
tistical hypothesis tests are not used for these questions.
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3.3 Results
Below are the results of the case study evaluating threat modeling in an enter-
prise environment, drawing from transcripts and artifacts from performance evalua-
tion sessions, survey answers, and logged security metrics. Participant demograph-
ics, baseline metrics, immediate post-training observations, 30-day observations, and
observations after 120 days are reported.
The findings are organizaed within the established framework of perceived ef-
ficacy, actual efficacy, and actual adoption [121, 145, 166]. Participants’ perceived
efficacy and belief that they will achieve their desired outcomes directly shape their
motivation for adopting threat modeling in the future [18]. Actual efficacy confirms
the validity of perceptions and further shapes the likelihood of adoption. Lastly,
regardless of perceived or actual efficacy, a framework must be adopted in order to
demonstrate true efficacy within an environment. Through these three measure-
ments, the study provides security practitioners with the first structured evaluation
of threat modeling within a large-scale enterprise environment.
3.3.1 Participants
Qualitative research best practices recommend interviewing 12-20 participants
for achieving data saturation in thematic analysis [84]. To account for employees
who might need to withdraw from the study due to pressing work duties, 28 partic-
ipants were recruited for the study. Of these, 25 participants completed the study
(Table 3.1), above qualitative recommendations, and also reached saturation in the
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ID Duty Position IT Experience Training (yrs) Education
P01 Leadership 16-20 6-10 SC
P02 Data Engr. 16-20 6-10 G
P03 Sec Analyst 11-15 0-5 SC
P04 Sec Engineer 11-15 0-5 BS
P05 Governance 16-20 6-10 SC
P06 Sec Engineer 6-10 11-15 P
P07 Sec Engineer 0-5 6-10 G
P08 Net Admin 21-25 6-10 G
P09 Sec Engineer 11-15 0-5 SC
P10 Sec Engineer 11-15 6-10 BS
P11 Net Admin 16-20 6-10 BS
P12 Sec Engineer 25+ 6-10 G
P13 Sec Analyst 0-5 0-5 BS
P14 Sec Engineer 11-15 0-5 BS
P15 Sec Engineer 16-20 25+ SC
P16 Support Staff 6-10 0-5 BS
P17 Sec Analyst 16-20 16-20 G
P18 Sec Engineer 21-25 16-20 G
P19 Sec Analyst 21-25 6-10 SC
P20 Leadership 11-15 6-10 G
P21 Sec Analyst 0-5 6-10 G
P22 Leadership 11-15 6-10 G
P23 Sec Analyst 16-20 6-10 BS
P24 Leadership 0-5 0-5 BS
P25 Leadership 0-5 0-5 G
Table 3.1: Participant Demographics. The columns show: participant identifiers
(coded by interview date order), duty position, years of IT experience, years of IT
training, and education. The abbreviations in the education column stand for high
school graduate, some college, bachelors degree, associates degree, graduate degree,
and prefer not to answer.
performance evaluation sessions. For the rest of this paper, all results refer to the
25 participants who completed the study. This sample represents 37% of the NYC3
employees as of August 8, 2017.
Technicians such as network administrators and security engineers account for
18 of the participants; the remainder fulfill supporting roles within NYC3 (e.g., lead-
ership, policy compliance, and administrative support). This composition is similar
to the actual work role distribution across NYC3, with 50 of 67 employees serving
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as technicians. Prior to this study, one participant had a high-level understanding
of the military applications of CoG, and none of the participants had any applied
experience using any threat-modeling framework.
All participants had at least some college education, with ten holding a grad-
uate degree and eight holding a bachelor’s. Additionally, 15 possessed at least one
industry certification. Participants had an average of 14.7 years of information tech-
nology and security experience in large organizations, with a mean of 8.5 years of
formal or on-the-job training.
3.3.2 Pre-intervention baseline
A baseline of how participants deployed defensive strategies prior to the train-
ing helps measure the impact of threat modeling within NYC3 systems. Most
commonly, they prioritized defending high-impact service-based systems such as
NYC.gov (n=7) and adhering to compliance frameworks (n=7), followed by ap-
plying risk management strategies (n=6) and assessing which systems are most
susceptible to attack (n=3). Participants reported using the following guidelines
and programs for assessing NYC’s digital security posture: city-specific policies and
executive orders such as the NYC remote access policy [162] (n=6), NIST Cyber-
security Framework [150] (n=4), and NYC3’s one-time accreditation process for
adding new technologies to their network (n=2). Of these guidelines, participants
stated that none of the programs were applied frequently enough, with P5 stating
that “compliance is only as good as your last assessment.” With too much lapsed
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time between audits, defenders cannot establish an accurate assessment of the en-
vironment’s security posture over time. The remainder of respondents (n=13) said
they were unsure about which programs or policies were applicable.
3.3.3 Immediate observations
In contrast to the baseline survey, performance evaluation session observations
and post-training surveys indicate that threat modeling provided participants with
a better understanding of their security environment, that participants felt more
confident in their ability to protect NYC, and that participants could successfully
apply threat modeling relatively quickly with accurate results.
3.3.3.1 Perceived efficacy
Participants’ initial threat modeling perceptions are recorded in the context
of new insights, framework usefulness, and changes in self-efficacy. Participants’
perceptions and beliefs that they will achieve their desired outcome directly shapes
their motivation for adopting threat modeling in the future [18].
New understanding. Overall, 12 of 25 participants reported that threat modeling
allowed them to understand new critical capabilities, requirements, or vulnerabilities
that they had never previously considered. In particular, four participants had never
previously mapped threats to vulnerabilities. P16, a non-technical administrative
support staffer, used threat modeling to understand the implications of wide-open
security permissions on a wiki and networked share drive.
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Threat modeling provided two participants with self-derived examples of why
crisis continuity plans exist for large organizations. P04 stated that this new under-
standing would further assist him with planning for crises, allowing him to recom-
mend to “senior management the plan of action for what should be done first.”
Of the 13 participants who did not report discovering anything new, seven
stated threat modeling was simply a restructured approach to current defensive
concepts like defense-in-depth [132]. Four stated threat modeling did not help them
discover anything new but added additional emphasis to areas they should be con-
cerned with.
Four participants identified an over-reliance on personal relationships (rather
than codified policies) as a critical vulnerability for organizational success, which
conceptually is something none of them had ever before considered. During his
performance evaluation session, P24 discussed how changes in the political environ-
ment from the local to federal level can affect established trust across the GoNYC;
a large turnover in personnel could halt some progress and potentially kill some
initiatives. P25 stated “I had not really considered. . . the impact that some sort of
major, non-cyber event could have on the ability to be successful,” discussing how
a major terrorist event within NYC could decrease NYC3’s ability to sustain criti-
cal requirements and capabilities. Thus, both participants recommended codifying
existing relationship-based agreements into legislation capable of withstanding non-
digital security threats to their daily responsibilities. An example of this includes
establishing a formal memorandum of understanding (MoU) with law enforcement
agencies in NYC to facilitate the exchange of threat indicators.
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Perceived framework usefulness. After completing the performance evaluation
session, 23 participants agreed that threat modeling was useful to them in their
daily work. For example, ten said the framework allowed them to prioritize their
efforts. P24 developed a new litmus test for adding any defensive efforts, stating
that “If the adversary doesn’t care, then it’s all just fluff [inconsequential].” P21
used threat modeling to show “what we’re lacking or what we need to concentrate
[on],” such as standard cyber hygiene.
Eight participants expressed that threat modeling added much-needed struc-
ture and perspective to difficult problems. P11 feels empowered by its structure and
believes it allows him to “accept the things you cannot change, change the things you
can, and have the wisdom to know the difference. I feel [CoG is] along those lines;
this is your world, this is what you control.” He believes threat modeling makes a
positive difference with available resources, while helping to prioritize requests for
future capabilities and support.
Five participants reported that threat modeling allowed them to plan defensive
strategies more effectively. P05 stated that threat modeling helps him “plan effec-
tively, document, track, monitor progress, and essentially understand the security
posture.”
Threat modeling allowed four participants to comprehend how threats can af-
fect systems within their environment; these technicians previously relied upon best
security practices without fully considering threats. While applying the framework,
P10 declared that “insider threats overcome the hard shell, soft core” within most
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enterprise networks and that threat modeling helped him identify new ways to neu-
tralize the impact of insiders bypassing perimeter defenses and exploiting trusted
internal systems.
Four participants stated that purposefully considering their asset inventory
during threat modeling allowed them to fully understand their responsibilities.
Three participants stated that threat modeling provides them with a new appre-
ciation for their position within NYC3. P14 said, “When I did my job, I didn’t
think about what the purpose of the group is [within NYC3]. . . [threat modeling]
aligns what we’re thinking with what I think my role is in this organization.”
Interestingly, both of the participants who did not find threat modeling useful
felt that cybersecurity is too nebulous of a realm for a well-structured approach
like CoG. P12, when asked to clarify his difficulties with the framework, stated
that cloud environments present unique problems for defenders: we care about “the
center keep of your castle, well there’s this other castle somewhere out there, we
don’t know where, [and it is] part of the CoG.” However, these two participants did
successfully use threat modeling to discover critical vulnerabilities within their daily
work that they had not previously considered.
Changes in self-efficacy. When comparing responses from the post-training sur-
vey to baseline responses, 10 participants reported a perceived increase in their
ability to monitor critical assets, 17 reported an increase in their ability to identify
threats, 16 reported an increase in their ability to mitigate threats, 15 participants
reported an increase in their ability to respond to incidents. Respectively, aver-
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ages increased by 8.8%, 19.3%, 29.8%, and 20.0%. Using the Wilcoxon signed-rank
test [226], there were significant increases in participants’ perceived ability to iden-
tify threats (W=61.0, p=0.031), mitigate threats (W=47.0, p=0.010), and respond
to incidents (W=59.0, p=0.027).
3.3.3.2 Actual efficacy
The study measures the actual efficacy of threat modeling using several met-
rics: the accuracy of participants’ output, task completion times, similarities be-
tween participants’ identified CoGs, and the contents of their actionable defense
plans.
Output accuracy. Simply completing CoG tasks is insufficient to demonstrate
success; the resulting output must also be valid and meaningful. Thus, the accuracy
of participants’ results is assessed via an expert evaluation from two NYC3 senior
leaders. Both of these leaders received in-person training on CoG and are uniquely
qualified to assess the accuracy of the provided responses given their intimate knowl-
edge of the NYC3 environment and cybersecurity expertise. The evaluators received
an anonymized set of the study results and asked them to jointly qualify the ac-
curacy of the identified centers of gravity, critical vulnerabilities, threat capabili-
ties/requirements, and ideal defense plans using a 6-point Likert scale ranging from
zero to five with zero being “extremely unlikely (UL)” and five being “extremely
likely (EL)” (See App. A.1). Additionally, the leaders were asked to indicate whether
each ADP was sufficiently detailed to implement. The survey included one fictitious
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Figure 3.3: A cumulative distribution function (CDF) for participant subtask com-
pletion times.
participant entry as an attention check and validity control, which both panel mem-
bers identified and rejected.
The panel concluded that: 22 of 25 identified centers of gravity were accurate
with respect to a participant’s responsibilities (‘EL’=3, ‘Likely [L]’=9,‘Somewhat
likely [SL]’=10); all critical vulnerabilities were accurate for the identified centers
of gravity (EL=6, L=7, SL=12); 23 of 25 threat capability and requirement profiles
were accurate (EL=6, L=7, SL=10), and 24 of 25 actionable defense plans would
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Figure 3.4: Perceived efficacy after using threat modeling for 30 days.
accurately address the identified threats (EL=5, L=11, SL=8).
A logistic regression, appropriate for ordinal Likert data, was used to estimate
the effect of work roles, experience in IT, and educational background on the accu-
racy of the panel results. The regression included a mixed-model random effect [90]
that groups results by work roles to account for correlation between individuals who
fill similar positions. The initial model for the regression included each demographic
category. To prevent overfitting, the regression tested all possible combinations of
these inputs and selected the model with minimum Akaike Information Criterion [7].
The final selected model is given in Appendix B.1.5. The regression results show that
no particular work role, amount of education, IT experience, or combination thereof
enjoyed a statistically significant advantage when using threat modeling. These high
success rates across the demographics support findings by Sindre and Opdahl that
indicate threat modeling is a natural adaptation to standard IT practices [185].
Time requirements. Time required to apply CoG analysis helps to measure effi-
ciency, which is a component of efficacy. On average, participants used the frame-
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work and developed actionable defense plans in 36 minutes, 46 seconds (σ = 9 : 01).
Figure 3.3 shows subtask completion times as a cumulative distribution function
(CDF). Participants spent the greatest amount of time describing critical vulnera-
bilities and developing actionable defense plans, with these tasks averaging 5:27 and
6:25 respectively. Three out of five participants in a leadership role affirmed with-
out prompting that threat modeling provided them with a tool for quickly framing
difficult problems, with P24 stating “within an hour, [CoG] helped me think about
some items, challenge some things, and re-surface some things, and that is very use-
ful for me given my busy schedule.” P22 applied the framework in 22 minutes and
commented during his closing performance evaluation session that he would “need
much more time to fully develop” his ideas; however, he also said the session served
as a catalyst for initiating a necessary dialogue for handling vulnerabilities.
CoG consistency. Analysis of the performance evaluation session results reveals
that participants with similar work role classifications produced similar output. For
example, 16 of 18 technicians indicated that a digital security tool was their CoG
(e.g., firewalls, servers) whereas four of six participants in support roles identified
a “soft” CoG (e.g., relationships, funding, and policies). Participants produced
actionable defense plans averaging 5.9 mitigation strategies per plan and ranging
from a minimum of three strategies to a maximum of 14.
Actionable defense plans. The contents of participants’ actionable defense plans
help to further evaluate success. Participants identified real issues present within
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their environment and developed means for reducing risk. Within the 25 action-
able defense plans, participants cumulatively developed 147 mitigation strategies;
detailed examples are described in Section 3.3.5. Participants indicated that 33%
of the mitigation strategies they developed using threat modeling were new plans
that would immediately improve the security posture of their environment if im-
plemented. Additionally, participants stated that 31% of the mitigation strategies
would improve upon existing NYC3 defensive measures and more adequately defend
against identified threats. Participants felt that the remaining 36% of their described
mitigation strategies were already sufficiently implemented across the NYC3 enter-
prise.
The NYC3 leadership panel indicated a majority of the actionable defense
plans were sufficiently detailed for immediate implementation (‘Yes’= 16). This
shows that, even with limited framework exposure, many participants were able to
develop sufficient action plans. To help illustrate, here is an ADP with insufficient
detail using a security analyst’s plan. After identifying his CoG as an Endpoint
Detection and Response (EDR) system (Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR)
describes a suite of tools focused on detecting and investigating suspicious activities,
intrusions, and other problems on endpoint systems) and applying the framework,
his ADP consisted of three mitigation strategies: “Make sure there is a fail-over
setup and test it. Better change control. Better roll back procedures.” While all
of these address critical vulnerabilities, they provide no implementation details. In
cases such as this, individuals require additional time to improve the fidelity of their
responses or may benefit from expert assistance in transforming their ideas into fully
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developed plans.
3.3.4 Observations after 30 days
After 30 days, participants still had a favorable opinion of threat modeling,
most participants actually implemented defensive plans that they developed through
the study, and that NYC3 institutionalized threat modeling within their routine
practices.
3.3.4.1 Perceived efficacy
Thirty days after learning about CoG, there was a slight decrease in the per-
ceived efficacy of the framework when compared to participant perceptions imme-
diately after training: a 1.47% decrease for monitoring critical assets (W=81.0,
p=0.57), 3.22% decrease for identifying threats (W=131.0, p=0.83), 3.58% decrease
for mitigating threats (W=94.0, p=0.18), and 1.67% decrease for responding to in-
cidents (W=100.0, p=0.59); none of these decreases were statistically significant.
When comparing these 30-day metrics to the baseline, however, participants’ per-
ceived ability to monitor critical assets increased 7.4%, perceived ability to identify
threats increased 16.1%, perceived ability to mitigate threats increased 26.3%, and
perceived ability to respond to threats increased 18.3%. Participants’ perceived
ability to mitigate threats is a statistically significantly increase from the baseline
(W=73.5, p=0.049).
Figure 3.4 shows participants’ evaluations of the efficacy of CoG analysis after
53
30 days. Overall, all participants agreed (“Strongly”= 13) that threat modeling sup-
ports critical aspects of their job. Additionally, 24 participants agreed (“Strongly”=
15) that threat modeling enhances the way they think about digital security. De-
spite the aforementioned decrease in perceived efficacy over the 30-day period, the
number of participants who found the framework useful to their jobs increased from
23 to 24, as NYC3’s adoption of ADPs within their environment caused one partic-
ipant to believe in the framework’s usefulness. Lastly, 245 of 275 responses to the
11 TAM questions indicated threat modeling is valuable for digital security.
3.3.4.2 Actual efficacy
Participants’ knowledge retention helps measure actual efficacy after 30 days.
Measuring knowledge retention allows researchers to evaluate the longevity of organiza-
tional impacts from integrating the framework. After 30 days, participants averaged
78% accuracy on four comprehension questions. This is an increase from 69% im-
mediately after learning the framework, suggesting threat modeling may become
more memorable after additional applied experience. Each comprehension question
required participants to pinpoint the best answer out of three viable responses; this
allowed researchers to measure if participants understood critical relationships. In
the 30-day follow-up, all participants accurately answered the critical vulnerability
question, 23 correctly identified a CoG visually, 17 correctly identified a critical




After 30 days, 21 participants reported that they implemented at least one
mitigation strategy that they developed using threat modeling. In addition, 20 par-
ticipants reported after 30 days that they integrated concepts from threat modeling
within their daily work routines. For example, seven participants now use the frame-
work for continually assessing risk; this is in contrast to the baseline results, where
participants typically assessed risk only during audits and initial accreditation. Five
participants stated that they now use threat modeling to prioritize their daily and
mid-range efforts. Participants who did not adopt said they were too busy with
urgent tasks (n=4) or needed more applied training (n=1).
NYC3 started to institutionalize threat modeling after participants had dis-
cussed their results with one another and realized the important implications of
their findings. One week after completing their performance evaluation sessions,
six participants transformed a wall within their primary meeting room into an “ur-
gent priorities” board (Figure 3.5) for implementing defensive actions that address
critical vulnerabilities identified during this study. Their board facilitates two-week
action periods and improves how the organization communicates the impact of their
progress to senior leaders. NYC3 leaders have since formalized this board using
project management software and other practices such as “demo days” to demon-
strate the viability of their defensive efforts.
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Figure 3.5: NYC3 developed an “urgent priorities” task tracker to address problems
identified in this study.
3.3.5 Observations after 120 days
Observing NYC3’s environment 120 days after the study concluded allows re-
searchers to understand the longer-term impact of threat modeling within live work
environments. In total, NYC3 implemented eight new categories of controls directly
based on the ADPs developed by participants in this study. Additionally, NYC3
provided researchers with access to server logs, their alert dashboard, and vulnera-
bility reports to help measure the actual efficacy of three of these new controls.
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3.3.5.1 Actual adoption
Below a sample set of ADPs that participants derived using threat modeling
are detailed. NYC3 leaders monitored the implementation of these ADPs using
their priorities board, and all mitigation strategies persist within the NYC environ-
ment 120 days after the study. Only provide high-level details about the ADPs are
provided below to avoid placing NYC3 systems at risk.
Testing readiness. Nine participants cited resilient systems as critical require-
ments within their environment, and two identified untested disaster recovery plans
as critical vulnerabilities. To dampen the impact of a cyber attack, natural disaster,
or terrorist attack, they recommended frequently using multiple “fail-over” sites to
validate functionality. Accordingly, NYC3 has begun testing fail-over servers within
their local domain and plans to implement periodic, mandatory readiness tests across
all NYC networks.
Securing accounts. Several participants identified user account permissions – a
fundamental security control in any networked environment – as insufficiently well
managed. Three participants stated that it is common for employees to migrate
across the organization and retain permissions to data shares and assets they no
longer need. NYC3 now directs monthly audits and re-certification of user access to
narrow the impact of insider threats or stolen credentials. Seven participants rec-
ommended implementing multi-factor authentication. As a proof of concept, NYC3
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implemented multi-factor authentication for 80 user accounts within a monitored
subdomain.
Protecting physical network assets. Seven participants determined that if con-
trol measures restricting physical access to networking infrastructure were weak,
it would create critical vulnerabilities. All expressed concern with insider threats
causing damage or stealing data, but they all indicated that the most likely threat
stems from accidental damage. Three participants discussed concerns with inad-
vertent, wide-scale power outages or power surges to networking infrastructure that
could cause some issues to persist for an extended duration. These three partic-
ipants recommended security escorts for all personnel, in addition to multi-factor
access control near all networking infrastructure. Since the performance evaluation
sessions, NYC3 has been working with federal, state, and private-sector entities on
issues related to this topic.
Crowdsourcing assessments. Two participants reported that automated vulner-
ability assessment tools might not detect all vulnerabilities and that manual testing
is needed for identifying more complex issues. Thus, P21 recommended that NYC
establish a bug bounty program for public-facing services to benefit from the col-
lective security community. Because of his recommendation, NYC3 partnered with
a bug bounty service provider to conduct a 24-hour proof-of-concept assessment
against one of its web services.
Sensor coverage. Ten participants acknowledged that the NYC environment is
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far too vast for manual monitoring and that automated sensors play a critical role in
defense. In this situation, a gap in sensor coverage can lead to unprotected systems
or the successful exploitation of known vulnerabilities. Four participants recom-
mended deploying additional EDRs on systems in specific subdomains within which
NYC3 had limited visibility. Within 30 days after the threat modeling training,
NYC3 technicians deployed 1331 new EDR sensors within these subdomains.
Protecting legacy systems. Three participants stated that legacy systems sig-
nificantly impact their ability to secure systems; some were installed five decades
ago and were never intended to be networked. Thus, they recommended segmenting
non-critical legacy systems until they are replaced/upgraded. NYC3 is now work-
ing closely with partners to protect segmented systems and those that must remain
online.
Protecting against data corruption. Participants P02 and P17 identified data
corruption as risks to NYC3 systems. NYC3 technicians now verify the integrity of
each software and indicator of compromise (IOC) update provided by third-party
vendors to prevent the exploitation of update mechanisms, as seen in the 2017
NotPetya malware outbreak [182].
Reducing human error. Human error was another common theme across the
threat landscape. Six participants stated that a simple typo in a configuration
script, like the one that caused the 2017 Amazon S3 outage [9], could have signif-
icant impacts across multiple systems or networks. Three defenders recommended
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two-person change control when updating configuration files on firewalls and EDR
systems. Such controls require one person to propose a change and another to re-
view and implement the change to reduce the likelihood of human error. NYC3 now
enforces two-person change control on all modifications to access control lists.
3.3.5.2 Actual efficacy
Quantitative metrics captured in the 120 days after threat modeling training
empirically support the efficacy of threat modeling. A NYC3 security analyst verified
every intrusion, incident, and vulnerability within these data records. To protect
the operational security of NYC3, specific threats that would enable a malicious
actor to re-target their systems are not mentioned.
Securing accounts. User account logs allow researchers to analyze account hijack-
ing attempts based on the geographic origin of attempts, time frequency between
attempts, and why the attempt failed (e.g., wrong password or invalid token). Over
120 days, NYC3 recorded 3749 failed login attempts; based on frequency and sub-
sequent successful logins, 3731 of these attempts with employees forgetting their
password. Among the remaining failed logins, NYC3 successfully blocked hijack-
ing attempts that originated from a foreign nation against seven privileged user
accounts. Of these seven accounts, the attacker failed at the multi-factor login step
for five accounts and failed due to password lockout on the other two accounts. Prior
to this study, this subdomain did not have multi-factor verification enabled; these
five privileged accounts were protected by mechanisms implemented solely because
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of the introduction of threat modeling.
Crowdsourcing assessments. The 24-hour bug-bounty trial program yielded im-
mediate results. Overall, 17 security researchers participated in the trial program
and disclosed three previously unknown vulnerabilities in a public webserver pro-
tected by NYC3, verified through proof-of-concept examples. NYC3 validated these
vulnerabilities and patched the production systems in accordance with policy and
service-level objectives. After the success of this trial, NYC3 has authorized an
enduring public program that will focus on improving the security posture of web
applications under NYC3’s purview. Such a program is a first for the City of New
York and NYC3, created as a direct result of introducing threat modeling.
Sensor coverage. EDR reports allow researchers to uniquely identify which IOCs
appeared in which systems, their severity level, and frequency of attempts. NYC3
deployed 1331 new sensors to endpoints that were previously unmonitored and were
able to verify and respond to 541 unique intrusion attempts identified by these new
sensors. Of these 541 intrusion attempts, 59 were labeled critical and 135 were la-
beled high severity; NYC3’s partnered vendor security service manually validated
each of these intrusions and verified their severity levels as true positives. One im-
portant aspect to note: if any systems had been infected prior to sensor deployment,
the study would have captured both new intrusion attempts and any re-infection at-
tempts that occurred after NYC3 deployed the sensors for the first time. According
to the lead NYC3 EDR engineer, all 541 of these events could have led to successful
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attacks or loss of system availability if technicians had not deployed the sensors to
areas identified during threat modeling.
3.4 Discussion
This study provides the first structured evaluation of introducing threat mod-
eling to a large-scale enterprise environment. Overall, the findings suggest that
threat modeling, in this case the CoG framework, was an effective and efficient
mechanism for developing actionable defense plans for the NYC3 enterprise. De-
fense plans created using CoG led to measurable, positive results. These results
suggest that even a relatively small amount of focused threat modeling performed
by IT personnel with no previous threat-modeling experience can quickly produce
useful improvements.
Immediately after completing the performance evaluation sessions, 23 par-
ticipants reported that they found the framework useful; after 30 days of use, 24
participants reported finding the framework useful and 20 participants reported reg-
ularly using concepts from threat modeling in their daily processes. In less than 37
minutes on average, the 25 participants developed 147 unique mitigation strategies
for threats to their organization. NYC3 adopted many of these recommendations,
improving their security posture in eight key areas. After 120 days, participant-
designed ADPs blocked account hijackings of five privileged user accounts, blocked
541 unique intrusion attempts, and discovered (and remedied) three vulnerabilities
in public-facing web servers, all of which support that introducing threat modeling
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made NYC3 more secure.
Many of the ADPs that NYC3 employees developed and implemented (Sec-
tion 3.3.5) contain straightforward recommendations, such as applying multi-factor
authentication. This in itself constitutes an important finding: despite adhering
to applicable federal, state, and local compliance standards and “best practices,”
these measures were not already in use. Threat modeling offered the participants
the agility to identify and implement defensive measures not (yet) prescribed in
these standards. In this case, threat modeling helped the organization gain new
perspective on their security gaps and proactively mitigate issues.
Many organizations are currently making significant investments in digital-
security tools and capabilities [49]. The case study of threat modeling, in contrast,
shows promising results that can be achieved by leveraging existing resources, with-
out the need for new technologies or personnel. Further, the approach included
only two hours of employee training, which is expected to be palatable for many
organizations.
3.4.1 Lessons learned
Based on the case study, there are several observations available for the process
of adopting threat modeling in a large organization.
Hands-on learning. Participants indicated that the hands-on approach to teach-
ing threat modeling worked well. After the performance evaluation sessions, without
prompting, 24 of 25 participants said that the personalized, hands-on application
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allowed them to understand the framework better than the educational intervention
classes alone. The logistic regression analysis on participants’ CoG accuracy revealed
a relatively level understanding of the framework across educational backgrounds,
experience levels, and work roles. This suggests that many different practitioners
can potentially benefit from this hands-on approach, supporting findings from Kolb
& Kolb [118] and Bandura [21].
Mentoring and peer partnering. Multiple participants mentioned a desire for so-
cial and organizational support to facilitate the adoption of threat modeling. In their
30-day follow-up surveys, P18 and P24 stated that NYC3 would need organizational
programs in place to aid wide-scale adoption of threat modeling, such as pairing ju-
nior personnel with mentors and facilitating peer-to-peer partnerships. During their
performance evaluation sessions, P09 and P19 both mentioned that threat modeling
would also be useful for integrating new personnel into NYC3. It is hypothesized
that pairing experienced employees with junior personnel could permit mentors to
orient their mentee to the environment and provide context to ongoing defensive
initiatives, all while reinforcing their own understanding of threat modeling.
Further, the NYC3 leadership panel results indicated that 9 of 25 actionable
defense plans were insufficiently detailed for immediate implementation. Peering
would allow small teams to challenge one another and elicit details until results are
adequately robust. This accords with prior studies of threat-modeling techniques, as
well as peer partnering examples from other domains, that demonstrate the benefits
of peer collaboration [47,57,61,77,85,86,103,128,131,134,136,146,154,177].
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Communication with leadership. After threat-modeling training, participants
reported that they were better able to communicate the importance of various
threats to NYC3 leadership. This was reflected in the immediate deployment of
mitigation strategies, as discussed in Section 3.3.5. It is hypothesized that use of
a single threat modeling framework — in this case CoG — across administrative
boundaries may help to facilitate a shared language within the organization for com-
municating about threats. It would be particularly interesting to explicitly evaluate
whether training executive-level leadership along with on-the-ground practitioners
might yield useful communication benefits.
Shortcomings. Knowledge retention results show that participants struggled with
framework-specific terminology; only 17 of 25 participants correctly identified critical
requirements after 30 days. When institutionalizing threat modeling, it may be
helpful to provide learners with quick-reference guides containing relatable examples
to help clarify essential terminology. Additional emphasis on critical requirements
within educational intervention training may help because critical vulnerabilities,
threat capabilities, threat requirements, and actionable defense plans are all derived
using critical requirements. Hands-on learning exercises using with the Eikmeier




Further work is needed to complement and validate study findings. In this
work, I took advantage of a unique cooperative opportunity to evaluate the intro-
duction of an exemplar threat-modeling approach into an enterprise environment.
In future work, comparative evaluation — ideally also in real-world environments —
is necessary to understand the relative effectiveness of different threat-modeling ap-
proaches and may also help to clarify in what situations and environments different
threat-modeling approaches are likely to be most effective.
To this end, threat modeling should be tested in multiple environments, to
understand when and why these frameworks should be applied. Future evaluations
may be able to consider how organization size, experience level and typical work-
load of staff members, organizational culture, and existing threat-modeling and/or
security-analysis processes affect the efficacy of threat modeling. Future work should
also explore less tangible organizational characteristics, such as employees’ under-
standing of organizational objectives, hierarchical structure, lines of communication
within and across groups, and the empowerment given to mid-level leaders.
In summary, study results indicate that introducing threat modeling — in this
case, CoG — was useful for helping a large enterprise organization utilize existing
resources more effectively to mitigate security threats. These findings underscore
the importance of future evaluations exploring when and why this result generalizes
to other real-world environments.
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Chapter 4: Baselining Security: Security Implications of Policies,
Laws, and Regulations
In this chapter1 I present research that focuses on the implications of baseline
compliance security programs on organizations. Proactive baselining is intended
to ensure digital systems are operating at a minimum level of security to defeat
common threats and ensures administrators strictly adhere to practices that sustain
security. In many cases, proactive baselines are mandated by various laws, policies,
or regulations through compliance programs [75, 108, 159, 169]. These compliance
programs are typically one-size-fits-all in applicability and scope, meaning organiza-
tions are left to independently assess which threats they are still vulnerable to and
how to prepare for likely security incidents.
Generally, digital security compliance programs and policies serve as power-
ful tools for protecting organizations’ intellectual property, sensitive resources, cus-
tomers, and employees through mandated security controls. Organizations place a
significant emphasis on compliance and often conflate high compliance audit scores
with strong security; however, no compliance standard has been systemically evalu-
ated for security concerns that may exist even within fully-compliant organizations.
1Published as [192,193]
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Here, I describe the novel approach for auditing exemplar compliance standards
that affect nearly every person within the United States: standards for federal tax
information, credit card transactions, the electric grid, and cloud-based services for
the federal government. Partnered organizations help validate these findings within
enterprise environments and provide first-hand narratives describing impact.
This study reveals that when compliance standards are used literally as check-
lists — a common occurrence, as confirmed by compliance experts — their technical
controls and processes are not always sufficient. Security concerns can exist even
with perfect compliance. Hundreds of issues with varying severity across these stan-
dards exist. Additionally, no clearly-defined process exists for reporting security
concerns associated with compliance standards. Overall, results suggest that audit-
ing compliance standards can provide valuable benefits to the security posture of
compliant organizations.
4.1 Method
In the first step of this study, the researchers comprehensively audited three
compliance standards to identify potential security concerns. To validate these con-
cerns, the study leverages four experts to provide their assessment of the findings.
Through quantitative and qualitative analysis on expert responses, the results iden-
tify discrepancies and also derive additional context for applicability within enter-
prise environments.
This study occurred from October 2017 through September 2018 and was ruled
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not human subjects research by the ethics-compliance office. Due to the sensitive
nature of unmitigated data vulnerabilities within real environments, many findings
are generalized to protect networks and systems.
ID Employment Role Org Size IT Exp (yrs) Edu. Docs
R1 A, G M, R 500 18 MS I,P,N
R2 G M, R 10k+ 16 PhD I,P
R3 A, G*, I M, R 100 20 BS I,N
R4 I M, R 35 15 JD I,P
R5 A, G*, I M, D 100 8 BS I,N
R6 G M, D 100 5 BS I,N
E1 G, I M 150 10 BS I
E2 G M 150 15 MS I
E3 G*, I M, D 1k 18 MS P
E4 A, G*, I R 5k 20 MS N
Table 4.1: Researcher and Expert Demographics. The columns show: participant
identifiers (coded by interview date order), place of employment, work role, em-
ployer’s organization size, years of IT experience, education, and which documents
they evaluated. The abbreviations A/G/I/* in the employment column stand for
academia, government, industry, and previous experience in the indicated sector
respectively. The abbreviations M/R/D in the work role column stand for manage-
ment, research, and development. The abbreviations in the education column stand
for bachelors degree, masters degree, and doctorate (PhD/JD). The abbreviations
I/P/N in the documents column stand for IRS P1075, PCI DSS, and NERC CIP.
4.1.1 Compliance-standard audit
The team of six researchers designed the audit to systematically evaluate three
unrelated compliance standards in a repeatable manner. Each researcher audited
a subset of the standards, with at least three researchers per standard (as shown
in Table 4.1). The objective was to identify issues that might negatively affect
digital security, including policies that expose sensitive information and processes
that create issues due to ambiguous implementation guidance.
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Figure 4.1: Example of recorded security concerns.
To support asynchronous collaboration, each researcher independently logged
their findings (Figure 4.1). This repository maintained a running list of codified
definitions and instructions for researchers to reference throughout the study.
All six researchers conducted a complete audit of IRS Publication 1075, follow-
ing a content-analysis process drawn from social-science research. Each researcher
independently examined each line of the standard. At each of several predeter-
mined milestones within the document (e.g., the end of a section), the researcher
would log their findings, including the section title where the issue was found, the
exact phrase deemed problematic, a short description of the perceived issue, and
references to related, publicly-known issues. If a researcher found multiple issues
within one phrase or section, they logged each separately and each issue was given
a unique identification number (this assisted greatly in performing post-collection
analysis). For every logged issue, all other researchers would indicate (1) if they
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found the same issue independently and (2) whether they concurred with the find-
ing. If there was not unanimous consensus on an issue, the issue was discarded it but
maintained a record of the disagreement (used to calculated inter-rater reliability).
Issues without unanimous agreement were discarded instead of resolving disagree-
ment due to time constraints; future studies using this methodology may choose to
mediate disagreements within the group or use an external expert for conducting
tie-breakers. Mediation may provide addition real-world discoveries that would have
been discarded otherwise.
After each researcher logged all of their independently-discovered security con-
cerns, researchers then calculated the inter-coder reliability — a measure of consis-
tency among independent auditors — for IRS P1075. Researchers used Krippen-
dorff’s Alpha (α) to account for chance agreements [88]. To do this, researchers
normalized all data for ingest into ReCal3, an online inter-rater reliability calcu-
lator. Each individual compliance control is considered an independent item that
researchers could agree (or disagree) upon. For example, each individual compliance
control fell into one of three different categories: (1) all researchers identified and
agreed that the control contains security concerns, (2) all researchers agreed that
the control did not contain security concerns, or (3) there is a disagreement whether
the control contains security concerns.
The first step of normalizing the data for inter-rated reliability was converting
IRS P1075 into a binary matrix, listing each technical control in the document
as a row. Columns in this matrix indicated agreement levels from each of the six
researchers for corresponding control listed in the row (‘1’ indicates research believes
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R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6
Control1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Control2 0 1 0 0 0 1
..
ControlN 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 4.2: Example matrix used for calculating inter-rater reliability in compliance
controls. The columns show: researcher identifiers and whether the researcher in-
dependently assessed a security concern in the security control.
a security concern is present, ‘0’ indicates a researcher believes a security concern
is not present). Using the example shown in Table 4.2, there would be unanimous
agreement that ‘Control1’ has a security concern but a disagreement for ‘Control2.’
Results yielded a reliability of α = 0.815 for P1075; an α value above 0.8 indicates
high reliability [120, 126]. Having developed a reliable auditing process, subgroups
helped parallelize the remaining effort. Four researchers audited NERC CIP 007-
6 and three researchers audited PCI DSS. One researcher (R1) audited all three
guidelines to provide continuity. The subgroups attained α = 0.801 and 0.797
respectively.
Researchers further analyzed the identified issues using iterative open cod-
ing, a process for creating and applying category labels (known as a codebook) to
data [199]. In particular, the researchers who audited each standard coded each
identified issue in that standard for perceived root cause, probability of occurrence,
and severity. Researchers resolved all disagreements among coders and developed
a stable codebook by establishing a unanimously agreed-upon definition for coded
terms, adapting many terms from the Composite Risk Management (CRM) frame-
work [216] and the Information System Risk-based Assessment framework [65]. After
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any revisions to these definitions, researchers re-coded previously coded items, re-
peating this process until researchers coded all responses, resolved all disagreements,
and the codebook was stable.
The final codebook described four root causes for security concerns. A data
vulnerability is an issue that will result in a data breach or compromise of sensitive
information. An unenforceable security control cannot be enforced as written; these
controls should be reworded or removed from the compliance standard. An under-
defined process is an issue explicitly missing instructions or details that are required
for a secure implementation, resulting in security gaps. An ambiguous specification,
in contrast, is vague or ambiguous about some implementation details, such that
different readers could interpret it differently. Some interpretations could potentially
result in either an inappropriate action or inaction. Throughout Sections 4.2.2, 4.3.2,
and 4.4.2, audit findings are detailed using these root causes.
The following terms and definitions are used for probability: frequent occurs
often and is continuously experienced; likely occurs several times; occasional occurs
sporadically; seldom is unlikely, but could occur at some time; and unlikely is as-
sumed it will not occur. The following terms for are used for severity: catastrophic
results in complete system loss, full data breach, or the corruption of all data; critical
results in major system damage, significant data breach, or corruption of sensitive
data; moderate results in minor system damage or partial data breach; and negli-
gible results in minor system impairment. Using a risk assessment matrix adopted
from the CRM framework (Figure 4.2), one can then calculate each issue’s risk level
— a function of probability and severity — as extremely high, high, moderate, or
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Figure 4.2: Security concern risk levels. Levels were assigned based on a Com-
posite Risk Management risk-assessment matrix that includes both probability of
occurrence and impact severity.
low [216].
Best practices suggest that empirical research should be conducted by person-
nel with extensive domain knowledge [171]. Accordingly, the auditing researchers
possess an average of 14.3 years of digital security experience within academia, the
federal government, and industry. Each researcher grounded their audit findings in
their past digital security experiences. Additional information about the data set is
in Appendix B.2.2.
4.1.2 Expert validation process
To obtain external validation of the findings, I established partnerships with
real-world organizations and compliance subject-matter experts to confirm or reject
the findings. Experts were asked to classify the identified issues in one of three cate-
gories: confirmed, plausible, or rejected. A confirmed issue indicates that the expert
has previously observed security concerns associated with the issue or that observ-
able consequences from the issue actively exist within an enterprise environment. A
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plausible issue occurs when the expert has not personally observed security concerns
related to the issue but agrees such security concerns could manifest within other
organizations. A rejected finding indicates that there is no observable evidence of
security concerns related to the issue within a live environment, or that there are
related security factors not considered.
Each expert was asked a series of closed- and open-ended survey questions to
elicit information (detailed in Appendix A.2). In addition to directly validating or
rejecting each issue, the experts were asked to provide additional context from their
personal experience. The experts received the issues in a randomized order, and
received only the referenced section title, exact text from the section, and a short
narrative describing the perceived issue.
After collecting data from each expert and removing rejected findings, the
Wilcoxon signed-rank test is used to compare researchers’ assessment of probability
and severity with the experts’ responses for PCI DSS and NERC CIP 007-6; the
Friedman test (omnibus) with planned pairwise Wilcoxon signed-rank tests helps
compare IRS P1075 responses, which had two expert validators [51, 226]. Open-
ended discussions with the experts were used to discuss similarities and differences
in assessments.
Partner criteria. The following criteria was used for partnering with organizations:
(1) the organization must regularly be subjected to audits, must regularly audit
other organizations, or must contribute to the content of the relevant compliance
standard, (2) the provided validators must have at least two years of experience with
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the relevant standard, and (3) the organization must be able to mediate responsible
disclosure of the findings.
After months of negotiation, researchers established memorandums of under-
standing with three organizations that met the criteria. Leaders within each orga-
nization nominated several compliance experts; each candidate received an email
outlining the voluntary nature of the study as well as the motivation and goals.
Table 4.1 shows the qualifications of the four volunteer experts. Experts completed
their surveys during regularly scheduled work hours and did not receive any addi-
tional monetary incentives for participating.
Issue selection. An essential tenet for partnering with experts is minimizing dis-
ruption to their daily responsibilities. Research suggests that the quality of survey
responses decreases over time, and excessive time away from work may result in
an expert terminating their participation in the study [100]. To this end, surveys
were designed for experts to complete within 60-90 minutes of focused effort; ac-
tual completion time averaged 84.8 minutes. Given the limited pool of experts, this
required the selection of only a subset of the findings to validate; as described in
detail below, the issues were selected to validate semi-randomly, while prioritizing
the extremely-high-risk and high-risk issues.
Pilot. Prior to deploying the protocol with partnering organizations, surveys were
piloted to pre-test relevance and clarity with security practitioners familiar with
auditing and compliance standards. The study protocol was updated based on
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pilot feedback. The finalized questionnaire in Appendix was created after two it-
erations A.2. The two pilot experts currently conduct digital-security penetration
testing against organizations, providing technical remediation recommendations for
discovered security concerns.
4.1.3 Limitations
The recruitment letter and consent waiver explained the purpose of the study.
Thus, there may be self-selection bias in which personnel most interested in the
study were more likely to anonymously participate. However, this may also suggest
that the experts were prepared to think more critically about reported issues.
All of the experts work directly in compliance and their intimate working
knowledge with compliance standards reduces the possibility of demand character-
istics — a condition in which participants unconsciously change their behavior to
perform well within a study [167]. The study questions the validity of the compli-
ance standards that serve as the basis for the experts’ employment. This suggests
that the experts would be in many cases predisposed to underestimate problems
within these standards. Additionally, the validation method does not elicit expert
feedback for false negatives – issues that the original analysis may not have detected.
As such, the expert responses provide a lower bound for validity.
The partnered organizations have similar structures, missions, and technolo-
gies to other organizations that adhere to the selected compliance standards; how-
ever, there may exist specific organizational characteristics that affect their specific
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implementations or inhibit generalizability. As such, validating the presence of the
discovered security concerns within partnered organizations’ environments does not
mean that all organizations adhering to similar compliance standards have security
concerns, and the rejection of one of the findings does not imply that another or-
ganization elsewhere does not have security concerns. Nonetheless, the results can
indicate systemic issues that organizations need to account for when assessing their
levels of digital security risk and provide novel insights into the impact of compliance
standards on digital security in enterprise environments.
Lastly, each compliance was audited standard without considering other secu-
rity controls in complementary documents. For this study, it is assumed that orga-
nizations implement compliance standards perfectly and limit the scope to finding
security concerns in the documents as written.
4.2 Results: IRS P1075
4.2.1 Overview
IRS Publication 1075 provides mechanisms for protecting and controlling ac-
cess to federal tax information. IRS P1075 applies to all U.S. federal, state, and
local agencies that receive Federal Tax Information (FTI) from the IRS or from sec-
ondary sources like the Social Security Administration [108]. Of the three standards
assessed, IRS P1075 is the longest standing, dating back to 1996 [107]. This study
audited the 2016 revision, which was the most current version available at the time.
FTI security potentially affects every federal taxpayer. Organizations such
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of security concerns identified for IRS P1075. Color indi-
cates the type of security concern; each dot indicates by size how many security
concerns were identified with a given type, severity, and probability. Data vulnera-
bilities were most common (n=37).
as the Office of Child Support Enforcement from the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services rely upon IRS P1075 for securing the networked infrastructure
of child support financial records [215]. Companies such as Amazon offer cloud
infrastructure services that are fully compliant with P1075, marketing their virtual
private server services to customers who need a “turn-key” solution for systems that
transmit or receive FTI [10].
P1075 is written for information technology security professionals responsible
for securing FTI. Key provisions include definitions for terms, parties authorized to
access FTI, record-keeping requirements, physical controls for securing data, tech-
nical controls for secure storage/transmission, inspection protocols, and sanctions
for non-compliance. The IRS Office of Safeguards coordinates and conducts compli-
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ance audits of entities possessing FTI. Of the three standards assessed, P1075 has
the weakest sanctions. There are no provisions for the issuance of fines for insecure
practices, and the strictest sanction available to inspectors is data revocation after
failure to adhere to a prescribed corrective action plan. However, non-compliant or-
ganizations can apply for data revocation waivers that extend their access to FTI for
six months; according to the standard as written, this process can continue indefi-
nitely despite continued non-compliance. This process has the potential to minimize
the impact of sanctions while allowing insecure practices to persist. Overall, IRS
P1075 was qualitatively and quantitatively the weakest of three documents assessed
during this study.
4.2.2 Findings
The audit of P1075 identified a total of 81 independent issues across 309 indi-
vidual security controls (Figure 4.3). Of these, two issues presented an “Extremely
High” risk, whereas 13 were “High,” 32 were “Moderate” and 34 were “Low” risk
according to the Risk Assessment Matrix (Figure 4.2). In addition, 15 initially
identified issues were discarded, including 11 discarded when researchers found im-
plementation details that were clarified in later sections of the standard and four
resulting from researcher disagreements. All four issue disagreements related to
nuanced interpretations of ambiguous portions of the standard.
Security concern trends. There are five issues involving portable devices (e.g.,
mobile phones and laptops) and seven involving cloud-based data storage solutions.
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The prevalence of these issues are associated with shifts toward bring-your-own-
device regimes and an increased reliance on cloud-storage solutions over on-premises
servers [76]. These emerging solutions require specialized security measures and cre-
ate inconsistencies with the best security practices that professionals have developed
over the past few decades [201].
Of the 81 issues identified within P1075, Section 9 had 40 technical controls
with security concerns. Of note, Section 9 has several obsolete controls such as
password expiration period requirements (which is shown to encourage insecure
practices such as writing newly rotated passwords near user workstations) [81,205].
In this particular instance, the IRS mandated organizations to make a worse security
decision than the decision they might have made in the absence of P1075. Below are
detailed examples of findings based on their associated root cause.
Data vulnerability. There are 37 issues that would establish conditions for a
data breach if controls and processes are implemented as described in the publica-
tion. One example in Section 9.3.6.8 outlines processes for restoring backups once
a compromise in a live system has occurred. As written, P1075 does not require
technicians to verify the integrity of backups before restoration, meaning that tech-
nicians could revert to a state that an attacker has already infected (giving them
persistent access) or revert to a vulnerable state that an attacker could re-exploit,
reestablishing access to sensitive data [173]. Real-world trends stemming from ran-
somware support the urgency of backup integrity checks [180]. This high-risk issue
has a likely probability and moderate severity.
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Section 9.3.5.11 includes provisions for user-installed applications. Environ-
ments that store or transmit FTI should be highly secure and should only be used
for FTI — other functions and services should occur outside the FTI environment.
As such, there should be little to no need for user-installed software, especially
given that users are one of the primary vectors for introducing malware into en-
vironments [3]. Section 9.3 should instead mandate application whitelisting for
installation attempts, limiting the subset of authorized applications that anyone
can install on the system. A more stringent recommendation would include revok-
ing user-installation privileges altogether, forcing trusted system administrators to
establish a safe baseline of applications allowed to interact with FTI. This high-risk
issue has a likely probability and critical severity that can place FTI at risk.
There is an extremely-high-risk issue within Section 1.4.4 “Information Re-
ceived From Taxpayers or Third Parties,” which limits the responsibility for secur-
ing FTI. According to this section, the IRS is only responsible for securing data
originating from the IRS as FTI, excluding data received from customers like fed-
eral tax returns. Additionally, this section includes provisions for removing FTI
protections on data if an entity replaces IRS-sourced FTI with the exact same infor-
mation sourced from another party. This is analogous to eliminating protections for
top-secret government data simply because the same information can be bought on
the black market. This mandated behavior allows organizations to bypass security
measures and remove protections on the data P1075 is meant to safeguard. P1075
should enforce protection for all FTI, regardless of source.
Section 1.4.3 defines certain data as personally identifiable information (PII)
82
but does not protect the names of individuals associated with the person filing
the return – such as a spouse or dependent. This high-risk issue may allow an
attacker, for example, to develop a targeted spearphishing campaign against an
individual. The definition of PII should expand to include sensitive information
about all persons listed.
Unenforceable controls. There are three controls that are unenforceable. For
example, Section 4.7 provides several measures for secure telework access to FTI.
P1075 provides many requirements for physical data protections, such as badge-
based control and on-premises guards; these are infeasible in the case of telework, as
most personnel with FTI access at their private homes cannot abide by these types
of controls. Additionally, IRS inspections of private residences for physical security
compliance seems fraught with complications. Either the IRS should ban residential-
based telework programs until it can verify that all locations with FTI access are
compliant with physical security requirements, or that the standard acknowledge
that these physical controls are not actually required. This high-risk issue has a
frequent probability and moderate severity.
Under-defined process. There are 27 issues that reflect processes that are not
sufficiently detailed for a secure implementation. One such issue within Section 8.3
states that “every third piece of physical electronic media must be checked to ensure
appropriate destruction of FTI.” Given the disparate possible sizes of electronic
media, this particular section should recommend accounting for logical storage size
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of the media instead of its physical instantiation. This would ensure that media
with larger storage volumes are highly prioritized for destruction validation. This
issue has a moderate-severity, moderate-risk issue with a likely probability.
One low-risk issue occurs in Section 1.4.7, which limits human access to FTI
based on “need to know” but does not consider machines or systems with a “need
to access” data. Administrators must limit system access to FTI to prevent unau-
thorized access or manipulation of data, especially for systems performing aggregate
analysis that may inadvertently disclose sensitive information.
Section 9.3.13.3 covers background checks for personnel with access to FTI.
The researchers assessed that this section could create information gaps at the fed-
eral, state, and local levels. For example, information about an individual who mis-
handled sensitive data at a previous job may never have entered federal databases.
These extremely-high-risk information gaps increase likelihood for insider threats
and risks to data, and highlight the need for aggregating multiple sources of data
for thorough background checks.
Section 9.3.5.8 has an issue, which outlines a procedure for establishing an
Information System component inventory (i.e., a listing of authorized devices that
operate within an organization). As written, this procedure does not require the
inventory process to be tied to a “ground truth,” meaning there is no comparison
of which devices should be operating within an organization with which devices
actually are. This is dangerous, as it could permit a rogue system to persist on a
network or even be inventoried as a legitimate system. Providing a rogue system with
legitimate access within a sensitive environment obviates the need for an attacker
84
to deploy malware within the environment and reduces the likelihood that any
defensive sensors would ever detect anomalous activity from the attacker. This
moderate-risk issue has an occasional probability and moderate severity. Industry
recommendations integrate asset inventory with supply acquisition, ensuring that
only company-purchased, legitimate systems are on the network [25].
Ambiguous specification. There are 14 issues involving insufficient details that
create ambiguity or uncertainty throughout P1075. P1075 uses vague terms such
as “significant change” throughout, without ever defining thresholds that auditors
deem to be significant. As an example, Section 9.3 outlines “Access Control Policy
and Procedures” that must be reviewed (by whom?) every three years or whenever
a significant change occurs. This subjectivity allows reviewers to deem any or all
changes insignificant to circumvent a change review. Additionally, the document’s
use of passive voice clouds the responsibility for conducting the review — ambigu-
ous controls can create security gaps through inaction. Each mandate should use
active voice and assign a responsible individual (e.g., an office manager or system
administrator) for each requirement. As presently written, an individual who works
in an organization’s talent recruiting department with no security training would
be a sufficient reviewer for access-control policy. These moderate-risk issues have a
likely probability and moderate severity.
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4.2.3 Expert validation
For assessing the validity of the IRS P1075 audit, the findings were exported
to New York City Cyber Command (NYC3) for evaluation. NYC3 is a city gov-
ernment organization that oversees the cybersecurity of 143 separate departments
and agencies as well as more than 300,000 people. In addition to defending NYC
against cybersecurity threats, NYC3 is responsible for ensuring compliance with
government-mandated policies. In particular, the NYC3 team includes five full-
time employees and three consultants who focus solely on security compliance. Each
of the 143 departments within the city government also has an internal, full-time
compliance teams.
IRS P1075 applies to the vast majority of these 143 entities. NYC3 advises
other NYC entities on P1075 compliance and is also subjected to IRS audits. Two
NYC3 governance and compliance officials assessed the validity of the findings with
respect to a particular subdomain under NYC3’s purview that must comply with
P1075 standards. This subdomain consists of a controlled internal network that
contains FTI and supports approximately 150 users. NYC3’s last formal P1075 audit
was in January and February 2018, where three on-site auditors used the standard
as a line-by-line checklist to assess NYC3’s compliance. Of note, preparation for
this inspection consumed the compliance team as well as several technicians for
approximately four months prior to their inspection date.
Because of their limited time availability, these two NYC3 compliance officials
(hereafter referenced as Experts E1 and E2) assessed 20 issues (25% of the total 81
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issues). In order to cover issues at all risk levels but prioritize significant concerns,
the evaluation included both extremely-high-risk issues, and then randomly sampled
10 of the 13 high-risk issues, four of the 32 moderate issues, and four of the 34 low-
risk issues.
When validating P1075 issues, E1 and E2 were able to directly examine their
network for the presence of security concerns caused by issues identified by the
researchers, in a kind of white-box penetration test [74]. This was possible because,
unlike E3 and E4, E1 and E2 are officials with administrator privileges within the
audited subdomain. The two experts analyzed the findings independently and did
not discuss their findings with one another during the study. Overall, these experts
confirmed 17 of the findings, rejected two issues, and indicated one issue could be
plausible within their own or another environment.
When comparing the risk estimates to those of E1 and E2, there was found
no statistical difference between severity estimates (omnibus p = 0.54), but the
researchers assessed issues to be statistically more likely with medium effect (p =
0.0001, 0.034, < 0.0001; r = 0.485, 0.336, 0.533 for omnibus and then pairwise
researchers vs. E1, E2 respectively). E1 indicated that his knowledge of current
and on-going initiatives most likely biased his responses, making it hard for him to
follow instructions to consider each issue only “if standard is followed as written and
nothing else” (as written in Appendix A.2). This response supports the notion in
Section 4.1.2 that participant-validated responses represent a lower-bound for this
study.
The issue that E1 and E2 classified as plausible rather than confirmed comes
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from Section 1.4.7 “Need to Know.” E2 indicated that NYC3 data scientists in-
corporate the principle of least privilege for systems, service accounts, and user
accounts, which would prevent unauthorized access and manipulation of FTI. E1
added that NYC3’s PKI infrastructure assists with controlling access to “need to ac-
cess” data. Both participants indicated they were unsure if this security concern was
ever present within NYC3, but that it could be present within other organizations.
E1 and E2 rejected the finding for Section 1.4.3 PII, indicating NYC3 always
encrypts entire tax records while in transit and rest, and that this is standard
practice for organizations with access to FTI. Thus, associated individuals’ PII
are always protected, invalidating the finding. However, because this is not codified
within P1075, there is no certainty that other organizations adhere to this “standard
practice.”
NYC3 also rejected the finding associated with Section 9.3 background checks.
E1 indicated that it is standard practice to aggregate personnel records from the
locations an individual has lived or worked to determine if the individual should
have access to sensitive information, thus rejecting the finding. Because P1075 does
not mandate data sources or how far back in history to consider, there is no certainty
that other organizations conduct this practice.
Additional defenses. E1 and E2 identified several controls pervasive throughout
NYC3 that help reduce or eliminate the impact of many of the researcher findings.
Of note, NYC3 requires a Change Control Board (CCB) that E2 believes “is an
essential risk-mitigating factor” for addressing many of the confirmed P1075 security
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concerns, such as Section 9.3.5.11 “User-Installed Software.” The CCB evaluates all
user requests for system modifications and holistically considers the change’s impact
to security. If the CCB approves the change, it authorizes a trusted administrator
to conduct the software installation and adds the change to the system’s secure
baseline. Additionally, NYC3 incorporates a real-time, automatic asset manager
which alerts their Security Operations Center any time a new device is added to
their networks. This defensive strategy eliminates the security concern identified in
Section 9.3.5.8 “Information System Component Inventory.”
It is important to note that these defenses employed at NYC3 exceed the
baseline security standards required by P1075 and mitigate issues that P1075 either
fails to account for even causes. One cannot assume that all organizations will
recognize the need for these additional mitigations and be willing to invest in them.
4.3 Results: PCI DSS
4.3.1 Overview
The Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) applies to all
entities that store, process, and transmit credit-card-holder data for major branded
credit cards [169]. Guidance in this standard includes building and maintaining
a secure network and systems, protecting cardholder data, and monitoring/testing
networks. PCI DSS v1.0 dates back to 2004 as a program led by Visa; the PCI Se-
curity Standards Council (SSC) was formed in 2006 by American Express, Discover,
JCB International, MasterCard and Visa to enhance PCI DSS [169]. Researchers
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audited the 2016 v3.2; v4.0 was in development during this study.
PCI DSS affects every person within the United States who makes credit card
purchases and every organization that accepts credit card payments. A U.S. Federal
Reserve study showed that consumers spent $5.98 trillion with credit cards in 2016,
highlighting the importance of securing the systems that support those financial
transactions [214]. PCI DSS authors designed the document to be accessible to
assessors and the technicians charged with implementing the technical controls.
Qualified Security Assessors perform PCI DSS audits after attaining the ap-
propriate inspection certifications. According to one such assessor (not an author
or an expert validator), audit frequency varies for merchants and service providers
depending on their number of supported annual transactions [149]. On-site audit
teams vary from one to three personnel per inspection; these personnel focus full-
time on auditing the PCI DSS compliance of other organizations. The assessor
indicates that penalties for non-compliance are common, but vary in size based on
the severity of infraction and size of customer base. Monthly fines that can range
from $5,000 to $100,000 and continue until compliance issues are resolved. If a data
breach occurs as a result of non-compliance, companies may be responsible for con-
sumer services (e.g., credit monitoring) or may have payment-processing privileges
revoked.
90
Figure 4.4: Distribution of security concerns identified for PCI DSS. Color indicates
the type of security concern; each dot indicates by size how many security concerns
were identified with a given type, severity, and probability. Under-defined processes
were most common (n=29).
4.3.2 Findings
Within the 851 independent controls specified by PCI DSS, 46 security con-
cerns were identified: eight high-risk, 22 moderate-risk, and 16 low-risk (as shown
in Figure 4.4). Six other potential issues were discarded, all of which were under-
defined processes that did not result in any insecure practices or conditions.
Security concern trends. There are four issues related to improperly identify-
ing sensitive information. PCI DSS focuses heavily on protecting primary account
numbers (PANs) that are tied to credit cards but fails to protect other information
that could lead to PAN access, such as passwords or password-recovery information.
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Additionally, there are 10 issues involving technical controls that lack timelines for
required action. For each required action, the standard should specify either a fixed
interval for repetition or for a triggering event with an ensuing deadline. Below are
discovered PCI DSS issues, organized according to perceived root cause.
Data vulnerability. There are seven security concerns that could establish condi-
tions for a data breach. One example of a high-risk vulnerability stems from Section
1.4, which includes mandates for securing personal computing systems within the
cardholder data environment (CDE). Security professionals should disallow personal
electronics within the CDE network segment; more broadly, all services and systems
should be limited by “need to access” cardholder data. Personal devices and activ-
ities increase the likelihood of malware or other unauthorized access and generally
are not necessary within CDE network segments [3]. This security concern has a
likely probability and critical severity.
A tangentially-related moderate-risk security concern stems from the “Net-
work Segmentation” section of PCI DSS, which scopes the standard’s safeguards to
only the network segment that contains cardholder data. Effectively, this provision
would allow an organization with no security controls outside of the CDE to pass an
audit as long as the CDE itself is protected in accordance with PCI DSS specifica-
tions. Allowing vulnerable servers and systems within the same network as the CDE
could provide attackers with a landing point into internal portions of the network
and establish conditions for lateral movement into the CDE from adjacent network
segments (through well-known attacks such as VLAN hopping). Due to the series
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of security holes that must be present for such an attack to occur, the exploitation
of this vulnerability should be seldom but critically severe for affected systems.
Another data vulnerability is present within the “PCI DSS Applicability In-
formation” section, where PCI DSS defines sensitive authentication data. PCI DSS
does not consider passwords to be sensitive authentication data and does not protect
information an attacker could use to reset service passwords (e.g., email addresses,
Social Security Numbers, and dates of birth). The social engineering attack against
Naoki Hiroshima’s @N Twitter account leveraged similar pieces of information to
access protected accounts [95]. Given that publicly-available articles detail how un-
protected information can lead to unauthorized access, this security concern has a
moderate severity and likely probability.
Under-defined process. There are 29 issues with process specifications that are
insufficient for a secure implementation. Section 3.2.1 calls for assessors to select
a sample of system components and examine data sources to detect cardholder
data that is improperly stored. Sampling is an insufficient process, considering the
simplicity of searching for cardholder data that adheres to a well-known format.
Assessors should be mandated to use automated tools on all CDE systems to detect
improperly stored cardholder data. Based on the moderate severity of exposed
cardholder data and the frequent likelihood insufficient checks occurring, this issue
has a high-level risk.
PCI DSS features two high-risk under-defined processes in “Requirement 5:
Protect all systems against malware and regularly update anti-virus software or
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programs” and Section 5.1. These sections rely solely on antivirus to prevent mal-
ware infections. Numerous data breaches have shown that antivirus alone cannot
protect against all malware [40]. These limited-scope requirements leave organiza-
tions exposed to multiple attack vectors that will most likely occur frequently and
have moderate severity. These sections should mandate additional controls such
as application whitelisting, blocking access to areas that permit persistence (e.g.,
Windows Registry Keys), and enforcing least-privilege access.
Section 1.3.7 focuses on limiting the disclosure of private, internal IP addresses
from firewalls and routers, but fails to discuss any other services that could leak the
same information, such as a domain name server or internal files (e.g., Word doc-
uments) improperly exposed to search engines. Attackers have leveraged common
techniques such as “Google Hacking” to discover internal network configurations
and sensitive systems like a domain controller [127]; expanding the scope of this
moderate-risk issue to limit external enumeration would improve its security.
Sections 11.1.c and 11.1.d actually incentivize less-secure practices. Each sub-
section defines additional audit checks that an assessor must conduct only if a par-
ticular security control is in place (wireless scanning and automated monitoring,
respectively). Under this policy, financial sanctions associated with non-compliance
could lead a security professional not to implement a security control at all rather
than risk having it assessed as non-compliant — if it is not present, the organization
is automatically compliant. These two particular controls would have a negligible
overall impact if they were not in place; therefore, this is a low-risk issue. If the
PCI SSC believes these security controls are important, they should be mandatory
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rather than optional; otherwise, these sections should be eliminated entirely.
Ambiguous specification. There are 10 issues within PCI DSS in which insuf-
ficient details create ambiguity or uncertainty. An example of a high-risk security
concern with a frequent probability and moderate severity stems from Section A1.1
and limits the usage of Common Gateway Interface (CGI) scripts to control priv-
ileged access to cardholder data. This control is sound but is overly narrow; in
modern systems, there are a variety of applications that could access or manipulate
cardholder data in ways similar to CGI scripts. Simply replacing “CGI scripts” with
“applications” would improve the clarity of this control.
Section 11.3.3 discusses corrective action plans for vulnerabilities discovered
during penetration tests. The section does not specify how soon after a penetration
test vulnerabilities must be addressed, nor the party responsible for fixing the vul-
nerabilities. Based on the researchers’ past experiences with organizations delaying
remediation, this security concern has a high risk level with a frequent probability of
occurring and a moderate severity. Moreover, the non-validator assessor confirmed
that in his experience, organizations often delay remediation, and typically dedicate
one to two full-time employees for 30-40 days prior to an inspection to ensure reme-
diation is complete just in time [149]. This section should specify a time limit (based
on vulnerability severity) for addressing issues discovered during a penetration test
and clarify the party responsible for fixing the vulnerable condition.
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4.3.3 Expert validation
To assess the PCI DSS findings, researchers partnered with an organization
that is a PCI SSC member. Expert E3 represented this organization, possessing 18
years of experience advising the security practices of large financial organizations,
assessing organizations’ adherence to PCI DSS security controls, and conducting
digital security assessments against networked environments. E3 confirmed past
utilization of PCI DSS as a line-by-line checklist as they audited organizations in
the past.
E3 was asked to assess all eight high-risk issues and a randomly-sampled subset
of seven moderate issues and five low-risk issues; this accounts for 43% (20 of 46)
of the issues from the audit. E3 confirmed 18 of the issues and categorized the
remaining two as plausible, although he had not experienced them.
There was no statistical difference between probability estimates between E3
and the auditors (p = 0.77),but E3 assessed issues to be statistically more severe
with medium effect (p = 0.003, r = 0.469). During the post-survey discussion
with E3, he stated that the financial impacts of digital security breaches involving
cardholder data caused him to increase his assessed impact of each issue — had these
issues been present within another business sector, E3 would not have assessed them
as severely.
The first issue assessed as plausible rather than confirmed involves Section
1.3.7 and information disclosure. E3 indicated that internal data exposure is “in-
consequential if boundary configuration is correct,” meaning an administrator is
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successfully limiting which inbound connections from external entities are allowed
to communicate with private IP addresses. However, E3 acknowledged that the
security concern would exist if these additional controls are not in place.
The second issue E3 flagged as plausible rather than confirmed involves Section
5.1’s reliance on anti-virus software. According to E3, organizations have lessened
reliance on anti-virus for protection; he argued that Section 5.1 would have minimal
impact on organizations with defensive strategies for protecting network segments,
user accounts, and key resources.
Additional defenses. E3 recommended account-protection solutions such as multi-
factor authentication to mitigate concerns such as VLAN attacks or insufficient
protection of passwords.
As discussed for P1075 above, both the issues E3 assessed as only plausible and
his recommended additional defenses hinge on additional security controls beyond
the PCI DSS standard; one cannot necessarily assume non-mandated controls will
be applied.
4.4 Results: NERC CIP 007-6
4.4.1 Overview
The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Reliability Stan-
dards define the requirements for planning and operating North American bulk
power systems (BPSs), defined as large interconnected electrical systems consisting
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of generation and transmission facilities and their industrial control systems [159].
All BPSs within the continental United States, Canada, and the northern portion
of Baja California, Mexico must comply with NERC Reliability Standards, mean-
ing that these security controls affect most people living within these areas. The
NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Committee, which oversees the set
of standards, comprises representatives from 30 companies and municipalities across
North America [160]. Although NERC is an international not-for-profit, its regu-
latory authority stems from section 215(e) of the Federal Power Act and Title 18
Code of Federal Regulations §39.7. The set of standards that make up CIP date
back to 2009; in this study, auditors used CIP 007-6, which is the 2014 revision of
the Systems Security Management standard. CIP 007-6 includes key sections for
securing ports and services, patch management, malicious code prevention, event
monitoring, and access control.
NERC Regional Entities are the organizations responsible for conducting au-
dits and monitoring adherence to the compliance standards within their assigned
geographic region. On-site audits typically last one week and occur every three
years. Accordng to the expert validator E4, a NERC Regional Entity employs four
to seven auditors per assessment, drawn from a pool of full-time employees. Audi-
tors typically conduct 7-30 audits per year. E4 also noted that organizations allocate
a large portion of their operating budgets toward compliance and often spend one
year preparing for their audit.
Of the three standards assessed, NERC has the strongest sanctions (which can
actually create security concerns, as discussed in Section 4.4.3). The maximum fine
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for a compliance violation is $1M (U.S.) per day; NERC or the applicable Regional
Entity determines the monetary fine [158]. According to the expert participant,
fines for NERC non-compliance are common. Recently, NERC levied a $10M fine
against Duke Energy for 127 security infractions between 2015 and 2018 [91].
Qualitatively and quantitatively, CIP 007-6 had the strongest security controls
of the three documents assessed (shown in Figure 4.5), but numerous issues exist
that create security gaps within compliant organizations.
4.4.2 Findings
NERC CIP has 79 individual controls. The internal audit identified 21 total
issues: one extremely-high-risk, four high-risk, six moderate-risk, and 10 low-risk.
One additional issue was discarded as a duplicate entry.
Security concern trends. Seven of the 21 issues identified deal with overly vague
terms such as “when feasible” or “unnecessary” without defining feasibility or ne-
cessity. For example, Section 5.7 calls for limiting authentication attempts or gen-
erating alerts when feasible. The subjectivity of these statements can lead to mis-
interpretations of the standard and potentially permit insecure actions. Mandatory
compliance standards should be mandatory; either administrators must limit au-
thentication attempts or it is merely a suggestion. Additionally, none of the 21
issues identified specify which entity is responsible for specific actions, which can
lead to inaction. Notably, NERC identified “confusion regarding expectations and
ownership of tasks” as a key problem contributing to Duke Energy’s non-compliance
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Figure 4.5: Distribution of security concerns identified for NERC CIP 007-6. Color
indicates the type of security concern; each dot indicates by size how many security
concerns were identified with a given type, severity, and probability. Under-defined
processes were most common (n=20).
and eventual fine [91]. Below details examples of findings, organized by their per-
ceived root cause.
Data vulnerability. Based on the assessment, CIP 007-6 only has one moderate-
risk issue pertaining to a data vulnerability. Section 5.1 states that administra-
tors should “[h]ave a method(s) to enforce authentication of interactive user access,
where technically feasible.” This caveat allows legacy equipment with no provision
for authenticating authorized users to endure within a secure environment. It is
well-documented that legacy systems often have no password, transmit unencrypted
passwords, or never change passwords from their default settings [48]. This permits
attackers and insider threats to easily gain control of legacy systems, which could
range from sensitive databases to the logical system “off switch.” Secure, authenti-
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cated access should be a hardware and software requirement for all systems in this
critical environment, reducing the likelihood of such an attack.
Under-defined process. The remaining 20 issues involve processes that are not
sufficiently detailed for a secure implementation. Section 2.1 has an extremely high
risk, as written, due to the critical severity and frequent probability of a security con-
cern occurring within critical environments. The issue involves the implementation
of a patch management program for improving the security of systems. Through-
out all of the NERC CIP documents, no mandate exists that organizations must
maintain a representative test environment for patch evaluation. Applying patches
directly to live systems that provide power — including to critical infrastructure
such as hospitals — could result in outages and corresponding loss of life; one such
incident occurred in March 2008 and caused a nuclear power plant to shutdown [119].
Testing patches prior to live deployment allows administrators to observe potential
effects within their environment and reduce the likelihood that unforeseen outages
will occur as the result of the patch [211].
There is a potential loophole in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, which rely upon vali-
dated sources for patches against known vulnerabilities. If the entity responsible for
patching systems does not provide sources, then there is no requirement for patch-
ing. Additionally, CIP 007-6 does not account for patches from external sources
beyond the list of valid providers. Do administrators have a requirement to ap-
ply a patch for a known vulnerability if it is from an outside source? According
to Cardenas, there are instances where applying a patch may violate the certifica-
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tion of certain control systems [39]. This loophole presents a high risk due to the
critical severity associated with unpatched systems in these environments and the
occasional probability of their presence.
Section 5.3 requires administrators to “identify individuals who have autho-
rized access to shared accounts.” Shared accounts have a moderate-risk threat, as
administrators are unable to deploy granular controls on a by-need basis. Shared
accounts also inhibit auditing, as the compromise of a privileged shared account
could lead to the spread of malware or outages that administrators cannot posi-
tively attribute to one individual. Researchers from Sandia National Lab identified
this security concern in 2003 [188].
Section 5.4 outlines provisions that allow systems to retain their default user-
names and passwords if documentation supports that the “vendor passwords were
generated pseudo-randomly and are thereby unique to the device.” The auditors be-
lieve that vendor-generated pseudorandom credentials can present a threat to BPSs
if the pseudorandom algorithm is predictable (e.g., basing its seed on a unique identi-
fier such as a serial number). This type of exploit requires in-depth knowledge about
the vendor’s algorithm and might seldom occur despite posing a moderate risk to
the environment. Compliance authors should eliminate this provision entirely and
mandate that administrators change all system credentials before allowing a system
to communicate with a BPS.
There is a high-risk issue in Section 4.3 concerning event log retention. CIP
007-6 requires facilities to retain 90 days of consecutive logs and demonstrate proof of
such practice over a three year period. This relatively short-term rolling requirement
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can interfere with incident investigations, given that advanced persistent threats
can operate within networks for years before being detected [2, 220]. Organizations
should be mandated to ship logs to a data warehouse for long-term storage and
investigation support if needed.
4.4.3 Expert validation
A government organization that focuses on national security issues assisted in
validating the CIP 007-6 findings. Expert E4, as the organization’s representative,
has 20 years of experience conducting digital security assessments against BPSs.
E4 confirmed first-hand utilization of NERC CIP standards as a checklist for past
audits. E4 has served on numerous executive councils and federal-level panels ad-
dressing cybersecurity concerns within industrial control systems. Most notably, E4
was a contributing author to many of the NERC CIP standards.
Due to the complexity of NERC CIP, the 60- to 90-minute survey could include
only nine audit findings (43%). The extremely-high risk issue and all four high-risk
issues were included, and included two randomly-sampled moderate-risk and two
low-risk issues. Of these, E4 confirmed one issue and one broader trend, rejected
one issue, and categorized the remaining seven issues as plausible.
When comparing the auditors’ risk estimates to those of E4, there was no
statistical difference between severity estimates (p = 0.18),but the auditors assessed
the issues to be statistically more likely with a large effect (p = 0.01, = 0.603). E4,
addressing these comparison differences, indicated that CIP 007-6 relies heavily on
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the broader framework of CIP standards and that security controls in other CIP
documents help harden the overall environment. Like E1, E4 commented that he
was unable to assess CIP 007-6 only “if standard is followed as written and nothing
else,” as directed (Appendix A.2). As such, E4 indicated that he rated each issue
as less likely given his broader understanding of the compliance framework.
The issue E4 rejected involves the loophole identified in Sections 2.1 and 2.2
for patch management. E4 stated that “each item in the [system] baseline needs
a source identified or evidence that a source no longer exists.” In his experience,
he never encountered an external source that could provide a trusted, proprietary
patch. However, E4 acknowledged that if a component is no longer supported or a
source no longer exists, it is highly likely that the component will remain unpatched
against all future publicly-disclosed vulnerabilities.
E4 confirmed the log-retention issue identified in Section 4.3, attributing the
known gap between log retention and investigation windows to two factors. Pri-
marily, the specification is written to account for the limited log retention capacity
on most devices within a BPS environment. Second, most administrators and BPS
owners are unwilling to connect to and aggregate event logs on an external plat-
form. Placing an additional device within the environment (for logging) increases
the number of devices an attacker can exploit and is one more device potentially
subject to financial sanctions.
E4 also confirmed the risks of not specifying a responsible party for tasks, a
trend the researchers identified, and referenced the aforementioned Duke Energy
fine as an example.
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Additional defenses. E4 noted that the best additional defense for mitigating the
issues identified was to upgrade system components to more modern devices that
can implement up-to-date best practices (e.g., multi-factor authentication, strong
passwords, limiting login attempts. As with P1075 and PCI DSS, organizations that
only meet the minimum required by the standard will not be able to take advantage
of these defenses. E4 confirmed that while some facilities exceed this “minimum
baseline” and systematically replace obsolete devices, he has also audited facilities
that only follow the standard exactly as written.
Other recommendations. E4 described additional security concerns that the au-
ditors did not identify. Subsets of NERC CIP security controls apply to BPSs based
on how much power the system produces, creating three tiers of compliance: the
highest tier of power producers are subject to all security controls, while the lower
tiers of power producers must comply with decreasing subsets. E4 believes this per-
versely allows attackers to use publicly-available information to locate facilities that
must adhere to fewer security controls and then systematically target the controls
that may not be present. E4 therefore argues that NERC must standardize controls
across all facilities to mitigate the targeting of smaller stations.
Additionally, E4 stated that the zero-defect culture and high fines associated
with NERC’s sanctions program can incentivize minimum-effort security. Organiza-
tions that undertake additional security precautions beyond NERC CIP mandates
may discover vulnerabilities that would not otherwise be identified. NERC levies
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fines for non-compliance even when organizations self-report such vulnerabilities, po-
tentially punishing organizations for transparency. E4 believes this behavior inhibits
sharing of information across the power sector and collectively lowers security for all
facilities. He argues that NERC could reverse this trend by eliminating fines asso-
ciated with self-reporting and providing “credits” to organizations that contribute
to the overall health of the power sector.
When discussing concerns with log retention, E4 recommended that all facili-
ties should contribute toward a common log aggregation center, where security pro-
fessionals could conduct in-depth security-breach investigations spanning all NERC-
compliant facilities.
4.5 Disclosures
Researchers made an effort to disclose the findings responsibly. Compliance
standards typically have a request-for-comment (RFC) period that allows for the
submission of comments, concerns, and recommendations during a fixed window.
During this study, none of the standards assessed had an open RFC, and no clearly
defined channel existed for reporting security concerns, either directly to affected or-
ganizations or at the federal level. Using the partners as mediators, all of the findings
were sent to the IRS; the PCI Security Standards Council; a contributing author
of the NERC CIP standards; the United States Computer Emergency Readiness
Team (US-CERT); the MITRE Corporation’s Common Vulnerabilities and Expo-
sures (CVE) team; and the Department of Homeland Security. Even though this
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study was completed between October 2017 to September 2018, as of June 2020, re-
searchers are still actively working with the U.S. Government to help organizations
understand the impact of the findings. Overall, there have been varying levels of
success with disclosure attempts, as described below.
4.5.1 Disclosure intent
Before disclosing any of the study findings, researchers envisioned that the
findings could help the U.S. federal government establish a centralized repository
of best-practices and lessons learned associated with compliance controls. This
information could (1) help authors of compliance programs adopt language that has
been proven to be effective, (2) help organizations understand potential risks they
could inherit, and (3) allow compliance programs to incrementally evolve at speed
with technology to remain secure and relevant.
To achieve this intent, disclosure occurred through contacts at high levels in
the federal government, at organizations responsible for creating compliance pro-
grams, and directly at the organizations that use the affected compliance standards.
This involved extracting contact information from the audited standards, extracting
information from publicly-available official sites, contact-chaining through personal
contacts, and searching through social media for appropriate contact information.
Below are the attempts and shortcomings in trying to achieve the disclosure intent.
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4.5.2 IRS P1075
The IRS, NIST National Vulnerability Database (NVD), US-CERT, and the
MITRE Corporation were contacted to disclose the P1075 findings. US-CERT was
the first organization to respond to the disclosure attempt. After exchanging sev-
eral emails, their technicians concluded that “CVEs are assigned for specific vul-
nerability in implementations. Each issue that requires a ‘separate patch’ can get
a CVE [213].” In a series of email and phone exchanges, it was argued that each
of the recommendations provided are “patches” for the vulnerable portions of the
compliance standards, but US-CERT stated that the “patches” identified must be
tied to a specific piece of software. Future research that correlates security con-
cerns to compliant software may be eligible for CVE identification numbers using
US-CERT’s definition.
Both NIST NVD and the MITRE Corporation indicated that compliance doc-
uments are outside their scope of responsibility, with MITRE stating “that a reason-
able person can conclude that IRS Publication 1075 was never intended to have a
level of abstraction that was sufficient to direct secure coding [143].” Contradicting
this argument, the partners confirmed that auditors are indeed using compliance
standards such as P1075 as a line-by-line checklist to confirm controls at levels as
granular as access control lists on firewalls.
The IRS was contacted nine times via personal contacts, emails, and phone
calls over the span of three months. To date, the IRS has not provided any form
of acknowledgment other than the automated responses from SafeguardReports@
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irs.gov, the only point of contact listed in IRS P1075.
4.5.3 PCI DSS
Unlike P1075, there was success in responsibly disclosing the findings to mem-
bers of the PCI Security Standards Council. Researchers established a memorandum
of understanding with a PCI SSC member organization; in turn, this organization
provided the findings to the PCI DSS Version 4 Working Group.
The recommendation for improving the “Network Segmentation” section of
PCI DSS has already been implemented within Version 4, prior to the opening of
their RFC submission window. This change will apply PCI DSS guidelines to the
entire networked environment and not only an isolated subnet with cardholder data
– this change could help reduce the likelihood that an attacker could gain access
via unprotected portions of the network. Additionally, the v4 Working Group is
considering incorporating all feedback associated with the ambiguous specification
findings.
4.5.4 NERC CIP 007-6
Expert E4, after providing feedback, noted that the recommendations would
be included at future working groups for CIP revisions. However, it could be years
before the next CIP update (potentially taking the recommendations into account)
is released. Additionally, the partnered organization for CIP disclosure is incorpo-
rating the feedback into a comprehensive evaluation of electric grid security. More
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than any other expert, E4 provided years’ worth of lessons learned from CIP au-
dits and helped explain why the standard was written the way it is. Given that
the group of researchers had little experience with industrial control systems or the
electric grid prior to this study, Expert E4’s insight was truly invaluable for assessing
the validity of the findings.
4.5.5 Federal-level recognition
To approach problems with federal-level compliance standards in a top-down
manner, researchers met with representatives from the NIST National Cybersecurity
Center of Excellence (NCCoE) to discuss the findings [152]. Researchers highlighted
that IRS P1075 Section 9 (which contains 49% of the P1075 security concerns dis-
covered) is copied from older versions of NIST SP 800-53 (NIST has since updated
SP 800-53 twice). NCCoE offered to incorporate the findings into future document
revisions. In ongoing revisions that began before the meeting, NIST acknowledged in
draft SP 800-53v5 that organizations may inherit risk when implementing mandated
security controls; that is, standards may create security problems [164]. Specifically,
NIST describes deliberate efforts to remove ambiguity, improve understanding of
responsibility, and keep controls up to date, corroborating many findings from the
study.
Next, researchers contacted the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Na-
tional Protection and Programs Directorate. Several personnel within the Federal
Network Resilience Division expressed interest in assisting with the findings; how-
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Document Controls Total Issues Extr. High High Mod Low
IRS 309 81 2 13 32 34
PCI 851 46 0 8 22 16
NERC 79 21 1 4 6 10
Table 4.3: Security concerns, by document and assessed risk
ever, the DHS Office of External Affairs for Cybersecurity and Communications
directed the contacts to cease communication and did not provide any alternative
mechanisms for disclosure. This decision continues to provide friction between the
agent contacts at DHS and the organization – the agents are motivated to help
remedy the discovered issues. Through open publication, these agents are now able
to use the findings and shape future compliance development on their own.
4.6 Discussion
This research provides the first structured evaluation of security issues within
digital-security compliance standards. This study finds that when compliance stan-
dards are used as checklists, with “by-the-letter” implementation of security con-
trols, security concerns can be created. The systematic approach identified security
issues spanning multiple root causes and varying levels of risk (shown in Table 4.3).
This section highlights common issues across the audited compliance standards, po-
tential mitigations, recommendations for reconsidering compliance programs, and
opportunities for future work.
Common issues. When considering the findings, some common issues become
apparent. All standards assessed exhibit under-defined processes and vague writing.
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While issues of vague writing may not seem as immediately dangerous as, for exam-
ple, failing to identify passwords as sensitive data requiring protection, they have
important implications when standards are treated like point-by-point checklists.
Many issues stem from passive voice, creating ambiguity concerning who is
responsible for exactly what actions. Using the active voice to construct compliance
controls is a best practice that helps eliminate uncertainty and ensure there is a
responsible party for requisite actions [109]. If it is not feasible to eliminate passive
voice (perhaps because it would prescribe organizational structure too strongly),
standards authors could perhaps include supplemental best-practice recommenda-
tions for identifying responsible personnel. In addition, the standard might require
each implementing organization to create a written plan identifying who is respon-
sible for each requirement.
Further, numerous compliance controls did not have clear deadlines for action.
Compliance standards should define expected periodicity (e.g., every 30 days) or
thresholds for action (e.g., within 12 hours of an event). These issues with deadlines
seem especially concerning in light of observations by several auditors that many
problems are only mitigated during an immediate run-up to a compliance audit, as
part of preparations to pass.
Terms such as “when feasible” and optional guidelines create confusion about
what is actually required and may provide an illusion of more security than what is
actually provided. In some cases, this wording reflects practical limitations: for ex-
ample, updating legacy power systems to include modern security controls (NERC
CIP) could require multi-million-dollar equipment investments and degrade near-
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term power availability. Nonetheless, categorizing clearly insecure systems as “com-
pliant” simply because there is no feasible alternative is counterproductive. Instead,
compliance standards could adopt a third category that does not punish the affected
organization but still indicates clearly to administrators and auditors that the situ-
ation is suboptimal and further precautions are needed. For clarity, authors should
move optional guidelines into supplemental documents separate from mandatory
compliance.
Each compliance standard has weak controls for user-access review and revo-
cation procedures. To mitigate insider threats, compliance standards could mandate
frequent review of active user accounts, as well as access termination before formally
notifying an employee who is terminated.
Lastly, and perhaps most concerning, none of the compliance standards as-
sessed have mechanisms for reporting security concerns. Without a direct line of
communication with a governing body, it is likely many discovered security concerns
will remain unaddressed. The lack of a centralized CVE database-like construct for
reporting problems with compliance standards affects both governing bodies and
compliant organizations. Governing bodies do not have a reference for common
mistakes when developing compliance standards, meaning issues are likely to re-
peat across multiple standards. Additionally, this lack of transparency prevents
industry-wide alert notifications for issues within a compliance standard; if a re-
searcher discovers a valid security concern, all affected parties should be notified.
Further, no standard could be expected to perfectly capture all needed security con-
trols; as several of the experts noted, strong security practices often require going
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beyond the minimum established by a standard. A centralized repository would
also present an opportunity to recommend additional best practices to build upon
compliance and mitigate any reported gaps.
Recommendations. The work highlights difficulties than can arise when compli-
ance standards are used as checklists, regardless of their original intent. This ap-
proach seems inevitable when a standard is associated with potentially large penal-
ties for non-compliance, but little or no incentive for going beyond the minimum
requirements. This state of affairs suggests a need for rethinking the compliance
paradigm more broadly.
First, authors of compliance standards should take into consideration that
their standards might be used as an audit checklist. Whenever possible, guidelines
should be broadly applicable across a particular domain but concrete enough that
line-by-line compliance will provide meaningful security. Of course, writing guide-
lines that achieve this ideal is difficult and may sometimes be impossible; standards
authors should explicitly consider tradeoffs between generalizability and secure im-
plementation when making choices. Providing supplemental documents describing
potential such issues could help standards implementers manage resulting risks.
Secondly, authors should identify opportunities to craft compliance standards
that improve audits beyond checklist assessments and consider an organization’s
overall security culture. Provisions for a rewards program could incentivize organi-
zations to bolster security. As examples, organizations that take proactive measures
beyond minimum requirements or organizations that publish digital security lessons
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learned could receive some limited safe harbor against future sanctions. As discussed
during the audit of NERC CIP standards, an organization that responsibly discloses
and remedies a vulnerable condition is still liable for financial sanctions. Allowing
organizations to self-report issues with less fear of sanctions could incentivize better
behavior and increase transparency, with potential benefits for the entire associated
sector [16].
Another consideration for standards authors is that rapidly changing tech-
nology necessitates rapidly updated security mechanisms. An effective standards
update mechanism should allow easy reporting of issues and enable fast revision
of the standard itself, while avoiding imposing costs on organizations that cannot
immediately meet the new requirement. Newly updated standards could provide
suggestions for transitioning and require organizations to provide a plan for becom-
ing compliant with the updated requirement within some specified time period.
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Chapter 5: Baselining Security: Security Implications of Policies,
Laws, and Regulations in the Cloud
In this chapter1 I present research that builds upon Chapter 4 and focuses
on the security implications of the FedRAMP compliance program on U.S. federal
organizations that leverage cloud-based services.
Researchers identified 46 issues that may present security threats to organi-
zations that use FedRAMP-approved programs. Additionally, researchers identified
four threat models that appear to be neglected throughout FedRAMP and could
pose significant threats if not properly handled.
Alongside Chapter 4, this chapter supports the notion that baseline secu-
rity programs are insufficient to provide adequate security against current threats
due to security concerns that may be introduced by the following compliance pro-
grams. Complementing baseline security with proactive planning and implemen-





In response to the coronavirus pandemic, millions of people moved to online
videoconferencing for work and school. Zoom, and other products like it, skyrock-
eted in popularity and usage. Hackers and security researchers quickly discovered
security vulnerabilities in some of these services, including the ability to hijack
meetings. CitizenLab also found that Zoom’s cryptographic strength was less than
advertised [130]. The Department of Defense, NASA, Google, and others banned
use of Zoom in response. While Zoom is continually evolving plans to bolster secu-
rity [26], this national-level attention on Zoom calls attention to a larger problem
for the United States government.
Since April 2019, Zoom for Government has been compliant with the Federal
Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) [75]. Achieving this au-
thorization required adherence with a set of government-defined security controls for
cloud-based services, but despite this certification, security issues remained, high-
lighting the danger in assuming that compliance implies security. FedRAMP is
more comprehensive and flexible than many other compliance programs, yet dan-
gerous gaps remain. For example, despite FedRAMP existing to protect government
systems and information, no security control in FedRAMP prohibits cryptographic
keys used by FedRAMP-compliant programs from being generated by a foreign na-
tion. This could be exploited to allow a hostile nation to read sensitive information
belonging to federal organizations and its employees.
As of May 2020, FedRAMP has authorized 188 programs for use, with 49
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additional programs currently in evaluation. FedRAMP’s security (or lack thereof)
impacts more than 5 million systems and devices across more than 150 government
agencies. Given this scope, it was necessary to dissect the controls within FedRAMP
to understand security gaps. Specifically, the focus was to identify the security
controls that could lead to sub-optimal security conditions within an
organization despite being compliant with FedRAMP.
FedRAMP is currently based on the NIST 800-53 revision 4 standard, which
was originally published in April 2013 and updated in January 2015. A host of
new threats to information security have emerged since this time: organizations
have migrated toward bring-your-own-device strategies that let employees attach
their personal devices to private networks and organizations have shifted from on-
premises servers to the cloud, to name just two examples.
FedRAMP incorporates controls for a diverse set of security considerations,
including several categories of protection. The FedRAMP control naming convention
uses the two-letter category abbreviations below combined with numbers to indicate
the groupings of controls.
• Access control (AC): security mechanisms that govern how systems and data
are accessed
• Audit and accountability (AU): requirements for assessing the implementation
of controls
• Identification and authentication (IA): mechanisms for verifying users
• Incident response (IR): programs and plans for handling security incidents
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• Media protection (MP): mechanisms for protecting various storage devices
• Physical and environmental protection (PE): requirements for safety and health
• Risk assessment (RA): requirements for understanding risk and risk mitigation
• Security assessment and authorization (CA): controls for conducting penetra-
tion tests
• System and communication protection (SC): controls for ensuring privacy and
availability
• System and information integrity (SI): controls for data resiliency
• System and services acquisition (SA): controls and restrictions for the pro-
curement of digital systems and devices
FedRAMP will likely adopt the NIST 800-53 revision 5 standard once it is
finalized, but the standard is still under revision at the time of writing, with final
draft comments due in May 2020. This slow pace of updating offers stability to
cloud computing companies, which can design security and compliance programs to
a known standard, but also potentially leaves new and emerging threats unmitigated.
5.2 FedRAMP evaluation results
A line-by-line audit of FedRAMP controls revealed a number of security con-
cerns. Throughout FedRAMP, the focus was on identifying the security controls
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or policies that can lead to sub-optimal security conditions when implemented as
written.
Each security concern identified carries an associated risk. Frameworks such
as the Composite Risk Management framework (shown in Figure 4.2) calculate risk
as a function of the probability of an event occurring and the severity associated
with that event. Using this model, researchers can assess that a likely event with
a negligible severity carries a low risk to an organization, while a likely event with
a catastrophic severity (loss of life or significant financial loss) carries an extremely
high risk to an organization.
In total, the audit of FedRAMP identified a total of 46 independent issues
across 325 security controls. Of these, one issue presented an “Extremely High”
risk, with four rated as “High,” 13 as “Moderate” and 28 as “Low” risk (depicted in
Figure 5.1). These 46 issues fall into three categories: an ambiguous specification,
an obsolete reference, or a risk to data. Below are detailed examples from these
categories.
5.2.1 Ambiguous specifications
Ambiguous specifications occur when two organizations can implement drasti-
cally different security controls and both are compliant; these types of issues repre-
sent the bulk of the findings. An example would be if ACME Company implements
the control AC-06(09) for ensuring an “information system audits the execution of
privileged functions” by auditing after each individual occurrence, but the Wid-
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Figure 5.1: Distribution of the 46 security issues identified within FedRAMP, by
category.
gets’R’Us Company only conducts such audits every 60 days. Both companies are
compliant — they both perform the mandatory audit — but ACME should be con-
sidered more secure. In the context of this example, an organization’s interpretation
and implementation of this control could be the difference between detecting a ma-
licious threat during the initial stages of a compromise or only after attackers have
already stolen sensitive victim data from the network.
The FedRAMP program uses certified third party assessment organizations,
or 3PAOs, as auditors to review and assess the FedRAMP compliance of any or-
ganization applying for authorization. The 3PAO, therefore, will be the primary
arbiter of any ambiguous specifications or questionable implementations. While the
FedRAMP program aims for all 3PAOs to operate with equal rigor, differences can
arise. The 3PAO for ACME may drill into the implementation details of the audit
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check, as well as all functionality within ACME’s system, to ensure that all privileged
functions are run through the same system audits. The 3PAO for Widgets’R’Us,
meanwhile, may fail to dig deeply enough to catch that not all functionality is au-
dited, or may fail to recognize that auditing privileged functions every 60 days is
not compliant with the spirit of the control.
In total, researchers identified 31 unique issues involving ambiguous specifica-
tions: two high-risk, 10 medium-risk, and 19 low-risk. Inconsistencies in organiza-
tional and 3PAO interpretations of these controls may result in an increased threat
to organizations using FedRAMP-compliant programs.
There are 11 ambiguous specifications, with varying levels of risk,
that fail to incorporate a time-based factor: how often should a task be per-
formed or how soon after an event should a task be performed? A high-risk example
includes AU-06(01) which requires automated analysis of data artifacts to support
investigations into suspicious activities. Examples of artifacts include records of
every website a user visits, every time someone attempts to log into a user account,
or every time an antivirus program generates a suspicious activity alert. These
artifacts, depending on the size of the network, could amount to billions of indi-
vidual records and require 4-8 petabytes of storage a day. This control leaves up
to the organization (and its 3PAO auditor) essential decisions like artifact reten-
tion periods, correlation frequencies, and report availability. Given that advanced
persistent threats can operate within networks for years before being detected, an
organization must adopt a log retention policy that would allow them to investigate
compromises that may have occurred 6-12 months in the past [220]. Correlation
122
frequencies and report availability are intertwined; how often an organization aggre-
gates and correlates data from network streams, end points, and service platforms
directly shapes how soon they can process this data and provide a meaningful re-
port that can support an investigation. Real-time processing can be a substantial
monetary investment, but correlating petabytes of enterprise data from the past 6
months from a cold start may take too long. Obviously there is a middle ground
here, and researchers recommend the inclusion of a best-practice timeline for how
often organizations should conduct data correlation for threat analysis.
There are 10 ambiguous specifications involving authentication mech-
anisms that may under some interpretations allow an attacker to gain
access to resources. Two of these issues involve weak passwords. AC-18(01)
protects wireless access to systems using authentication and encryption, but as-is,
would allow an organization to use encryption algorithms with known cryptographic
weaknesses or trivially weak WiFi authentication passwords, such as the letter ‘a.’
IA-05(04) requires password strength checks using arbitrarily-defined requirements
(such as complexity and length) but does not compare user-generated passwords
against common passwords or passwords found in data breaches. (For example,
‘P@$$Word123’ passes most complexity checks but should not be used.) OWASP
and Have I Been Pwned maintain repositories of commonly used passwords and
account breach data and provide interfaces for services to check passwords against;
however, use of services such as these is not required under any FedRAMP control.
Understanding and mitigating the use of commonly used passwords and credential
reuse across multiple accounts would improve the security of user accounts.
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There are five issues involving multi-factor authentication (MFA)
and authenticators. These five controls permit SMS and email authenticator
codes. Depending on implementation, these additional layers of authentication may
simply present additional hurdles that a capable attacker can likely bypass. SMS-
jacking is a known attack vector that allows an adversary to port their victims’ phone
numbers to phones that the attacker controls, allowing them to receive victim SMS
authenticator codes [4]. Attackers can also intercept unencrypted emails through
man-in-the-middle attacks or traffic sniffing, allowing them to gain access to email-
based authenticator codes. Hardware-based authenticators (such as Yubikeys or
Titan keys) and software authenticators (like those from Google Authenticator or
Duo Security) have other complications but typically offer a much more secure
approach to MFA.
Five controls allow organizations to provide their own definition of
secure. AC-01 and AC-03 allow an organization to develop its own access control
procedures and policies. These serve as the basis for most other controls within
FedRAMP. Using an exaggerated example, imagine that ACME Company empow-
ers an employee with 15 years of experience in access control to create its access
control program, while Widgets’R’Us subcontracts the task to the bagel vendor in
the front lobby. As long as both companies produce the requisite documents, both
are compliant, but ACME is more likely to have a robust program.
Controls such as MP-07, IR-01, and AC-04 allow organizations to define what
information is considered sensitive, how data can be exchanged between intercon-
nected systems, and how the organization should conduct incident response investi-
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gations respectively. None of these controls should be arbitrarily defined, but rather
rooted in best practices and iteratively updated after each internal evaluation, se-
curity exercise, or real-world data breach.
5.2.2 Obsolete references
Obsolete references occur when the document mandates the use of an outdated
policy or references a document that has since been superseded – there are two
instances of this in FedRAMP.
Throughout the document, FedRAMP references “FIPS Publications 140-2,”
which was replaced by 140-3 in September 2019. Additionally, IA-05(01) requires
organizations to enforce password expiration policies that NIST SP 800-63 has since
rescinded – this high-risk issue is shown to encourage insecure practices such as
writing newly rotated passwords near user workstations [205]. These two issues
highlight a greater concern: FedRAMP has not been updated since August 2018. As
technologies and best practices evolve over time, FedRAMP authors must reconcile
the need to remain secure with the requirement to remain adaptive. Compliance
programs such as FedRAMP should reference other security documents for best
practices, but only the most recently updated versions.
5.2.3 Risks to data
There are risks to data, defined as security controls that expose sensitive in-
formation to an attacker, as the category posing the greatest potential risk to or-
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ganizations. In total, there are 13 risks to data: one extremely high, one high, two
medium, and nine low-risk issues.
Organizations using FedRAMP-compliant solutions must consider
who has access to protection mechanisms and how they can be accessed.
AC-17(02) specifies the protection mechanisms for remote access to systems. IA-
05(02) details requirements for PKI-based authentication. SC-12 allows organi-
zations to define requirements for key generation, distribution, storage, access, and
destruction; SC-12(02) and SC-12(03) specify requirements for symmetric and asym-
metric keys respectively. None of these controls mandate protection requirements
for cryptographic keys. Given that FedRAMP relies on cryptographic keys for many
security controls, an attacker can exploit this policy weakness to target and gain
access to unprotected cryptographic keys. Control AC-17(02), which governs remote
access to systems, would present an extremely high-risk situation for organizations
if keys are not adequately protected.
MP-05(04) outlines protection mechanisms for media, but it does not include
protection mechanisms for keys or passwords used to encrypt the stored data. Send-
ing passwords in cleartext emails or SMS would drastically reduce the efficacy of
password-protected devices that have been intercepted by an adversary.
FedRAMP lacks oversight over the systems that provide security
in an environment. Who is responsible for securing the security systems? SC-
08(01) mandates that systems enforce data integrity checks during transmission,
but does not consider tamper controls against those checks. Consider two scenarios
that could occur if an adversary gained control over an integrity checker. They have
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the ability to enact a denial of service attack by flagging all inbound and outbound
traffic as corrupted, causing endless re-transmissions of data. Additionally, they
have the ability to modify content in transmission and verify its integrity – this
could be exceptionally damaging to an organization if the attacker modified business
records to annotate significant financial losses or fired an entire company via a
cryptographically-signed email.
SA-10(01) enforces integrity checks against software updates and patches but
does not consider the compromise of an update server. In some situations, it may
be appropriate to confirm the validity of updates from external vendors for critical
networking devices, endpoint protection software, and workstations. These update
servers are a juicy target for attack, as they would give an adversary the ability to
exploit an entire customer base from one system.
Similarly, RA-05(01) mandates the use of vulnerability scanners and SI-03
mandates the use of malicious code scanners. Both solutions should be FedRAMP
compliant and would require privileged access to data and systems to perform their
intended functions. Neither solution is accounted for within FedRAMP as a potential
threat vector. Attackers could manipulate these scanners to provide false negatives
for alerts, allowing them to bypass defenses and gain access to vulnerable systems.
These systems could also become an internal attack platform for adversaries taking
advantage of their privileged, trusted access within the internal network. FedRAMP
controls calling for anti-virus software to be run on all systems similarly require
running software that executes with privileged access on all systems, including some,
such as Linux or Unix servers, where the anti-virus software itself may create more
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of a risk than the actual chance of viruses attacking these platforms. Organizations
should consider having tamper-resistant controls on all platforms that maintain
elevated access within their networks and closely monitor them for deviation from
normal behaviors.
Organizations must consider insider threats. AC-04 controls informa-
tion flow between interconnected systems but provides for local-network transmis-
sion of unencrypted controlled information. An insider threat or an adversary who
has bypassed perimeter defenses could intercept these transmissions, placing con-
trolled information at risk. As a best practice, sensitive information should always
be encrypted at rest and in transit and protected by appropriate restricted access
controls. The use of role-based access controls or other restrictions that prevent
viewing and manipulating data when not required for a user’s current job should be
in place. This kind of control can be implemented in a variety of ways and will be
subject to interpretation by 3PAO auditors.
5.3 Unaccounted for threat models
In analyzing the technical threats and trends across the results, there are four
threat models, or meta-level profiles of threat actors and their possible method-
ologies, that appear to be absent from FedRAMP risk management considerations.
These four threat models generically encompass the technical issues identified, and
are helpful to frame the way that weaknesses in compliance standards can be taken
advantage of by malicious actors. Abstracting the use of specific vulnerabilities into
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a threat model is a way that empowers defenders to identify and prioritize defenses
against many adversaries and attacks. Below threats are described in terms of scope
and motivation that undercut FedRAMP. While these focus on risks to FedRAMP
certified cloud computing platforms and web hosted software, improvement for other
compliance programs can also be informed by these threat models.
5.3.1 Nation-state privileged access
Security issues and gaps, as exemplified throughout FedRAMP, present op-
portunities for foreign nations to access the private or sensitive data of compliant
organizations. This may become more prevalent within the services provided by
multinational corporations that provide encrypted solutions to a global customer
base.
Private keys and passwords used for encrypting data must be pro-
tected from foreign government access. Compliance loopholes that permit
direct access to encryption keys and passwords could allow nation-states to bypass
privacy controls. For example, a foreign government could mandate that companies
generate encryption keys and store them in databases accessible to the company or
the government on demand. On-demand access would obviate encryption for data
at rest or in transit, allowing foreign governments to decrypt information, at will, to
conduct various forms of espionage to include intellectual property theft, personnel
tracking, and communication eavesdropping.
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5.3.2 Corporate aggregation and monetization
The second threat model considers businesses that desire to aggregate cus-
tomer information for monetization. Knowing how customers use a service, where
they choose to use the service from, when customers are most likely to use a ser-
vice, as well as knowing issues encountered when using a service can shape essential
business decisions. Businesses can craft and deliver targeted ads, forecast inventory
requirements, build security patches, or make future business investment decisions
based on this data. Most customers understand this is the status quo. However, one
must consider a threat model that exceeds the status quo and breaches customers’
expectations of privacy by monetizing information that should be unreadable by the
service provider.
In circumstances where companies identify loopholes in privacy laws or out-
right disregard privacy considerations, a company may be motivated to access the
encrypted communications of their customers to further enrich known information.
Issues such as the ones discovered in FedRAMP could allow service providers to
gain compliance and still bypass encryption. The ability to access private keys,
remotely access account information, and clone MFA authenticators could allow an
organization to impersonate users and farm information that can assist with further
monetization.
Further, unless information is encrypted end-to-end and the software provider
does not hold the encryption key – a relatively rare situation – user activity may be
encrypted in transit and at rest, yet still be processed by the service for targeted ads
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or personalized features. None of FedRAMP’s encryption controls prohibit business
access to private data and may present risks if sensitive information is disclosed.
While this concern is typically addressed during service contract negotiations, it is
important for compliance programs to explicitly address the issue.
Even though highlighted issues relate to corporations having too much user
data, one must also consider the implications of denying certain information. Some
companies use the user activity sent to them in order to make software safer and
more desirable for future purchases. One such example is Microsoft’s use of customer
stack traces, generated after crashes caused by users, to locate and fix security is-
sues [93]. Organizations that are highly concerned about the confidentiality of their
data may not allow these stack traces and other automated error reports to be auto-
matically shared. (In the experience, many FedRAMP-compliant programs forego
sharing stack traces for this reason.) This excludes some of the most likely targets of
sophisticated attacks from these automated vulnerability detection programs, which
may mean that exploits are detected only once they are used against other targets,
potentially limiting defensive effectiveness across the user base.
The examples in this section demonstrate that compliance programs must
reconcile the balance between service providers having too much user information
and not enough. As is, both sides of the argument present risks to organizations
that most reasonable users would not be willing to accept.
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5.3.3 Security of security appliances
The third threat model considers attackers who are motivated to exploit secu-
rity systems to bypass defenses and gain access to vulnerable systems. It is infeasible
and inefficient for most companies to develop their own in-house security solutions
or encryption mechanisms. Organizations, for the most part, rely on commercial
security appliances or third party service providers for their security. Inherently, the
security of these applications have wide-reaching implications.
Security controls, such as those in FedRAMP, inherently trust security appli-
cations and do not provide mechanisms for checks and balances. These applications
require privileged access to data and systems without explicit oversight. Web prox-
ies, for example, exist to reduce network bandwidth usage and provide security
stand-off from the Internet – but these proxies may also have insight into all users’
web traffic. Antivirus applications prevent the execution of malicious code on work-
stations – but these applications may have the highest level of access to sensitive
files and the core of the operating system.
The recent increase in remote work has made virtual private network (VPN)
attacks even more attractive to malicious parties [168]. While these attacks are not
new [153], the scale of users of these systems has greatly increased over the last
few months, creating an enticing pool of targets. In the rush to move to remote
work, many enterprises have neglected to ensure that their VPN servers are fully up
to date, and these unpatched VPN servers provide a gateway to access corporate
data that is otherwise unreachable. The VPN client software that runs on users’
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workstations and laptops provides another attack surface, particularly if the client
software is out of date and has unpatched vulnerabilities. Both VPN servers and
clients are security mechanisms often mandated by compliance programs that pro-
vide encrypted access to corporate information; however, the lack of explicit controls
on protecting these protection mechanisms from compromise place organizations at
risk.
There are a few methods that may provide requisite security checks. First,
monitoring and whitelisting the permitted behavior of these protection mechanisms
may prevent hijacking – for example, the service-level account of the VPN server
should not be allowed to access internal file shares after business hours. Site reli-
ability engineering provides many zero-trust recommendations that may help solve
similar problems [25].
5.3.4 Ignored cyber-physical systems
Digitally-connected physical safety and security controls must also be included
in an organization’s security plan. As physical systems become more intertwined
with information systems, technicians must actively mitigate the risks to organiza-
tions that could be posed by electric-power systems, closed-circuit television cam-
eras, biometric scanners, or fire suppressors. Controls such as PE-13(03) from Fe-
dRAMP mandate that organizations use an automatic fire suppression capability
for information systems when a facility is not continually monitored. Consider the
devastation that could occur if an attacker gained privileged access to a sprinkler
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system over a holiday and flooded the facility. An attacker could turn off power
to essential services or expand its access within a network by using unprotected
cyber-physical systems.
5.4 Comparing FedRAMP
Compared with other compliance programs for protecting taxpayer informa-
tion, credit card data, and the electric grid, there are fewer issues in FedRAMP.
This is attributed to the vast number of listed collaborators, frequent integration
of lessons learned, and use of public requests-for-comments which allow interested
parties to assess draft documents and provide recommended improvements. Ad-
ditionally, FedRAMP mandates security controls based on three different levels of
impact – low, moderate, and high. This acknowledges that systems and networks
have different value and associated risk and should be protected accordingly. But
as discussed, such flexibility sometimes comes at the expense of under-defined or
ambiguous specifications.
The maintainers of the FedRAMP program appear to have recognized some of
the problems highlighted here, such as varying interpretations of ambiguous specifi-
cations. FedRAMP partners with the American Association for Laboratory Accred-
itation to oversee its 3PAO program, and the two organizations have undertaken
a process to review and update the 3PAO training requirements and to evaluate
the technical competence of 3PAOs. Additionally, these organizations have released
standards that include a requirement that 3PAOs who operate internationally show
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how they minimize the risk of foreign parties interfering with the FedRAMP certi-
fication process. A 3PAO who is operating under the influence of a foreign nation
may, for instance, be more likely to be lenient in reviewing controls in certain ar-
eas that might make it easier for the foreign partner to attack systems or exfiltrate
sensitive data.
5.5 Discussion
Compliance programs like FedRAMP often contain security issues or gaps
that can allow risks to persist even in compliant organizations. This study provides
tips and recommendations to help businesses, security researchers, and government
organizations mitigate many of these risks. First and foremost, organizations and
security professionals must remember that compliance establishes only a minimum
level of protection. Compliance may be helpful (even required) to achieving the
end goal of protecting an individual or organization’s goals and assets, but it is not
sufficient.
Organizations should understand the impact that compliance programs may
have on overall security. All organizations should audit the compliance standards
they follow to identify gaps that are relevant to their specific requirements and
develop mitigating strategies accordingly.
As a whole, the United States government must adopt a mechanism that per-
mits always-open request-for-comment periods for compliance programs that allow
security researchers to identify weaknesses and recommend fixes. Additionally, there
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is a need for faster revision of compliance documents to maintain relevance with
emerging technologies and threats. These revisions should permit grace periods, to
allow organizations to migrate towards new controls without facing sanctions for
non-compliance.
The coronavirus pandemic and the rapid adoption of work-from-home solu-
tions such as Zoom only highlights the need for strengthening compliance programs.
Hopefully this work can help make organizations, businesses, and citizens aware of
potential security issues until the federal government implements more secure and
flexible options for compliance.
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Chapter 6: Implementing Security: Humans factors in Incident Re-
sponse Readiness
In this chapter, I present research that focuses on the end-to-end usability of
incident response playbooks within an enterprise environment. Proactive security
measures require professionals to implement security controls that will help mitigate
adversarial impact. Incident response playbooks present security practitioners with
a structured action plan for incident response efforts after a threat is underway.
These pre-planned actions are intended to help reduce stresses that technicians may
face during a security incident, allow them to gain momentum during response
efforts, and ensure organizations are prepared for likely adversarial situations.
Although playbooks are a common practice in the security industry, they have
not been systematically evaluated for effectiveness. This chapter takes a first step
toward measuring playbooks, using two case studies conducted in an enterprise envi-
ronment. In the first study, twelve security professionals created two playbooks each,
using two standard playbook design frameworks; the resulting playbooks were eval-
uated by experts for completeness and correctness. In the second, five personnel use
the created playbooks in no-notice threat exercises within a live security-operations
center.
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Playbooks, in some cases, do simplify and support incident response efforts.
However, playbooks designed using the frameworks examined often lack sufficient
detail for real-world use, particularly for more junior technicians. This study shows
that incident response playbooks may be valuable tools for increasing preparedness
against a threat, but often require extensive planning and threat modeling to de-
termine which playbooks should be prioritized for development and customization.
Additionally, baseline security mechanisms may constrain or alter playbook design
efforts to ensure compatibility with applicable compliance programs.
6.1 Setup and preliminaries
This section details the playbook frameworks evaluated, the two partner orga-
nizations, and the two incident-response scenarios selected as targets for playbook
design.
6.1.1 Selected frameworks
This study uses two frameworks that have U.S. government support and offer
freely available guides and examples.
IACD. The IACD framework was created by the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, National Security Agency, and Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory
to leverage automation within incident response [104]. The defining feature of IACD
playbooks is a visual flowchart capturing essential response actions for both humans
and automated systems to take (Figure B.4 in the Appendix).
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The IACD framework breaks playbook design into 10 steps. (Section 6.1.3.1
provides a running example in greater detail.) The first step is to identify the ini-
tiating condition: the event or situation triggering playbook use (e.g., a database
breach) and how that event is detected (e.g., an automated email alert sent to an
administrator). The second step involves listing all possible actions that could occur
in response to the initiating condition, typically via mind mapping. Practitioners
should reference existing best practices to identify possible actions. Next, playbook
designers designate each identified action as required or optional. For example, gen-
erating a written report that details the incident from beginning to end — which
may provide invaluable insight after the event but does not contribute directly to
response efforts — should be labeled optional. Steps 4-8 involve grouping actions
by function, ordering required actions sequentially, and interleaving optional actions
where appropriate. The designer produces a diagram showing these ordered rela-
tionships. In step 9, the designer verifies that the playbook terminates either in
a desired end state or in a new initiating condition that flows into another play-
book. The final step ensures the playbook satisfies applicable regulatory controls
and requirements.
NIST. The NIST Computer Security Incident Handling Guide (hereafter: the NIST
framework) focuses on quick recovery after a security incident [44]. Using this frame-
work, designers break a security incident down into three phases and create playbook
content for each. The preparation phase occurs before an incident and requires ana-
lysts to identify critical assets that must be protected from a particular threat. Play-
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book content for the detection and analysis phase should help defenders identify the
incident’s entry point, breadth of impact, potential consequences, and containment
methods. Phase three content — containment, eradication, and recovery — should
guide defenders in patching or isolating the attacker’s entry point and other similar
potential entry points, increasing monitoring, and safely bringing services back on-
line. Each phase of a NIST playbook should emphasize communication and metrics
tracking: ensuring essential personnel are informed, victims are notified, and the
scope of impact is thoroughly documented. While playbook designers may or may
not deem communications as required actions in IACD playbooks, communication
is required throughout NIST playbooks.
Unlike IACD, NIST does not typically result in a visualization of response
actions (although it could). Instead, NIST playbooks typically provide detailed
textual descriptions, intended to be drawn from institutional procedures or best
practices. Section 6.1.3.2 provides a detailed running example.
6.1.2 The partners
To evaluate playbook frameworks’ usability within organizations that had not
previously used them, researchers partnered with two organizations specializing in
digital security. For anonymity, they are referred to as the network defense center
(NDC) and the security development team (SDT).
NDC manages networks spanning multiple countries and 600 user accounts,
with a service-level agreement to maintain availability levels at or above 98.9% while
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securing highly-sensitive customer intellectual property. NDC had 12 employees
during the first case study and 13 during the second study.
SDT develops secure applications for nearly 1500 worldwide customers, often
building custom solutions for niche requirements. SDT employs 28 developers.
Both NDC and SDT have mandates to secure their development and produc-
tion environments from malicious attacks, insider threats, and natural disasters.
Both organizations have personnel with a range of security experience: a few entry-
level and the majority with more than 10 years’ experience.
Prior to this study, one co-author of this paper served as a supervisor within
both NDC and SDT, enabling deep understanding of both organizations’ missions,
cultures, customers, and risks. This co-author observed NDC’s response to three
security incidents within one year. The technicians’ responses were ad-hoc, rather
than drawing on predetermined plans, policies, or procedures. By the start of the
first case study, this co-author was no longer affiliated with either partner.
6.1.3 Selected scenarios
As playbooks are designed to address specific incident scenario, two scenarios
are used in the case study. Leaders from NDC and SDT collaborated to select two
scenarios from the MITRE ATT&CK database, using the following three criteria:
(1) both organizations could realistically encounter them; (2) each organization
should be able to quickly and consistently respond to them at any time; and (3)
neither organization had a standard policy or procedure in place to handle them.
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Brute-force login attempts [140] and valid credential compromises [142] were the
two selected scenarios.
6.1.3.1 Brute- force login attempts
In a brute-force login attack, an adversary attempts to gain unauthorized ac-
cess by guessing commonly used or randomly generated passwords. This study
focuses on protecting user-level domain accounts from locally-originating attacks.
Below details some of the essential tasks associated with detecting, responding to,
and eliminating brute force attempts from within the network using the IACD frame-
work.
The initiating condition is the detection of multiple password-guessing at-
tempts against one or multiple systems. A centralized log repository must contin-
uously audit and correlate login failures from across the network. If a brute-force
pattern is detected, the system should generate an alert (e.g., a dashboard push
notification or email to a technician).
Required actions, in sequential order, might include: identify the system(s) be-
ing attacked; identify the potential attack source; isolate source and/or victim nodes;
install new sensors for traffic monitoring; identify compromised accounts; conduct
root-cause analysis; perform root-cause mitigation; and restore accounts/services.
Two optional action groups might be prioritizing assets (determining which resources
are most important to isolate first) and producing reports (helping responders un-
derstand the situation and make better decisions).
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In IACD Step 9, the playbook terminates in a desired end state: the root
cause has been patched and affected services and accounts have been restored. The
final IACD step is to validate that the playbook satisfies regulatory controls and
requirements, such as log retention policies.
6.1.3.2 Valid credential misuse
Valid credential compromise can occur, for example, when a database breach
reveals credentials from one account that can be reused at another site. This study
focuses on protecting user-level domain accounts from local abuse.
Next is a sample NIST playbook that uses honeywords — usernames and
passwords for valid but fictional accounts — to detect credential misuse [112].
The preparation phase includes the creation of honeyword accounts, ensuring
security team members understand the significance of the honeywords, and deploy-
ing an automated log-event parser to scan for login attempts associated with the
honeyword account and generate an alert if found.
The detection and analysis phase starts when a human analyst receives an
alert (e.g., a dashboard push notification or an email). The analyst should then
investigate breadth of impact; for example, if the honeyword was created on a
domain controller, then the analyst may assume there has been a compromise of all
accounts on the domain controller.
The final containment, eradication, and recovery phase involves root-cause
analysis to determine how the domain controller was initially compromised and
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generate a “fingerprint” to check for similar compromises on other systems. Next,
all affected accounts must be denied access until they have changed their password.
Affected users and compliance entities (as applicable) must be notified of the breach.
Finally, the incident must be fully documented, and there may also be regulatory
requirements for follow-on security assessments.
6.2 Playbook design and evaluation
This section details the first of two case studies exploring the usability of
playbook frameworks. Participants from NDC and SDT were familiarized with the
IACD and NIST frameworks and asked to each design two playbooks using the
two frameworks and the two selected scenarios. This permitted the measurement of
participants’ perceptions of the process, and external experts evaluated the designed
playbooks for thoroughness and accuracy. Although most participants considered
the frameworks reasonably easy to use, about half of the designed playbooks were
rated as insufficiently detailed for real-world use.
6.2.1 Method
This case study assesses participants’ perceptions of the usability of the frame-
works as well as whether the resulting playbooks would be usable in a real-world
setting. In this context, usability is defined in terms of learnability (ease of first-time
use), efficiency (timely task completion), errors, and satisfaction [157]. A mixed-
methods study, as shown in Figure 3.2, addresses these questions.
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This case study occurred from September through December 2019 and was ap-
proved by an ethics review board. To protect the participants and partner organiza-
tions, sensitive information, including job descriptions and identified vulnerabilities,
is redacted and generalized.
6.2.1.1 Recruitment
Researchers partnered with NDC and SDT to recruit employees performing
daily security functions. Leadership from both organizations announced the study
during group meetings, describing the motivation and goals while emphasizing that
participation was voluntary. Employees were told that participants would be in-
troduced to new techniques that could be useful in their work, and that playbooks
from the study would be adopted into daily practice. Employees and contractors
were permitted to participate during regular work hours but were not otherwise
compensated. NDC/SDT leaders emphasized that participation in the study would
have no impact on performance evaluations.
6.2.1.2 Playbook design
Participants received group-based, in-person instruction on using IACD and
NIST frameworks, using an exemplar scenario not included in the main study: re-
sponding to spearphishing links [141]. These 30-minute introductory sessions were
based on fundamentals from adult learning research, including learning through ex-
amples and hands-on implementation [21,118]. Each group had the same instructor,
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an author who possesses five years of experience designing incident-response scenar-
ios for organizations. The instructor communicated this experience to each class to
establish credibility.
Next, each participant designed two incident response playbooks, one for each
threat scenario (Section 6.1.3), using publicly-available references and relevant en-
tries in the MITRE ATT&CK database [139]. The assignment of frameworks to
scenarios was randomized, as well as the order of tasks, to mitigate ordering effects
and other biases. Each participant used each framework and each scenario once.
After designing each playbook, participants completed an online survey based
on the System Usability Scale (SUS) [36]. Next were open-ended follow-up inter-
views, averaging half an hour, with each participant. Questionnaires and interview
guides for all segments of both case studies are given in Appendices A.3 and A.4
respectively.
For all surveys and interviews in both case studies, two co-authors jointly
analyzed all open-ended questions using iterative open-coding [199], building the
codebook incrementally. All disagreements were resolved by mutually refining code-
book definitions and then re-coding responses accordingly. This process continued




Participant perceptions are valuable, but to fully understand usability, it is
also important to measure error rates. Three expert evaluators — each with exten-
sive experience with playbooks in enterprise environments — were asked to assess
whether participants’ playbooks were valid and sufficiently detailed for use during
incident response.
For each playbook (anonymized before review), evaluators completed an online
survey with closed- and open-ended questions about whether the playbook accom-
plishes its goals, contains enough detail to be implemented in a real environment,
and contains any likely sources of error.
6.2.2 Participants
ID NBF IBF NCM ICM
P1 E1, E2 – – E1, E2
P2 E3 – – E3
P3 E1, E3 – – E1, E3
P4 – E1, E2 E1, E2, E3 –
P5 – E3 E3 –
P6 – E1, E3 E1, E3 –
P7 – E2 E2 –
P8 – E1 E2 –
P9 E2, E3 – – E2, E3
P10 E3 – – E3
P11 – E3 E3 –
P12 – E2 E3 –
Table 6.1: Evaluation coverage of designed playbooks. The columns show combi-
nations of framework to scenario, denoted by N: NIST, I: IACD, BF: Brute Force,
and CM: Credential Misuse.
Because of limited time availability, each evaluator examined a subset of play-
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books. To ensure consistency, 10 of the 24 total playbooks were assigned to two
different evaluators. In the event of disagreement on any key attributes, the third
evaluator was asked to review the playbook, and their response was used to break
the tie; one playbook required a third evaluation. The remaining 14 playbooks
received a single evaluation each. Table 6.1 shows the distribution of evaluations.
6.2.2.1 Limitations
All field studies and qualitative research should be interpreted in the context
of their limitations.
The recruitment materials explained the purpose of the study. This may have
resulted in self-selection bias: participants most interested in the study topic opting
to participate.
The results may also exhibit demand characteristics, in which participants are
more likely to respond positively due to close interaction with researchers [96, 167,
212]. Online surveys help mitigate this and promote candid feedback; additionally,
both positively- and negatively-framed questions ensure participants could provide
both perspectives.
NDC and SDT use organizational structures and technological resources com-
mon to many security-conscious organizations of similar size; however, specific
organizational characteristics may inhibit generalizability. This is an inherent limi-
tation of an in-depth field study. Nonetheless, the results may illuminate systemic
issues that organizations need to account for when adopting playbook frameworks.
148
ID Org Role Exp (yrs) Study Phase Order
P1 NDC Manager 11+ D NBF:ICM
P2 NDC Technician 0-4 D, IR1/2/3 ICM:NBF
P3 NDC Manager 11+ D, I, IR1/2 NBF:ICM
P4 NDC Manager 11+ D, IR1 IBF:NCM
P5 NDC Manager 11+ D NCM:IBF
P6 SDT Manager 11+ D NCM:IBF
P7 SDT Technician 11+ D IBF:NCM
P8 NDC Technician 5-10 D, IR2 NCM:IBF
P9 SDT Technician 11+ D ICM:NBF
P10 SDT Technician 11+ D NBF:ICM
P11 SDT Technician 5-10 D IBF:NCM
P12 SDT Manager 11+ D ICM:NBF
P13 NDC Technician 0-4 IR3 –
E1 – Senior Mgr 11+ E –
E2 – Senior Mgr 11+ E –
E3 – Senior Mgr 11+ E –
Table 6.2: Participant and expert demographics. The columns show participant
identifier, employer organization, work role, years of experience, participation phase
of the study, and order of playbook creation. The abbreviations in the fifth column
represent design, evaluate, implement, and incident response exercise. Abbreviations
in the sixth column represent NIST, IACD, brute force, and credential misuse.
As disclosed in Section 6.2.1.1, one co-author had previously served as a super-
visor within NDC and SDT. This case study started five months after the co-author
had departed these organizations; eight participants were new hires after the co-
author had departed. Additionally, all study execution decisions were made with
close NDC and SDT leadership oversight.
This study is not a direct comparison of two frameworks, but rather an obser-
vational case study attempting to identify benefits and shortcomings for each and
for playbook frameworks in general. The sample (n=13) is small, but it represents
100% of NDC’s full-time workforce (58% total workforce during this case study) and
21% of SDT’s employees.
For each qualitative finding, participant count provides context. However,
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participants who did not mention a specific concept when responding to survey or
interview questions may simply have failed to state it, statistical hypothesis tests
are not appropriate for these questions.
To limit biases, the partners did not have existing policies or procedures to
handle the selected incident response scenarios. This forced participants to build
plans around technologies not yet in place, which may have contributed to a lack
of detail in many playbooks (see results). However, this limitation is also realistic:
Evaluator E2 said his organization often faces similar situations, and IACD cites
the identification technology gaps as a key function of playbook design [104].
6.2.3 Results
Below are the results of the first case study, including participant demograph-
ics, participant feedback on the playbook design process, and expert evaluations
of the accuracy and completeness of the designed playbooks. Overall, participants
reported a somewhat favorable perception of playbook design frameworks and their
ability to assist with incident response efforts. In general, they appreciated thinking
proactively and identifying solutions to realistic threats they might face in the fu-




In total, 15 people participated in this case study, including 12 NDC/SDT
employees who designed playbooks and three expert evaluators (Table 6.2). Quali-
tative research best practices recommend 12-20 participants for data saturation in
thematic analysis [84]. The sample represented 58% of NDC’s workforce and 21% of
SDT’s workforce at the time of the study. Prior to the study, all design participants
(P1-12) said they knew that playbooks were an industry best practice, but none had
used a playbook to respond to an incident. All design participants had completed
at least one year of entry-level, on-the-job training for their job role; overall, they
averaged 10.6 years of digital security experience.
Three expert evaluators (E1-3) were recruited via email, based on participant
contact lists aggregated during previous research. Each has extensive experience
with designing, implementing, and using playbooks: E1 is the director of security
operations center with more than 300 employees; E2 is the Deputy CISO of one of
the largest cities in the U.S.; and E3 is the CISO of a major U.S. financial institution.
Collectively, they averaged 16.7 years of digital security experience.
6.2.3.2 Usability metrics
Score distributions from the survey questions show user satisfaction; this sur-
vey extended the SUS with four additional questions designed to elicit perceptions
of usability for others, following guidance from Brooke [35, 36]. Participants rated
the IACD and NIST frameworks 63.5 and 67.7 out of 100 respectively (σ = 16.3,
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Figure 6.1: A comparison of participant usability perceptions and error evaluations
from experts. The vertical lines (left to right) indicate poor, okay, good, and excel-
lent usability.
20.1; see Figure 6.1). This corresponds to a rating of “okay” on a standard scale
from poor to excellent [35].
All participants completed both assigned tasks. Average completion times
were 32.8 minutes (σ = 6.1) for IACD and 42.1 minutes (σ = 7.4) for NIST, are
considered acceptable for learnability for a complex task of this type. There were
no observed, noticeable differences in task completion time based on order.
6.2.3.3 IACD feedback
Participants identified a variety of positive and negative features of the IACD
framework.
Visualization is a key benefit. Most participants (n=10) identified the graphical
depiction of required tasks as IACD’s most positive attribute. P1 and P4 both
indicated that visually distinguishing between human and automated tasks helped
them focus on their roles during incident response, better understand how to leverage
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automated systems, and ensure they are compliant with mandatory controls.
Playbooks can help make up for lack of experience. P10 noted that IACD
“helped me organize my thoughts and guided me through problem-solving”; even
though he had never responded to the given scenario in a real event, he believed the
framework was helpful in eliciting the necessary steps to handle the situation. P12
said “it allows organizations with a preponderance of junior defenders to execute
something without the guidance of a senior defender,” especially when a speedy
response is critical.
Even experienced professionals had difficulty with some terminology and
instructions. Several participants (n=7) had difficulty grouping similar activities
and functions, a core step that many following steps build on. IACD does not pro-
vide a list of common groups to choose from, requiring users to determine their
own groupings. P8 indicated that it took him approximately one hour to develop a
playbook, and a majority of that time was spent attempting to identify appropriate
groupings to use. P9 had to reference the guide frequently when using the frame-
work, and three other participants said they were never confident they provided
enough information.
Resulting playbooks did not have enough detail or account for enough
contingencies. Two participants felt the resulting products were too abstract for
technicians to follow during incident response events. P7 said “the diagram is nice
and easy to follow, but probably also needs a document to go with it explaining
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in more detail what each action entails.” These comments foreshadow many of the
difficulties junior technicians during playbooks utilization (Section 6.3.2.3).
P4 wanted to see more emphasis placed on loops (and their exit conditions),
parallel activities that can be conducted simultaneously by both humans and sys-
tems, and accounting for multiple possible end states based on conditional transi-
tions. P12 felt similarly: “The point of a playbook is to recapture the initiative
from the attacker by having a several iterations of the OODA loop unrolled,” but
he felt the IACD did not account for multiple paths. P12 suggested more modeling
akin to the cyber kill-chain framework [228].
Identifying the initiating condition is most important. Ten participants
agreed the “identify the initiating condition” step was the most important. All 10
described this first step as setting conditions for all follow-on steps, and noted that
failure to recognize the initiating condition would significantly delay or even prevent
incident response; this again foreshadows complications observed in the second case
study.
P11 mentioned that the initiating condition will be in the playbook “table
of contents,” which technicians will reference when identifying a playbook for re-
sponding to an event. The technician will therefore “need to be able to correlate
what they believe to be occurring with how you laid out the [initiating condition]
entry into the playbook.” All participants used five or fewer words to describe their
initiating conditions; playbook designers must use concise yet descriptive terms to
cue defender actions.
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Identifying regulatory requirements is least important. Eight participants
indicated that “identify regulatory controls and requirements” was the least impor-
tant section of the playbook, noting that regulatory compliance was not relevant
to their job role or was someone else’s responsibility. P9 said: “Compliance is less
of an issue than actually solving problems.” This sentiment aligns with prior work
suggesting technicians view compliance as inhibiting security [17,45].
6.2.3.4 NIST feedback
As with IACD, participants identified benefits and drawbacks to the NIST
framework.
The framework was easy to understand. The most prevalent positive feedback
was that NIST playbooks were easy to understand (n=5). P6 stated NIST was
“[v]ery clear on what steps I needed to follow and what outputs are expected after
each step,” and P4 noted that the “[r]esulting text could be passed on to anyone to
help them perform initial triage.”
The framework prompted for detail. Participants liked that the NIST frame-
work prompted them to include as much detail as desired for response actions. They
felt that fine-grained details would reduce uncertainty during response actions taken
by junior defenders, rather than requiring novices to figure out on the fly how to im-
plement abstract instructions. Two self-identified managers said the detail-oriented
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design of the framework would help security engineers to understand and implement
controls or systems required by the playbook. For example, the NIST framework
prompted these two participants to describe in detail the expected content for an
alert email, providing guidance to security engineers who would be tasked with
building or configuring the alert system.
The framework supports proactive planning. Two participants appreciated
that the NIST framework allowed them to think about problems before a full-blown
crisis occurred. P6 noted that NIST offered him an option to “identify possibly
solutions, identify gaps in technology, and have at least an initial plan in place for
handling the situation.”
NIST playbooks may be less useful for novices. Participants (n=5) were con-
cerned that it might be difficult for a novice to quickly orient themselves to a NIST
playbook given the lack of visual aids, reflecting the importance of accommodating
various learning styles [118]. “It’s all just a bunch of words. During a crisis, you need
something concise and clean to follow,” P8 stated, after using NIST but prior to
using IACD. “I liken it to if IKEA’s instructions were text only. They wouldn’t be as
valuable.” Participants suggested adding a headline-style title, executive summary,
and visual cues to NIST playbooks.
Even more detail may be needed. Five participants wanted the NIST framework
to require even more fine-grained detail. They felt the NIST framework was too
open-ended, and would have liked the framework to prompt for exact commands
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that an analyst should execute, rather than requiring them to reference another
guide or have the commands memorized. Two other participants felt the framework
did not adequately prompt for decisions and branching plans to account for incident
variability. Two participants believed NIST did not account for partially-complete
tasks. P11 felt that if there is not a check on task completion, it could result in
unnecessary actions just because it is in a playbook or missed opportunities to do
something in parallel. These comments were similar to comments about the IACD
framework, suggesting that the participants were looking for detailed, pre-planned
responses that account for branching investigation paths.
Examples and instructions were again a challenge. Two participants wished
for multiple NIST playbook examples as a reference during the design process. P4
noted that the NIST framework was too abstract in places, making it hard to un-
derstand what is required for each step.
Detection and analysis is most important, but no strong consensus. A
plurality of participants rated “detection and analysis” the most critical response
step (n=5). All five indicated that knowing a security event is underway and they
need to take action, even if it is a false positive, is invaluable for a defender. P9
stated: “if you miss it, your plan for responding is useless.” This finding parallels the
importance participants placed on the initiating condition in IACD playbooks and
suggests the importance of user interfaces that deliver critical information without
overwhelming the analyst [30].
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For similar reasons, participants narrowly scored containment, eradication,
and recovery as the least important phase in the NIST framework (scoring 4% lower
than the “preparation” phase). Three participants said this step is only important
if you have detected a problem and successfully investigated to confirm the incident
is a true positive.
6.2.3.5 Expert evaluation
Overall, the playbooks participants created lacked sufficient detail and suggest
that amount of experience did not have a significant impact on accuracy. The expert
evaluators assessed six of 12 IACD playbooks and five of 12 NIST playbooks as
insufficiently detailed for use during incident response; when asked if the playbook
would be likely to adequately respond to the associated scenario, IACD playbooks
averaged 2.71 (σ = 1.40) out of 5 while NIST averaged 3.0 (σ = 1.57).
Comparing participants’ SUS scores to evaluator judgments of sufficiency helps
demonstrate how perceived usability mapped to effective outcomes (Figure 6.1). For
NIST playbooks, sufficient playbooks were generally associated with higher SUS
scores than insufficient playbooks, suggesting that participants understood whether
or not they were succeeding. For IACD playbooks, however, there is no clear rela-
tionship. This may indicate an important mismatch between perceived success with
the framework and outcomes.
Next are some common themes observed by the evaluators across playbooks
from both frameworks.
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Missing “implied” tasks. The experts noted that many playbooks were miss-
ing what one evaluator referred to as “implied” tasks: necessary for the defensive
strategy to succeed, but not codified within the playbook (IACD=4, NIST=3).
As one example, E1 noted that P3’s IACD playbook was missing investigative
steps necessary to confirm whether an alert is a true or false positive. To do this, the
analyst must determine (in the case of credential misuse) where the login attempt
originated from and why it occurred. In particular, when receiving an alert related
to a honeyword, the analyst should check whether an administrator is performing
a standard periodic login to ensure the account does not expire, before assuming a
valid attack; this step was not included in the playbook. Further, E1 suggested that
if the login attempt does appear to be a true positive, the analyst should then take
steps such as searching Internet forums for the honeyword to investigate how and
when the credentials were leaked.
Imprecise language may cause delay. Evaluators identified three IACD play-
books and four NIST playbooks with imprecise language or instructions that could
delay response efforts. For example, some playbooks rely on client applications run-
ning on all workstations. If a technician remotely pushes commands to the clients
without first ensuring all clients are running, the technician may have to re-run the
commands once they identify abnormalities in the results (wasting minutes or even
hours).
Missing essential communications. The experts agreed that most playbooks
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missed at least some essential communications; the six lowest-scoring IACD play-
books and six lowest-scoring NIST playbooks all lacked this information. A suffi-
ciently detailed playbook should include specific information (name, position, email
address, and/or phone number) about who to contact in different circumstances.
Expert E2 compared this to a bomb threat checklist, which allows users to collect
essential information and communicate it to the right people (e.g., calling 911) [58].
Business continuity and disaster preparedness experts recommend that incident re-
sponders have essential contact information, as well as fill-in-the-blank forms for
communicating must-know information, readily available in case of crisis [224].
Missing humans in the loop. A few playbooks (IACD=2, NIST=2) relied too
heavily on automation rather than including humans in the decision process. For ex-
ample, several playbooks included automatic account disabling during a brute-force
attack; while superficially sensible, this could result in locking out administrators,
hampering the response. E2 emphasized that when decisions affect critical services
or accounts, a human decision maker must be involved.
Too linear. Evaluators noted that, especially in the case of IACD, playbooks did
not account for parallel actions that humans and automated systems could accom-
plish concurrently, increasing efficiency and reducing overall investigation time. For
example, while a technician responding to a brute-force attack searches network traf-
fic for any attempts occurring in real time, automated systems could query log data
and locate attempts from the prior hours or days. Steps 3 and 4 of the IACD frame-
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work ask the playbook designer to order tasks sequentially and group by functions,
which may inhibit designers from planning parallel tasks.
Some include details and best practices. The experts did recognize multiple
playbooks (IACD=2, NIST=4) with high-quality, fine-grained detail. P10 included
references to best practices such as data loss prevention that would prevent users
with insufficient privileges from accessing sensitive data in the event of credential
misuse. Several other playbooks detail steps for determining what information, if
any, was stolen from the network in the event of a successful brute force attack or
credential misuse.
One playbook was not just incomplete but incorrect. The evaluators iden-
tified one playbook (P7, NIST, credential misuse) as potentially impeding a tech-
nician’s ability to respond to the incident. E2 believed this playbook’s response
events were ordered incorrectly, which could lead an incident responder to miss
valuable information in one step that would be required later. Both E1 and E2
noted that this playbook lacked root-cause analysis and therefore could not lead to
a successful resolution. Without root-cause analysis, it is possible for an attacker to
regain access or spread throughout a network undetected while responders focus on
inconsequential details.
After reviewing these expert findings, researchers conducted a follow-up in-
terview with P7, a software developer with more than 10 years of experience in
reverse engineering and secure code development but little exposure to network de-
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fense or incident response. P7 said they understood the scenario and gave the NIST
framework a slightly-below-average SUS score of 62.5. However, the playbook frame-
work guidelines and reference material about each tested scenario from the MITRE
database could not make up for P7’s lack of relevant experience. While it might
be unsurprising that a secure software developer struggled to develop an operations
playbook, none of the playbook literature specified prerequisites or qualifications for
designing playbooks [28,104,150,200].
6.2.4 Summary
This case study suggests that the two frameworks have only moderate usability.
Although all participants completed each playbook design task in under 45 minutes,
only about half were considered by experts sufficiently complete and correct for real-
world use. Participants found the idea of playbooks, and some individual features
of the two frameworks, useful, but also identified key weaknesses. In particular,
participants placed high importance on identifying the triggering action (in both
frameworks) and appreciated the visual process overview associated with IACD, but
also wanted detailed checklists. Participants appreciated that the NIST framework
came closer to prompting for this amount of detail, but wanted the framework to
go even further, such as requiring exact syntax for system queries and commands.
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6.3 Playbook implementation and use
The second case study is detailed next, which investigates playbook perfor-
mance in practice. Examined are two facets of using a playbook: implementing
processes to support the playbook’s incident detection and response plan, and then
executing the response plan during an incident.
6.3.1 Method
This case study, which took place from December 2019 to March 2020, uses
two playbooks that received high scores from the expert evaluators and spanned
both frameworks and scenarios: P4’s IACD playbook for brute-force login attemps
and P11’s NIST playbook for credential misuse. One participant engineered security
solutions based on the playbooks, and then evaluated their usability during three
controlled insider-threat events. Selecting high-scoring playbooks help approximate
a best-case scenario for playbook use. This study assesses efficiency, errors, and
satisfaction to measure usability.
The study did not obtain legal approval to modify network monitoring solu-
tions at SDT, so no SDT employees actively participated in this second case study.
Despite this, it is considered acceptable to use P11’s playbook (which was designed
for SDT) within NDC, because (1) it scored well in the expert evaluation and was
noted for containing fine-grained detail, and (2) the playbook could easily be imple-
mented as-is within NDC, because neither organization had any pre-existing solution
in place, so implementation could start from a blank slate. As in the first study
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(Section 6.2), NDC leaders informed potential participants about the study, while
emphasizing its voluntary nature. As before, participants were allowed to partici-
pate during work hours but not otherwise compensated; as before, participants were
assured that participation (or not) would have no effect on performance evaluations.
6.3.1.1 Playbook implementation
In this phase, one participant implemented new technical controls, based on
the requirements from the selected playbooks, to detect and respond to brute-force
attacks and the misuse of valid credentials within their live network.
It was not feasible for more than one participant to perform implementation
while interacting with the live network; however, this phase was necessary to en-
able evaluation during controlled events (Section 6.3.1.2). NDC leaders nominated
one participant for this phase, and that technician subsequently volunteered. As
such, findings are not generalized from this process, but observation comments are
provided from the (previously unexplored in the literature) implementation process.
After the participant implemented the controls specified in the two playbooks,
they completed a survey about the experience (Appendix A.3) and conducted an
in-depth follow-up interview (Appendix A.4). This survey and interview questions
were grounded in the technology acceptance model, but used both positive and
negative framing to mitigate social desirability bias [55,62,123].
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6.3.1.2 Playbook use during incident response
The main goal of this case study was to evaluate usability of the selected
playbooks during actual incident response. Given the unpredictability of actual
attacks, we worked with NDC leadership to conduct no-notice incident response
exercises that would trigger playbook use. Similar approaches have been described
in compliance programs, but to researchers’ knowledge have never been used to
investigate playbooks [75].
After the completion of the first case study (Section 6.2), NDC leadership
informed all of their employees they would begin using the selected playbooks as part
of their daily duties. Copies of each playbook were provided to each participant, and
also placed in a binder in NDC for easy access. Each technician received a 30-minute
orientation by NDC leaders on how and when to use the playbook. Technicians were
also asked to review the differences between the playbook they had designed in the
first case study and the ones that were selected for use. Additionally, technicians
were required to verify their use of the playbook in a logbook at the beginning and
end of each shift.
In order to maximize ecological validity, technicians were not informed that
the study would include incident response exercises testing the playbooks. This
deception is described in more detail below.
NDC leaders identified one employee as a trusted agent to simulate the insider
threat. Researchers then coordinated directly with the trusted insider to schedule
the simulated attacks; neither NDC leadership nor technicians received any advance
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notice of when they would occur. Researchers triggered three no-notice incident
response exercises on December 2, 2019 (IR1, brute-force); January 13, 2020 (IR2,
credential misuse); and March 2, 2020 (IR3, credential misuse) to evaluate NDC’s
ability to use the playbooks over time.
To initiate the brute-force attack, the trusted agent used a script to rapidly
attempt logins against actual user-level domain accounts throughout the enterprise,
using randomly generated passwords. During the brute force attack, the trusted
insider executed 50 total login attempts against two domain accounts. To initiate
the credential misuse attack, the trusted agent successfully logged into a designated
user-level domain account configured as a honeyword account.
After each exercise, we asked each participant to complete a survey about the
experience (Appendix A.3). Researchers conducted in-depth follow-up interviews
with each participant and with the trusted insider (Appendix A.4). Researchers
also reviewed NDC network and system logs related to the exercises.
For this study, incident response efforts taking less than 140 minutes are con-
sidered to be a success. According to a CrowdStrike analysis, this would be less than
the time period required for access expansion by many nation-state threat actors
and criminals [54].
Ethical considerations. No-notice exercises simulating real-world attacks carry
several potential risks: they may create unnecessary stress for participants or cause
senior personnel to make unnecessary decisions based on a fictional threat. To
mitigate these risks, researchers directed (in consultation with NDC leadership) the
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trusted insider to immediately inform participants who detected the event that it
was an exercise. All written and verbal communications from that point forward
were prepended with “EXERCISE” to indicate that it was not a real event; this is
a common exercise practice. Although participants were notified that the incident
was an exercise, they were not informed that it was specifically connected to the
playbook study.
Further, NDC leaders agreed not to consider participants’ performance in the
exercises (for good or bad) in annual performance reviews, in order to treat the exer-
cise as a learning opportunity to improve institutional practices. Finally, researchers
understand that responding to a controlled event may detract from NDC’s ability to
respond to an actual threat or security event. To mitigate this, events occurred only
on days when NDC was fully staffed. Only 2-3 participants engaged in each response
effort. As is standard in deception studies, after the final exercise, researchers de-
briefed participants, explained the true nature of the study, and provided them with
an opportunity to withdraw their data from the study; no participants withdrew.
This study was approved by an ethics review board.
Limitations. Best practices recommend interviewing 12-20 participants for the-
matic analysis data saturation [84]. Due to security and legal concerns, researchers
were only able to conduct this case study with one partner organization and five
participants. Researchers provide anecdotal observations from this unique oppor-
tunity to observe playbooks in use but do not attempt to generalize the findings.
Ethically, it was necessary to inform participants (after initial threat detection) that
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they were participating in an exercise. While this may somewhat degrade ecological
validity, it does not impede our primary objective: evaluating playbook use without
prior notice.
6.3.2 Results
Below are the results for the usability of playbook frameworks when (1) im-
plementing new security controls based on a playbook and (2) utilizing a playbook
during an incident response event. These results are based on observations, survey
answers, and logged digital security artifacts throughout the network. Reported are
participant demographics, participant feedback on implementing technical security
controls, and participant feedback on using playbooks during three incident response
events. These findings provide the first structured evaluation of playbook usability
from within a live security operations center.
6.3.2.1 Recruitment
Overall, five people participated in the second case study: one who imple-
mented security controls based on the selected playbooks and participated in two
exercises, one who participated in three exercises, and three who participated in
one exercise each (Table 6.2). Four participants had also participated in designing
playbooks for the first case study; P13 joined NDC in late February 2020 and only
participated in the final incident response event (IR3). As with the first case study,
all participants knew about playbooks as an industry standard, but none had used
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a playbook to respond to an incident. Participants averaged 8.2 years of digital
security experience.
6.3.2.2 Playbook implementation
Participant P3 implemented the security controls called for by the two selected
playbooks. P3 was the most experienced defender at NDC (18 years of hands-on and
management experience). P3 did not design either of the two playbooks selected for
implementation; they spent approximately 30 minutes becoming familiar with the
playbook requirements before implementing the requisite security controls.
After assessing the playbooks, P3 determined that all of the requisite logging
mechanisms (e.g., account login failures) and recorded network traffic already ex-
isted; all that was needed was a way to aggregate this data and correlate events to
obtain meaningful information. After a three-week acquisition and change-oversight
period (detailed below), P3 created within one hour a new alert dashboard and a
data-analysis plan to populate the dashboard with events. For the first time, NDC
had a real-time system to continually monitor the network for brute-force attacks
and credential misuse. The dashboard is visible on a large monitor displayed in the
front of the NDC workspace and is accessible from each analyst workstation. Once
either of the two scenarios is detected by the automated system, the dashboard
shows an alert that investigation is needed.
Oversight requirements, change control, and purchasing — mainly associated
with buying new equipment capable of storing and processing required amounts of
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network data — added about three weeks to the implementation process; potential
delays of this kind should be taken into account when planning to adopt playbooks
and new security controls. P3 suggested that playbooks explicitly include implemen-
tation requirements such as equipment specifications and change control procedures
to make this more transparent.
Implementation feedback. Overall, the participant provided neutral responses as
to whether or not the playbooks were useful. They somewhat agreed that playbooks
improved quality of work, positively impacted productivity, and supported critical
aspects of the job; however, they somewhat disagreed that playbooks allowed them
to accomplish more work than would otherwise be possible. In particular, P3 felt
that playbooks might be useful for more complex problems, but were not especially
useful or time-saving for smaller-scale issues, like the ones in our scenarios.
P3 also reported needing to rely heavily on his security engineering back-
ground, as he found both playbooks too abstract to directly guide the development
of new security controls. P3 slightly preferred the NIST playbook, citing previous fa-
miliarity with the framework (which he had seen but never used prior to the study).
They reported spending more time with the IACD playbook to ensure an effective
outcome, but attributed this primarily to lack of familiarity with the framework. P3
hypothesized that IACD’s visual presentation would be easier for less experienced
technicians to work with, but found the resulting playbook too generic for direct
implementation. P3 reported making many notes to expand on each step and rec-
ommended adding complementary reference sheets providing detailed instructions
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for each step.
6.3.2.3 Playbooks in use
Below are the results of the evaluation using incident response playbooks in
an enterprise environment during a series of no-notice attacks. Reported are (1)
how we conducted controlled incident response events through the use of a trusted
agent to conduct simulated insider-threat attacks, (2) metrics for the efficacy of
playbooks during incident response, (3) and general observations. Playbooks dur-
ing the first two incident response events had mostly negative results: experienced
security professionals did not feel the playbooks added much value to their response
efforts, and junior analysts struggled with detecting incident-response events. After
making modifications to the playbooks based on feedback from participants and
our experts, as well as lessons learned from the first two incident response events,
participants’ perceived usability of playbook frameworks increased noticeably.
IR1 outcomes. During the first event, the trusted agent initiated a no-notice brute-
force login attack against two user accounts. P4 was the first to detect the event,
notifying his supervisor of a potential incident 10 minutes after attack execution. P3
independently detected the event two minutes later. The supervisor informed both
participants that this was an exercise, and that they were to finish investigating the
breach independently and without informing other technicians. Within one hour of
detecting the threat, both participants successfully identified the point of origin for
the attack, recommended removing the infected system from the network, identified
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the person using the now-quarantined system, and notified the physical security
team about the (notional) insider threat.
P2, however, did not detect the attack until 14 days later. P3 and P4 left
all attack logs in place after their investigation concluded to provide P2 with more
chances to detect the attack in the future (and allow us to assess P2’s response
decisions). According to the NDC supervisor, it is common for multiple technicians
to check the same security logs and dashboard for alerts for redundancy. The brute-
force alert appeared on P2’s dashboard at least 19 different times during morning
and evening checks, but P2 did not recognize it.
Once P2 realized an event had occurred, they made an initial report to a
supervisor within 10 minutes. After that, it took P2 four hours to successfully
identify the root cause of the attack (and the associated user) and submit an incident
report to the physical security team. Altogether, 335 hours elapsed between the
initiation of the attack and P2’s report.
IR1 feedback. Participants P3 and P4 noted how the playbook contributed to
their successful responses. Both said the brute-force playbook (IACD, written by
P4) straightforwardly guided them to correct actions. However, both largely credited
their past security experience rather than the playbook for the successful outcome.
In particular, both said they relied on knowledge from past experience to make up
for missing details, such as syntax for querying access logs to determine who was
logged in at the system that initiated the attack.
P2 confirmed that he used the playbook, but nonetheless missed the alert as-
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sociated with the brute-force attack all 19 times. They said, “the playbook did not
have enough information for us to conduct a step-by-step walk-through. Because
I was unfamiliar with the new [brand] dashboard, I didn’t know what the alerts
would look like compared to normal data.” This suggests the 30-minute orientation
session was insufficient for this novice defender to learn how and when to use the
playbook. Because P2 missed the alerts, they never identified the initiating condi-
tion that requires a technician to use the incident response playbook. This aligns
with participants’ comments in Section 6.2.3 that the triggering event is the most
important step in a playbook design framework.
Further, P2 commented that since it was his “first time using [the playbook
for an event], we needed to work out who to inform and when. Identifying criti-
cal information for each step and who needs to know it would have saved time.”
P2’s supervisor rejected three reports during the 10-minute initial response window
because they lacked sufficient detail to communicate what was going on.
P2 also noted that having two playbooks available delayed their response:
faced with a stressful situation, P2 read through both playbooks to ensure they
were using the correct one. There was no table of contents and no easily identifiable
markings in the playbook headers (like bolded or colored text) to help an analyst
quickly choose the correct playbook. “It would help to more clearly identify which
playbook is for which event.” P2 commented that this problem could become worse
with more playbooks for other kinds of incidents.
When analyzing post-utilization perceptions of playbooks, all three partici-
pants indicated an overall neutral sentiment (averaging 3.45 on 5-point Likert scale
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questions adapted from SUS, σ=0.69) but all three strongly agreed that playbooks
support critical aspects of their job.
IR2 outcomes and feedback. P2 and P3 participated in IR2, a credential-misuse
event conducted in January 2020. (P4 was unavailable due to off-site training.)
P3 again successfully responded to the incident, performing nearly identically
to their response in IR1 and resolving the situation in 65 minutes. P2 again failed to
recognize the significance of alerts generated during the attack; the incident ended
after 11 days with no recognition.
As with IR1, both participants noted that the NIST-framework credential-
abuse playbook lacked sufficient detail, and P3 again relied heavily on past experi-
ence for their response. P2 provided two possible explanations for failing to detect
the incident. Primarily, they said they had taken several weeks off from work for
the holiday season, causing familiarity with the playbooks to atrophy. Second, P2
did not believe they would be evaluated with the playbook a second time. These
comments align with findings from previous adult learning theories about the im-
portance of continual, hands-on practice with new concepts [21,118].
Resetting after failure. After IR1 and IR2, researchers worked with NDC to
revise the designed playbooks, applying feedback we had received in the first case
study and in this case study so far. In particular, researchers sought to address
three interrelated concerns that had surfaced repeatedly: that playbooks contained
insufficient detail for use during incident response, that too much experience was
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required to use the playbooks properly (making things difficult for novices), and
that identifying a playbook trigger was the most critical challenge.
First, all NDC participants collectively improved both playbooks by adding
details appropriate for use by an entry-level technician, including click-by-click in-
structions for GUIs and specific text for command-line interfaces. As the playbooks
expanded in detail, technicians documented lengthy processes by creating comple-
mentary guides alongside the playbooks. Technicians also made changes focused on
recognizability: creating a table of contents for all playbooks, using bold-font titles
on each playbook, and including summaries for what the playbooks are intended to
help with.
Collectively, NDC participants walked through both scenarios in an ad-hoc
tabletop exercise, annotated playbooks gaps, and later made updates accordingly.
In one example, the tabletop exercise revealed that instructions for communication
were not yet sufficiently detailed; after the exercise, technicians made cheat sheets
documenting which information must be reported and to whom for each playbook
step.
Next, researchers asked NDC to implement a more collaborative model in
which technicians could work together while using playbooks. In particular, junior
technicians were encouraged to ask questions and seek advice from senior leaders
and technicians. After these changes, one month passed before initiating the final
incident response event.
IR3 outcomes and feedback. The trusted insider initiated IR3 (credential abuse)
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in March 2020. P2 and P13, both of whom had volunteered, were selected by NDC
leadership as participants. P13 joined NDC two weeks prior to IR3 and completed
all the on-board training related to playbooks that NDC had implemented. P3 and
P4 were unavailable for IR3 due to other job obligations.
Both participants successfully detected (P2=3 min, P13=5 min) and responded
to (P2=90 min, P13=104 min) the threat within our 140-minute threshold. P2 said
that the more detailed steps added to the playbooks and the new mentorship pro-
gram helped drastically with their understanding of how to respond to events and
communicate more effectively with their supervisors. P13 said, “As a new employee,
it helped me better understand our mission and how to do my job if a supervisor is
not available.” By completing the on-boarding training using playbooks, P13 felt
they more completely understood their role and responsibilities within NDC: “This
is what I do, this is what is required of me.” This supports previous claims regarding
the usefulness of playbooks for helping professionals learn new responsibilities and
technologies [89].
After IR3, both participants strongly agreed that playbooks made their jobs
easier, enhanced their effectiveness on the job, and allowed them to accomplish more
work than would otherwise be possible. After IR1 and IR2, P2 had answered neu-
trally to these questions. Both participants also strongly disagreed that playbooks
were confusing; P2 had answered neutrally after both IR1 and IR2.
While one cannot generalize from this experience, IR3 suggests that, when they
include sufficient detail as well as additional practice and orientation, playbooks may
be useful to help junior technicians with incident response. Future work is needed,
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however, to investigate the extent to which different elements of the implemented
improvements are useful.
6.3.3 Summary
Playbooks designed using both frameworks required significant modifications
to be useful and usable, especially for more junior technicians. During IR1 and IR2,
experienced technicians used the playbooks designed during the first case study —
created within 45 minutes — successfully, but credited most of their success to prior
experience rather than the playbooks. A junior technician was unable to respond
within the expected time window in either case.
After updating the playbooks (and associated organizational processes) using
lessons learned from both case studies, two junior technicians were able to use them
to mitigate a credential misuse attack within 110 minutes.
These findings suggest that current playbook frameworks are not sufficient
on their own, but may be useful as part of a larger process for developing and
institutionalizing playbooks; further research is required for validation.
6.4 Playbooks in other domains
Playbooks, and guidelines for developing them, can be found in domains out-
side of digital security.
Business continuity plans (BCPs) help minimize financial losses, ensure the
continuation of core functions, ensure resource availability, and train employees.
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Many organizations are required by insurance or regulations to have BCPs. Numer-
ous references provide reporting templates for communicating essential information,
how-to guides for audits, and training scenarios for a vast array of situations that
may cause damage to a business [27, 80, 94]. BCPs typically contain fine-grained
detail to assist with implementation and auditing (similar to the playbooks used
during IR3). BCP training varies, but typically involves intricate exercises [94].
U.S. government agencies maintain playbooks for natural disaster continuity
and health emergency preparedness, among other crises [224]; libraries of pre-made
disaster response playbooks are available for reference [67,148,227].
In the medical field, crisis resource management combines standard medici-
nal practices with non-technical skills to ensure exposure to best practices for likely
emergency situations [41]. Studies found that simulated rehearsals with response ac-
tion “playbooks” gave participants confidence that the lessons learned would transfer
to real-life situations [175].
6.5 Discussion
Using two case studies, researchers provide the first structured evaluation of
playbook framework usability within an enterprise environment. Overall, the find-
ings suggest that playbook frameworks are moderately usable for technicians design-
ing playbooks, but do have important areas for improvement. Playbooks generated
using these frameworks may require significant modification to meet their goals of
helping technicians implement the associated security controls and then respond to
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security incidents. Perhaps the most significant drawback, observed in all phases of
our evaluation, is that the frameworks do not elicit playbooks written in sufficient
detail for real-world use. More experienced technicians were able to rely on their
prior knowledge to fill in these gaps, but junior participants struggled to make use of
the playbooks. Based on these results, we make several recommendations for play-
book frameworks, playbooks themselves, and associated organizational processes.
Improvements to playbook frameworks. Technicians must understand the
initiating condition for incident response and be able to detect it – everything that
follows the initiating condition is irrelevant if defenders do not recognize the need for
action. Engineers who implement detection mechanisms must generate meaningful
alerts and should consider requiring a technician’s acknowledgement [53].
Playbooks must be usable during stressful situations. Minor changes such as
using boldface titles, using a table of contents to organize multiple playbooks, and
affixing summaries atop playbooks seemed to help technicians in our case study
quickly select the appropriate playbook for a given situation.
Visualizations may support technicians in understanding the high-level ap-
proach and tasks required to respond to a given incident, but technicians of all
experience levels indicated that highly-detailed instructions (based on best prac-
tices) are critical. Playbook designers should not assume playbook users are experts
with various technology platforms or command-line interfaces. Instead, they should
provide detailed instructions both for implementing required security controls and
for responding to an incident.
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The NIST playbook framework emphasizes communication throughout inci-
dent response, but IACD allows the designer to determine which communication
is essential or optional. Both case studies suggest that playbooks should prompt
technicians about what information to record as well as who to inform and when.
Fill-in forms (such as those found in DHS bomb threat checklist [58]) could be useful
for this purpose.
Playbook designers using IACD had difficulty grouping tasks together, in part
because the instructions left the choice of groupings open-ended and provided little
guidance for how to identify and label groups. Playbook frameworks might consider
providing multiple-choice options for category selection, guides with more detailed
prompts, or a large corpus of training examples annotated with explanations.
Playbook frameworks should prompt designers to plan for non-linear actions:
accomplishing tasks in parallel and accounting for multiple scenarios that may occur
during response actions. Parallel tasks allow for the execution of multiple automated
response actions to expedite investigation. Offering best practices for a variety of
likely encounters and adversarial actions could allow responders to maintain mo-
mentum during an investigation.
Playbooks should include the intent associated with every task. Helping users
understand why a task is relevant may allow them to exercise initiative and improve
overall response efforts [56]. Additionally, experts suggested that intent specification
may help security engineers who are implementing automation solutions based on
playbook design to better understand and meet requirements.
Finally, playbooks must carefully balance including all necessary information
180
without including too much information. Too much information could slow response
time as technicians sift through details to determine appropriate next actions. One
possible mitigation could be to include links and references to external resources such
as best-practice repositories, allowing designers to convey important information
without overly cluttering the playbook itself. Further research is needed to explore
this tradeoff.
Improvements to organizational processes to support playbook adoption.
During the evaluation phase, all three experts recommended using tabletop exer-
cises [225] to iteratively update each playbook until it is sufficiently detailed and
tailored specifically for the local environment. These exercises can be used to val-
idate that the playbook is complete and that all necessary policies and procedures
are in place to support incident response. These exercises were perceived as helpful
to the playbook revision process we observed.
Expectancy theory [18] suggests that if playbooks do not feel useful, it is un-
likely they will be used. Improving playbooks themselves, as described above, will
improve perceived usefulness, but organizational culture around playbooks may also
play an important role. In the second case study, organizational improvements such
as mentorship programs, peer partnering, and continual reinforcement of the play-
book process were cited by our participants as helpful in improving their perception
of playbook usefulness.
Finally, playbook designers must consider organizational concerns and pro-
cesses. Understanding particular constraints, such as requiring approval to make
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changes to a network or limiting hardware purchases to previously approved vendors,
may shape an organization’s incident response strategy and therefore its playbook
design. Designing a playbook that meets best practices while conforming to local
constraints may require significantly more effort and time than the averages shown
in Section 6.2.3.2.
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Chapter 7: Implementing Security: Complementing and Repairing
Baseline Security
Proactive security measures require organizations to understand their own
security posture, understand likely threats, and prioritize mitigation efforts. Chap-
ters 4 and 5 explain that digital security compliance programs are comprised of
technical controls and policies that establish a baseline of security practices in an
organization. This baseline is mandatory for organizations to provide critical ser-
vices or control access to sensitive data but also is laden with their own security
issues. As a result, security professionals are left to assess the impact of compliance
on their organization and to identify ways to extend security beyond compliance
mandates to fill known security gaps.
This chapter reports on organizations’ use of complementary measures — poli-
cies and technical controls enacted to mend known security gaps and exceed com-
pliance requirements. To gain a better understanding of complementary measures,
I surveyed 40 security professionals from across multiple essential-service sectors
and representing several multi-million dollar organizations. Participants reported
on which complementary measures their organizations use to address which security
gaps, which complementary measured worked particularly well (or poorly), and how
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their organizations prioritize and evaluate the complementary measures they adopt.
As expected, only 10 participants believed compliance programs are sufficient
in themselves to establish baseline security, and 37 of 40 participants reported im-
plementing complementary measures to mitigate risks unaddressed by compliance
standards. Some of the most commonly reported complementary measures include
multi-factor authentication, endpoint detection and response tools, periodic account-
access reviews, physical access barriers, and threat-hunting processes.
Although the specifics of how and why organizations implement complemen-
tary measures vary, organizations often adopt complementary measures in response
to security incidents, to reduce costs, when recommended by external experts, or
requested by (sometimes non-technical) executives.
On the whole, participants found complementary measures to be beneficial,
but far from perfect. Organizations know that gaps in compliance exist, and there-
fore solely relying on compliance to drive a defensive security posture exposes the
organization and its users to risk of an attack. Therefore, organizations create
complementary measures that go beyond compliance, however these efforts face or-
ganization inertia and risk. Participants reported numerous instances of poorly
managed complementary processes, investments in unproven or incompatible “solu-
tions,” information saturation, and difficulty keeping complementary measures up
to date and relevant. The results can be used to improve compliance mandates that
acknowledge their shortcomings and provide guidance on how to evolve a security
posture against the threats of tomorrow.
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7.1 Method
This section discusses survey design, participant recruitment, and the quanti-
tative and qualitative analysis conducted on participant responses.
This study was reviewed and classified exempt by the UMD ethics-compliance
office. Participants to provided information about their professional experiences,
perceptions, and background. Due to the sensitive nature of unmitigated security
vulnerabilities, participants only disclosed information they were comfortable with
sharing; additionally, the findings are generalized to protect organizations and sys-
tems.
7.1.1 Survey design
This study used a 21-question survey with a combination of open-ended and
close-ended questions broken into four sections: introduction/screening, baseline un-
derstanding, assessment of complementary measures, and demographics (App. A.5).
Research suggests that the quality of survey responses decreases over time, and ex-
cessively long surveys may result in a participant quitting the study [100]. To this
end, I designed the surveys for experts to complete within 30 minutes of focused
effort, in line with suggested best practices [73]. Actual completion time averaged
27.9 minutes (σ = 0.024). Participants were not compensated directly, but were
invited to opt into a raffle for one of two $50 gift cards.
First, participants answered screening questions (see Section 7.1.2) to ensure
they were qualified to address our research questions.
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Next, participants responded to two questions to better understand sentiment
and baseline defensive practices: (1) If participants’ organizations believed com-
pliance is sufficient to protect their systems and data and (2) If participants’ or-
ganizations employed proactive security controls to address threats not covered by
compliance programs. Participants who indicated their current employer enacts de-
fensive measures complementary to compliance controls were directed to the next
section; otherwise they were directed to the demographics section. For participant-
reported measures, our researchers independently verified that applicable compli-
ance standards did not actually require its use; all reported measures were, in fact,
complementary to compliance requirements.
The third section presented participants with a list of 18 proactive security
controls, selected from a corpus of digital-security risk-mitigation literature [78,
207, 217] and previous research on applied security [60, 117, 191, 192]. Participants
to selected all of the controls they employ that complement existing compliance
controls at their organizations. Additionally, participant could describe and discuss
other (unlisted) security paradigms they may employ.
If participants selected more than five complementary measures, the survey
prompted them to select the five controls they were most interested in discussing.
The survey back-end then randomized the order of the participants’ five selections
and asked six questions per control. Two questions were Likert-scale questions
asking (1) how frequently the participant’s organization assesses the control’s effec-
tiveness and (2) how well the control has worked out for their organization. Four
of these six questions were open-ended and asked participants to describe in detail:
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(1) why the control was implemented, (2) the aspects that worked (or did not work)
well with implementation, (3) how participants ensured complementary measures
were compatible with compliance standards, and (4) the key factors for prioritizing
complementary measures.
Next, participants provided demographic information about their experiences
and perspectives. These included specific work role, current business sector, years
of experience, and information about their clientele.
Finally, the survey prompted participants’ permission for further contact if
response clarification was needed or for future studies.
Survey pilot. Prior to broadly distributing our survey, I asked two security profes-
sionals to complete the survey and provide feedback, specifically focused on question
relevance, completeness, and clarity. I updated the survey based on pilot feedback
and overall study flow; the final version of the survey is listed in Appendix A.5.
7.1.2 Recruitment and Screening
Researchers leveraged personal contacts, email distribution lists, and social
media outlets tailored towards multiple different business sectors to assist with re-
sponse diversity. Specifically, researchers sought participants from the following
sectors: government, healthcare, financial services, consumer services, information
technology, and education. Researchers also employed snowball sampling, in which
participants recommended other qualified professionals. Diversifying participants
based on their current work role and business sector supports ecological validity and
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ensures findings represent varying perspectives.
Researchers screened participants based on three factors: (1) they are actively
employed by an organization that uses digital security compliance programs, (2)
their current job involves compliance standards, and (3) their current work role.
The first two factors ensure participants are dealing with compliance currently.
Additionally, researchers selected participants who serve as security managers, se-
curity analysts, security engineers, governance experts, or software developers to
increase the likelihood participants provided responses from a technical perspective.
Researchers also screened participants to verify they were fluent in English,
over 18 years old, and within the United States.
7.1.3 Data analysis
Researchers use both qualitative and quantitative analysis to identify themes
and trends across participant responses.
Iterative open coding. Two researchers independently analyzed all participant
open-ended responses using iterative open coding, creating a codebook to categorize
responses based on labels [199]. For each response, coders may identify one or
more applicable category labels. These categories are then aggregated into broader
themes [218].
If a survey response was unclear, coders would request clarification or addi-
tional information from the participant via email (if the participant had consented
to additional contact within their survey response); otherwise, researchers discarded
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the response in question. Overall, only two responses were discarded.
To establish a baseline codebook, the two researchers jointly coded a random
10% of the data set (n=4). This established a working set of label definitions.
Next, each researcher independently coded a new subset of the data (n=5) and
calculated the resulting Krippendorff’s Alpha (α = 0.8594) across the entire code-
book. Krippendorff’s Alpha measures inter-rater reliability — a measure of consis-
tency among independent coders — while accounting for chance agreements [88].
An α value above 0.8 indicates high reliability [120,126].
All disagreements during this iteration were associated with participants’ use
of technical jargon that could have multiple interpretations. All disagreements were
fully resolved, the codebook was updated, and the researchers again independently
coded a new subset of the data (n=5), with an α = 0.8229. With two consecu-
tive independent IRR scores above 0.8, the two researchers split the remaining 26
responses and independently coded them using a shared, collaborative codebook.
The two researchers iteratively updated the codebook as needed; when re-
visions were made, the researchers re-coded previously analyzed answers accord-
ingly. Researchers repeated this process until we resolved all disagreements and the
codebook was stable. Both coders attained thematic saturation in each of the five
codebook subsets prior to exhausting the list of participant responses. The final
codebook is given in Appendix B.5.5.
Statistical analysis. Researchers asked two Likert-scale questions about each
complementary control participants described: their satisfaction with the control,
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and how frequently that control is assessed.
To compare satisfaction across groups of controls, researchers used an ordinal
logistic, mixed-model (random effect) regression [42]. This approach is appropriate
for ordinal, non-continous Likert data, while accounting for multiple answers from
individual participants. Researchers added the adaptive Gauss-Hermite quadrature
approximation with ten quadrature points to the model for better accuracy and
fitting [174]. Full details of this regression are given in Appendix B.2.
To examine whether satisfaction is correlated with frequency of assessment,
researchers used the non-parametric Kendall rank correlation coefficient, appropriate
for ordinal data [1].
In both cases, we use α = 0.05.
7.1.4 Limitations
All qualitative research should be interpreted in the context of its limitations.
For each finding, researchers provide counts for the number of participants
who expressed that theme (and where relevant, the number of applicable security
controls) to provide context. However, it is possible that participants may have
omitted mentioning a specific concept when responding to open-ended questions
rather than explicitly disagreeing with the concept. Therefore, statistical hypothesis
tests are not used for these questions, nor is prevalence implied.
Researchers’ recruitment messages and consent waiver explained the purpose
of the study, which may lead to a self-selection bias such that personnel most in-
190
terested in the study were more likely to anonymously participate. However, this
may also suggest that participants were prepared to think more critically about how
compliance affects their security decisions.
All participants self-reportedly work directly with compliance standards and
their experiences with compliance may reduce the possibility of demand character-
istics — an experimental artifact in which participants unconsciously change their
behavior to perform well within a study [167]. By allowing participants to complete
anonymous online surveys, participants may be more likely to provide open-ended,
candid feedback without fear of attribution or negative impacts from their employ-
ers [63].
In instances where participants indicated that their organization employs five
or more complementary measures, participant selected five controls they were most
interested in discussing. This may have introduce some bias into our results. Re-
searchers felt this was acceptable in order to ensure participants were highly knowl-
edgeable on the control and/or most willing to provide detailed responses about.
7.2 Results
Below are the study results on the use of complementary measures to address
the shortcomings of digital security compliance programs within organizations that
provide essential services. Below are participant demographics, the ways in which
participants reported that compliance programs left their organizations exposed to
risk, how and why organizations complement compliance controls, and the various
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issues that arise when implementing complementary measures.
This section annotates prevalence by describing it with n the number of par-
ticipants that reported a particular finding and with c the number of controls to
which the particular finding was reported to apply.
7.2.1 Participants
Researchers recruited 100 participants for this study. In total, 41 responses
were discarded due to a lack of participant qualification as well as 19 partial re-
sponses. Among the remaining 40 participants whose responses we analyze, re-
searchers achieved data saturation by the fifteenth participant. These response
rates, rejection rates, and population size were consistent with previously published
studies with similar methods, participant types, and goals [14,29,38,210]. Table 7.1
describes the overall sample, and Table B.6 in Appendix B.5.4 details information
about each participant.
The study participants included security managers (e.g., CIOs, CISOs, and
SOC directors), specialists in compliance and governance, developers of security
software, security engineers, and security analysts. Ten participants served as senior
security officials for multi-million dollar organizations with client bases of more than
100,000 customers. These organizations represented six business sectors: consumer
services, education, financial services, government, healthcare, and information tech-
nology. Twenty-six participants had more than 10 years of experience. Overall, the








































Table 7.1: Participant demographics (n=40). First column highlights represented
business sectors, current work roles, and educational background. Second column
describes the number of employees at participants’ organizations, the size of partic-
ipants’ clientele, and experience levels.
technology alongside compliance standards; median experience was 15 years.
Specific experiences may vary depending on the particular compliance stan-
dards in effect. The top 30% of compliance standards most frequently used by par-
ticipants are: National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity
Framework (n=33), Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
(n=17), Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) (n=14), Federal
Information Security Management Act (FISMA) (n=12), and at least one document
from the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) (n=12). Figure 7.1
shows the distribution of compliance standards in greater detail. The full list is
reported in App. B.5.3
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Figure 7.1: Distribution of standards used by participants. We aggregate standards
used by three or fewer participants under “Other.” A complete list of standards and
acronyms is given in Appendix B.5.3.
7.2.2 Compliance is insufficient
Many previous works detail complications with organizations implementing
compliance programs. The following results provide further evidence from multiple
business sectors that compliance programs are often insufficient for establishing
baseline levels of security against common threats.
Overall, only 10 of 40 participants reported that their organizations believed
compliance standards were sufficient for their security needs. Seven participants
were unsure about the protection provided, and 23 indicated that compliance in-
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Figure 7.2: Distribution of complementary measures used by participants across
four categories of controls. Block size and color indicate prevalence, with MFA
reported as the most-used complementary measure (c=32) and five different controls
mentioned only once each.
sufficiently protected their organizations and systems. Participant P17 stated that
compliance failed to protect their organization from “nearly all threats. Compli-
ance is so high-level and abstract it is nothing more than a ‘CYA’ [cover your ass]
effort to make leaders invest in security.” Similar sentiment was shared by other
participants, with 21 participants indicating that compliance was in some ways dis-
connected from addressing realistic threats faced by their respective organizations.
Of note, this negative sentiment was shared by a majority of participants across all
business sectors except for finance. Participant P11 — the only participant from the
finance sector — offered their view of why their organization believed compliance
standards were sufficient:
“Compliance standards are sufficient because there are SO many. The
financial industry is literally choked with compliance standards. The real
issue is whether the financial companies can implement those standards
with enough flexibility to keep up with the changing threats, and that
will depend upon the organization.” (P11)
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This could be interpreted to mean that the plethora of (sometimes overlapping)
compliance programs in the finance sector are sufficient to protect the organization,
or perhaps sufficient in the sense that the organization was saturated and did not
want to add more standards or controls.
In total, 37 participants indicated that they employed supplemental security
controls (not required by compliance) to mitigate unaddressed threats. Here, seven
of the 10 participants who previously indicated their organizations believed compli-
ance standards sufficiently covered their security requirements explained that their
organization faced specific threats and that compliance standards were too abstract
to account for these threats. In these cases, compliance programs may have pro-
vided sufficient coverage for the industry at large but niche requirements remained.
Participant P28 summarized the sentiment of these 37 participants, stating that:
“[Compliance is] a baseline to ensure you’re thinking about controls in
many domains at a minimal/moderate [level]. Very often even the base-
line controls are not even implemented well to begin with. [Compliance
is] a starting point not a destination.”
Researchers then asked participants what specific threats were unaddressed
by compliance programs. Researchers categorized these responses, and the largest
category was emerging threats (n=10). Participant P19 stated that “published
standards do not have sufficient flexibility and adaptability to changing threat types
and methodologies. They serve only to resolve known or historic issues.” These
attitudes align well with findings in prior work. Compliance standards vary in how
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often they are updated, but nearly all fail to provide feedback opportunities after
major version releases [192], and malicious exploit development surpasses the ability
of compliance authors to modernize standards [2].
Twelve participants indicated that compliance fails against sophisticated at-
tacks; three participants from the government sector indicated that nation-state
actors are not deterred by compliance. P37 reported that compliance programs
“only protect against 80% of threats (i.e. the low hanging fruit),” suggesting or-
ganizations are exposed to moderate and sophisticated attacks. Compliance was
particularly concerning to P04: “we are a high profile target via name and repu-
tation,” and because of that compliance leaves them “vulnerable to attacks.” An
analysis of nation-state attack methods again highlights the gap between the speed
and complexity of their attacks and the efficacy of compliance programs [54].
Seven participants stated that compliance does not adequately protect or-
ganizations from insider threats (n=7). This aligns with prior work suggesting
insider threats possess privileged insight that allows them to bypass superficially-
implemented defenses required by compliance [49,102,106,208].
Other threats not covered by compliance but mentioned less frequently were:
relying on self-reporting for security issues (n=1), denial of service attacks (n=1),
phishing attempts (n=1), and untrained compliance auditors (n=1) who require
modifications to security that have “no traceability to mission/business require-
ments.”
To proactively defend their organizations from these unaddressed threats, the
40 participants reported that they collectively employ 300 complementary mea-
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sures to augment compliance. (As detailed in Section 7.1.1, participants were asked
to select all applicable complementary measures from a predetermined list of 18,
and offered space to report up to five additional measures under ‘other.’) After
deduplicating the ‘other’ responses, researchers obtained a final list of 23 unique
complementary measures that we bin within four different categories: (1) training
and exercises, (2) human-focused reviews, (3) passive defense, and (4) continually
evolving defenses. Training and exercises involve employees gaining exposure to
defensive techniques interactively through hands-on training (n=19), formal men-
torship programs (n=16), and tabletop “talk-through” exercises (n=15). Human-
focused reviews are triggered by events and require human-in-the-loop interactions.
Examples include change control boards that review and approve changes to digital
systems (n=18), periodic account access reviews (n=21), or proactively assessing
risks and developing mitigation strategies through threat modeling (n=16). Passive
defenses involve technologies that infrequently require human interaction; exam-
ples include multi-factor authentication (MFA) for account protection (n=32) and
zero-client hosts that provide users with new, pristine workstations for every use
(n=9). Lastly, continually evolving defenses require extensive human-in-the-loop
involvement to actively reduce threat exposure. The most used continually evolv-
ing defenses include endpoint detection and response tools (EDR) (n=26) which
focus on detecting and investigating suspicious activities on endpoint systems such
as workstations; implementing physical access controls (n=13) due to both physical
and digital organizational changes (e.g., office swaps, new server rooms, or influx
in hiring); threat hunting (n=20), where defenders attempt to identify and defeat
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known or unknown threats that have already bypassed existing security; and threat
intelligence (n=19), information feeds that inform defenders about emerging threats
and recent events.
The full list of reported controls is included in Appendix B.5.2 and illustrated
in Figure 7.2.
7.2.3 Going beyond compliance
Given that participants report compliance programs insufficiently address threats,
researchers next explored how and why organizations choose to complement com-
pliance controls. More than any other reported reason, compliant organizations
implement complementary measures after they encounter a security incident. Other
key factors include reducing overall costs and gaining better insight into network
activity. Overall, participants generally have a positive outlook on complementary
measures and the benefits they provide their respective organizations.
Security incidents lead organizations to adopt new controls. While re-
searchers did not specifically ask if participants’ organizations were the victims of
a security breach, many offered that past incidents were a driving factor for imple-
menting complementary measures (n=21, c=40). Security gaps not addressed by
compliance programs compelled organizations to take action, reinforcing previous
research that organizations make decisions based on risk exposure [99]. Participant
P36 offered insight into their incident:
“We had a public data breach... a misconfigured database I think? There
199
was immediate pressure to prove to higher [management] that we were
doing something to make sure it didn’t happen again in the future.”
(P36)
Security incidents at already-compliant organizations inherently demonstrate
that baseline compliance provides insufficient protection. To help mend security
gaps exposed by incidents, 16 participants implemented continually evolving de-
fenses (MFA, c=10), 14 implemented passive defenses (EDR, c=4), five implemented
human-focused reviews (account access review, c=4), and five implemented training
and exercises to help mitigate future incidents (tabletop, c=3). P27, a manager in
healthcare, explained their reasoning for moving to EDR after a breach on top of
compliance-mandated anti-virus:
“AV is just flatly insufficient. Attackers often use ”living off the land”
tools, [EDR] helps to detect and prevent normal tools used in bad ways.”
(P27)
Participant P29 reported that their organization “does not embrace comple-
mentary measures, which has led to several incidents,” resulting in adoption of
complementary defenses after the incidents. Participants (n=2) touched on the
reactive inclinations of their respective organizations, with P23 stating that their
organization waits until “incidents or threats appear, [then] prioritization changes.”
It is important to note that even though organizations implemented complementary
measures after an incident, not all of the new controls were directly related to the
previous incident. By implementing new complementary measures after incidents
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— whether or not related to the original problem — security teams signaled to
their organization that they were dedicating resources (e.g., money and personnel)
to improve overall security (n=3).
In addition to actual incidents, red teams — digital security professionals who
act as an adversary to assess networks and systems — have a similar impact on
implementing complementary measures, given that red teams are essentially con-
trolled incidents. Three participants reported that they are more likely to initiate
complementary improvements to compliance programs after a penetration test. This
aligns with prior work suggesting that formal vulnerability reports can have a large
impact [8, 223].
Organizations seek controls that reduce costs. Twenty participants indicated
that budgetary constraints were key factors in deciding to implement controls not re-
quired by compliance. Five of these 20 said that if they were to complement compli-
ance, the new complementary measures would need to reduce task completion times
and overall costs. Participant P15 seeks “potential for asymmetric gains – [controls
that let] a human do the same work 10x faster, or achieving quality/thoroughness
that would be unachievable by any number of humans.” P40 looks for automa-
tion and “time-savings by reducing staff labor hours.” Business re-engineering re-
searchers highlight these concepts as best practices, choosing to optimize the total
effectiveness of employees rather than downsizing [82]. Similarly, P14 stated that
some solutions “may be limiting if [they] are too time or labor intensive,” and their
organization will avoid hiring new personnel to extend security beyond compliance.
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When advocating for solutions that augment compliance, P09 and P10 had to
appeal to senior management in terms of return on investment and getting the most
“bang-for-buck.” However, Participant P24 indicates this is not always the case:
“Larger-budgeted enterprises can initiate security decisions at various
levels based on what is needed,” while “organizations with low fund-
ing need to invest time into basic measures such as routine reviews of
patch management and privileged account access or other inexpensive
proactive measures like table-top reviews of incident response scenarios
and in-person user training (that is actually engaging and informative).”
(P24)
The notion that larger-budgeted organizations permit lower echelons of decision
makers to test various complementary controls is corroborated by P33, who said
technicians at their organization are permitted to “[perform] pilots to determine if
solutions were right for the need.”
Machine learning (ML) (n=3), on-the-job mentorship (n=4), and hands-on
training (n=3) were other controls not required by compliance that participants
selected to address skill shortages and overcome hiring limitations. P37, when dis-
cussing machine learning, stated that “humans do not scale and are in short supply,
and security data is growing exponentially.” P26 similarly reported that they use
ML because there is “not enough staff to keep up with human analysis” required to
monitor compliance-mandated security platforms. P08 uses on-the-job mentoring at
their organization because many of their employees are entry-level and have little-
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to-no compliance experience; they said it is in their organization’s best interest to
“mentor our young employees to ensure they will be vigilant in the requirements of
compliance and overall site security.”
Some participants (n=2) cautioned about letting budgetary constraints drive
security decisions when adopting complementary measures. P16 lamented their
organization’s decision to adopt EDR technologies: “we bought trash solutions from
the lowest bidder.”
There are unspoken benefits to having an incident. Budgeting constraints
not only affect the adoption of complementary measures, but in some cases create
perverse incentives. Participant P31 stated that the occurrence of incidents actually
help security teams advocate for a higher budget prioritization. Participants P02 and
P27 similarly discuss an often unspoken trade-off between security and budgeting.
“If you have perfect security, you obviously don’t need your whole budget so let’s
give it to someone else that needs things more,” stated P02. For P27, “security
breaches are a strong, public-facing signal that something is wrong and resources
need to be applied to fix it. Embarrassment will continue until it is fixed.” These
comments fit with prior observations that security practitioners constantly compete
for a slice of their organization’s overall budget and must consistently demonstrate a
return on security investments [12,187]. This reality may motivate security teams to
roll out complementary measures over time, continually demonstrating to budget-
controlling officials a need for growth beyond baseline compliance security.
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Compliance measures do not provide requisite network insight. Partici-
pants often needed complementary measures to assist with decision-making because
the insights provided by compliance controls were insufficient; this accords with
findings from Kokulu et al. [117]. For example, participants reported that standard
compliance controls lacked visibility into network traffic flows and user activities
(c=35). Participant P36 explained one point of frustration with the NIST Cy-
bersecurity Framework, General Data Protection Regulation, California Consumer
Privacy Act, and other financial standards:
“It’s impossible to defend a network where I can’t tell you how many
workstations are attached. How many belong to us? We can’t connect
what users are visiting what sites, so how can I tell who downloaded
malware?” (P36)
Complementary measures are intended to provide improved understanding, allowing
managers and technicians to make better defensive decisions. In fact, participants
(c=36) indicated they employed complementary measures to enhance the effective-
ness of other digital defenses, some of which were mandated by compliance pro-
grams. Participant P28 uses EDR to support compliance-mandated anti-virus and
post-incident reporting:
“Simple signature based AV is dead. EDR tooling gives a much richer
vision of process execution that is valuable for both detection and foren-
sics.” (P28)
Participant P32 decided to use MFA to complement their password policies and
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provide “an additional level of security that assists in reducing the occurrence of
gaining access to critical systems.”
Organizations rely on external recommendations. Sixteen participants in-
dicated they rely heavily on the advice of experts from outside their organization
or marketing to make security decisions not required by compliance (n=16). Four
participants stated that the reputation of external experts plays a role in whether
they adopt the recommendation or not (n=4). Participant P37 spends “a good bit
of time finding vendors with truly useful technologies and not just well-marketed
snake oil” when following up on external recommendations.
Executive-level decisions made in isolation are seen as harmful. Several
participants reported that executives within organizations, some without technology
backgrounds, make decisions to complement compliance without input from their
technicians (n=5). This led to frustrations within the organization, with P22 feeling
many decisions about complementary measures were based on “political pressure”
to partner with a particular vendor, or “based entirely on whim of [the] CIO” with-
out an operational need or threat model to justify the decisions. Similarly, P23 said
complementary measures such as threat intelligence are “often seen as a ‘check the
block’ [box] function for executives to claim they are doing things” to defend the net-
work from threats not covered by compliance — often without a clear understanding
of the expected outcomes.
P06 warned about the misalignment of resources based on these types of deci-
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sions, recalling a time when their organization chose to buy a new security platform
rather than exploring why their existing tools failed: “Interesting technology is great
but if it doesn’t address a critical need, we end up working on less important needs.”
P30 stated, “once it is determined what product is wanted [by managers], security is
brought in to assess [the solution], which is slightly backwards.” P22 made a similar
point discussing their company’s implementation of EDR: “It was a dumpster fire”
because the purchased solution only worked on a fraction of the company’s systems.
Bottom-up recommendations to managers shaped implementation strate-
gies. Eight participants who were managers said they implemented complementary
measures based on technician-identified needs to address security gaps remaining
despite compliance standards. In total, managers implemented 26 controls based
on bottom-up requirements from security employees. Managers said they adopted
these controls to reduce the time required to accomplish tasks, improve overall per-
formance, and enhance shared ownership of the security situation.
Organizations generally have a positive outlook on complementary mea-
sures. Thirty participants indicated that their complementary measures had valu-
able outcomes for their organizations. More specifically, seven participants reported
that their security investments made their organization’s overall attack surfaces
smaller. For example, Participant P03 stated that their use of vulnerability disclo-
sure programs, threat hunting, and live security exercises identified “numerous gaps
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Figure 7.3: Visualization of participants’ sentiment towards complementary mea-
sures, per labeled category.
MFA counterbalances weak password policies, like those from the Internal Revenue
Service [192]. Participant P13 enjoys not needing “to remember complex passwords,
just need pin” for an MFA smart card, while P15 stated MFA removes attack vectors
associated with passwords like pass-the-hash [163] or hash cracking.
Analysis revealed, using the quantitative analysis methods discussed in Sec-
tion 7.1.3, that participants preferred complementary measures that did not require
much effort to maintain. As depicted in Figure 7.3, the passive defense category
— complementary measures that require minimal human-in-the-loop interaction —
had the highest overall sentiment scores (averaging 4.35 out of 5, σ = 0.95) and
served as the baseline for our ordinal logistic regression. Participants, as shown in
Table 7.2, were significantly more satisfied with passive defenses than with any other
category of complementary controls. In fact, the point estimates for the odds ratios
indicate that participants were only 10-20% as likely to express higher satisfaction
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Control Category Odds Ratio Conf. Int. p-value
Passive Defenses (c=52) – – –
Training and Exer. (c=75) 0.16 [0.06, 0.47] 0.0008∗
Human-focused Rev. (c=70) 0.19 [0.07, 0.52] 0.0012∗
Cont. Evolving Def. (c=103) 0.11 [0.04, 0.29] <.0001∗
∗Statistically significant
Table 7.2: Summary of regression modeling participant satisfaction levels as a func-
tion of control category. Results demonstrate that passive defenses were preferred
over other complementary measure categories
Proactive Control Group τ Correlation p-value
Passive Defense 0.08 Weak (+) 0.6057
Training and Exer. 0.21 Weak (+) 0.2002
Human-focused Rev. 0.23 Weak (+) 0.1148
Cont. Evolving Def. 0.26 Weak (+) 0.0137∗
∗Statistically significant
Table 7.3: Ordinal association between participants’ satisfaction level with each
control and their reported assessment frequency.
in the other categories as they were for passive defenses.
Additionally, participants are more satisfied with complementary measures
when they are assessed frequently enough. The results from Kendall’s τ compar-
isons (Table 7.3) show a significant but weak positive correlation — indicating that
satisfaction is higher when assessments are more frequent — for continually evolving
defenses. Similar correlations are observed for the other three categories, but these
trends do not reach statistical significance.
7.2.4 Additional measures are not a panacea
Despite participants generally having a favorable outlook, participants also
warn that complementary measures are not one-size-fits-all. This section highlights
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a range of challenges and complications associated with adoption of complementary
measures.
Positive benefits come at a cost. Participants’ efforts to fix security gaps not
covered by compliance programs came at a cost to the organization — consuming
time, money, or additional human capital (n=37).
Organizations typically weigh the costs of managing a compliance program [23],
but also must consider the workforce costs for supporting complementary measures.
While training and exercises invest in the technical competency of the workforce,
they also require organizations to allocate time for employees to be away from their
primary job. Participant P26 reported that live security exercises allowed for tech-
nicians to “discover what worked, and what didn’t” during exercises — increasing
the likelihood that mistakes are made during training and not real-life. P36 stated:
“we usually see instant benefits after training... we typically cycle people through
training in small groups so the overall security team still functions.” In addition,
P02 warned about significant planning obligations leading up to exercises: “two
planners from our SOC participated in [about] 100 hours of planning for 12 hours
of training.” With complementary behaviors like on-the-job mentorship programs,
P35 stated they provide the “ability to raise talent level. Strengthen internal rap-
port, structure, work product[s]. Shorten responses and knowledge transfer [during]
emergencies.” At the same time that mentorship programs raise the talent level
of organizations, P36 cautioned that organizations need to be prepared to dedicate
time away from their job and focus deliberately on mentorship: “if you don’t set
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aside time for it, it isn’t happening. But if you set aside time for it, plan for what
isn’t being done during that time. ”
Participants noted that human-focused reviews require organizations to trade
speed for enhanced security. Participant P12 stated change control in their organi-
zation “slowed down change but increased reliability”; P20 made similar comments.
According to P35, human-focused reviews in general should have mechanisms for
“temporarily breaking beaucracy” under urgent circumstances and should optimize
everyday timelines when possible — factors often not accounted for in compliance
programs [192].
Participants also reported usability concerns with passive defenses (n=11) that
diverted a significant amount of time away from other security tasks. MFA, the most
commonly employed complementary measure, also had the most usability concerns.
Six participants (n=6), representing each surveyed business sector, stated the se-
curity benefits of MFA came with usability challenges including lost smart cards,
the migration of soft tokens to new phones, and lost hardware tokens (thus, cor-
roborating complications discussed by Neware et. al [155]). Similarly, P17 and P19
highlight security-usability tradeoffs in the use of zero-client systems, which have
no host operating system or storage and instead serve a clean virtual desktop that
is erased after each use. Zero-client systems can create an “easy to establish ‘gold’
standard [that can be] updated as needed,” (P17), but the lack of “persistence or
personalization of the operating environment” (P19) can inhibit required work.
Participant P25 indicated that some organizations implement controls without
thinking about the “next step” of usability. For example, with sandboxing, their
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organization suffers from usability “challenges [in] getting samples from the live
environment to the [forensics] sandbox in a safe manner.” Mapping out end-to-end
use cases may provide a benefit in adopting new technologies.
P21 noted tradeoffs in implementing end-to-end encryption, a passive defense
measure: the security and privacy benefits “must be balanced with needs for log-
ging, troubleshooting and forensics,” including creating challenges during incident
investigation.
Complementary measures should not conflict with compliance. While com-
plementary measures are intended to augment compliance controls, they are not
always fully compatible with existing compliance standards. Participants reported
that for 46 implemented complementary measures (c=30 from the government sec-
tor), there was no check for compatibility with compliance. P21’s comment about
end-to-end encryption, for example, noted that this complementary measure may
inhibit collection of logging data that is required under some compliance regimes.
Sometimes incompatibilities between compliance controls and complementary
measures are more nuanced: P19 claimed that tabletop exercises do not have any-
thing to do with compliance. However, considering compliance while executing
tabletop exercises may help ensure participants practice compliant actions such as
protecting sensitive information from improper disclosure [111,204].
However, some participants did report that their organizations carefully con-
sider compatibility when implementing complementary measures. Participant P28
described their organization’s methodical selection process for ensuring compatibil-
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ity with existing programs. Five participants reported that they looked specifically
for MFA solutions marketed as “compliance-ready” before buying, a trend previ-
ously identified by Julisch et al. [113]. When incompatible issues arise, P40 stated
they “encourage self-report[ing]” when compliance may have been violated, which
runs contrary to many zero-tolerance policies that enact financial sanctions for all
infractions [158].
Poorly-managed measures provide reduced benefit. Eleven participants re-
ported instances of complementary measures that provided reduced or even no ben-
efit when poorly managed within their organization (n=11). Participant P27 indi-
cated that their organization paid “six figures” for intrusion detection systems that
remained in storage and were never set up (a pilot participant also reported a similar
situation).
P25 said of their vulnerability disclosure program: “developing the program
was great... informing everyone of its existence has been a struggle.” As a result, few
vulnerabilities have been discovered or remediated. In contrast, P24 said marketing
for their disclosure program yielded high participation with “over 100 vulnerabil-
ities identified” despite their organization being compliant. However, uncovering
vulnerabilities using a disclosure program may still not be sufficient if there is no
plan in place to manage them: P01’s organization had issues reported, but they “go
into a backlog where they don’t get remediated.” This finding accords with other
examples of mismanagement of vulnerability disclosure programs [8].
Three participants reported financial losses when implementing threat hunt-
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ing because their organization hired unqualified employees and did not adequately
understand their own networks (n=3). Participant P17 stated that it “turns out
finding unknown threats from systems that aren’t baselined is hard.” Since their
organization’s compliance programs did not require up-to-date documentation (such
as network maps), the organization paid hunters to sift through a network that its
own administrators did not understand. P16 similarly said, “we go where we fear
the threats are, rather than where they actually are,” that their organization often
“ignores their [threat hunters’] findings,” and “fails to train, equip, or employ [threat
hunters] properly.” P12 was “not convinced [their organization] brought in the right
hunters.” As with vulnerability disclosure programs, complementary measures may
fail if the organization is not prepared to use them effectively.
Three participants emphasized the importance of managing routine human-
focused reviews, which is a known weakness in compliance standards themselves [192].
P12 complained that their organization does not perform account-access reviews as
frequently as their internal policy requires; P24 offered that access reviews “don’t
work well unless you commit to a routine schedule, and make time to conduct the
review.” Additionally, P24 warned that change-control review boards “can become
extremely bureaucratic and provide the opportunity for non-decision makers to be-
come gatekeepers that slow down the process.” Of note, P24 indicated that missed
change-control board response deadlines significantly delayed approvals for a new
security platform. These comments suggest that complementary measure sometimes
reify problems with baseline standards rather than alleviating them.
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Keeping complementary measures relevant is difficult. A key weakness of
compliance is staying up to date with current technology and best practices [192],
but complementary measures often struggle with the same challenge. In total, 13
participants warned about the difficulties of keeping complementary measures rele-
vant.
Participants argued that organizations should ensure training and exercises
are congruent with the current threat landscape to maximize effectiveness (n=3).
P16, expressing their frustrations with live security training, stated “We let morons
design them. They are not grounded in reality and are at least five years behind
[current] threats.”
Information does not equate to actionable intelligence. Ten participants
reported that their organizations struggle to act on the information gained from
implemented complementary measures (n=10), with four complaints specifically fo-
cused on threat intelligence (n=4).
Participant P16 lamented “information overload,” indicating that their orga-
nization’s implementation of threat intelligence “is neither timely, nor actionable. It
is designed to give the illusion of insight, without forcing meaningful change.” P17’s
organization likewise “struggles to quickly integrate paid vendor intel into our analy-
sis systems,” and similarly, P13 has “yet to see any complementary measures taken
based on threat intel.” P19 mentions that information overload of this kind can
delay responses: “current models for developing and evaluating threat intelligence
have been successful in timely development of information but have not provided
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sufficient time to mitigate across the domain.” This sentiment corroborates prior
findings that return-on-investment for threat intelligence varies [124].
Outside of threat intelligence, P24 warns that information is not sufficient
when it’s not used properly: “Logs from agents my not be collected properly or
reviewed by personnel with the proper training.”
7.3 Discussion
This paper examines how organizations overcome shortfalls with digital-security
compliance programs. Security professionals rely on a wide range of complementary
measures to address the threats their organization face, as discussed in Section 7.2.2
and depicted in App. B.5.2. While many security professionals described effective
methods of complementing compliance, they also reported numerous inefficiencies
and challenges that can occur when implementing complementary measures.
Based on these results, below are some recommendations for improving both
compliance standards themselves and the ways that organizations supplement them.
Integrating complementary measures into compliance. This work echoes
others in finding that compliance standards are insufficient on their own, leading
many organizations to introduce complementary measures.
Section 7.2.3 shows that, in many cases, complementary measures can ef-
fectively reduce organizations’ attack surface. Complementary measures that gain
significant adoption and acceptance are promising candidates for incorporation back
into revised compliance standards as requirements. Standards authors should for-
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malize mechanisms for audited organizations to provide feedback about the com-
plementary measures they are using, why they are using them, and how well they
are working. This would enable standards authors to observe trends at scale and
identify generalizable benefits for participating organizations [16].
Documenting complementary measures’ use cases also provides an opportunity
to assist with compliance compatibility. Specifically, standards can be written to
directly recognize that complementary measures are often desired or even necessary,
akin to guidelines provided by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration [70]. Here,
standards authors can create provisions that require organizations to document and
carefully manage the complementary measures they implement, without spelling out
what those measures might be. In particular, standards could require that organi-
zations (and therefore auditors) ensure: (1) a holistic management program is in
place, (2) complementary measures are being routinely monitored and/or adjusted,
(3) employees are provided with requisite training to understand and implement
complementary measures, and (4) incidents related to complementary measures are
remediated.
Recommendations must come from reputable sources. Section 7.2.3 shows
that organizations typically rely on advice from security tool vendors, external ex-
perts such as red teamers, or devise their own strategies for implementing comple-
mentary measures. But as this study shows, these sources may not always lead to
security benefits: organizations are left to sift through vendors’ “snake oil” solu-
tions and some implementation strategies fail to address actual security problems.
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Aggregating data that supports the efficacy of complementary measures, akin to
the Building Security In Maturity Model [133], can help organizations make better
implementation decisions and understand what worked well (or poorly) before in-
vesting. Anonymizing and making “success stories” publicly available may also help
overcome common security secrecy [230].
Keeping pace with evolving threats and technologies. Compliance programs
struggle with agility and responsiveness to evolving threats and technologies —
often driving organizations to implement complementary measures. Our findings
suggest, however, that some complementary measures suffer similarly from insuffi-
cient timeliness. There are opportunities to improve agility for both compliance and
complementary measures.
Efforts to make compliance standards more responsive could reduce the need
for complementary measures but, as others have noted, rapid compliance changes
may have negative organizational impacts [135,192]. As seen in Section 7.2.4, there
are examples of complementary issues failing to evolve when organizations invest in
solutions that “are not grounded in reality” or focus on outdated, unlikely threats.
It is important for decision-makers to understand that responsiveness is a systemic
issue and compliance is not solely to blame. Organizational behaviors and cultural
factors that reinforce responsiveness and agility also may have a significant impact
on security.
Organizational factors are just as important. Compliance security gaps exist
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and complementary measures can help. But when they are not planned for, as we
see in Section 7.2.4, complementary measures may fail to fill security gaps or induce
new problems. Complementary measures need to be routinely enforced, must align
with actual security needs, and organizations need to prepare for end-to-end use
cases prior to implementation.
Here is a slight modification to an old adage: if a thing is worth doing, it
is worth doing well and routinely. Throughout Section 7.2.4, we find instances
of organizations investing in complementary measures but not following through
on required security tasks such as: buying new security platforms and failing to
actually use them, missing critical security events because analysts failed to check
logs, or delaying the approval of a much-needed security platform because a change
review board missed their response deadline. Routine checkups, reassessments, and
deadlines can help eliminate these problems.
Section 7.2.4 shows that organizations chose to spend money on new comple-
mentary controls rather than understand why their current security strategy failed.
Participants highlighted instances were security platforms were misconfigured due
to a lack of training and, instead of triaging the problem to identify the training
or configuration deficiency, organizations were more likely to spend more money
instead of optimizing the platforms already in use. Organizations should priori-
tize security requirements and expenditures against actual needs, based on business
goals, requirements, and threats.
Lastly, organizations need to have support in place prior to deploying com-
plementary measures. Section 7.2.4 reports instances of complementary measures
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generating massive amounts of information (e.g., threat intelligence or security logs)
without support in place, such as a place to store the data. There were also orga-
nizations that failed to train their employees on how to use new platforms or hired
employees with mismatched skills for tasks such as threat hunting. Prior research
suggests that organizations should sufficiently resource usable solutions, invest in
employee training, and support the end-to-end use-case requirements for security
measures [8, 60, 72,87,110,117,191,202,203].
While compliance is a critical aspect of an organization’s digital security, it
is far from a panacea. Organizations know that gaps in compliance exist, and
therefore solely relying on compliance to drive a defensive security posture exposes
the organization and its users to risk of an attack. Thus, organizations create
complementary measures that go beyond compliance; however, these efforts face
organization inertia and risk. These results may spur development of improved
compliance mandates that acknowledge their shortcomings and provide guidance on
how to evolve a security posture against emerging threats.
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Chapter 8: Discussion
The work in this thesis provides insight into the effectiveness of proactive mea-
sures for security professionals in real-world environments. The proactive benefits of
planning, baselining, and implementing security controls can provide organizations
with measurably improved security, but it is essential for support to be integrated
throughout an organization’s culture.
8.1 Better together
The observations in this thesis suggest that proactive measures provide optimal
benefits when employed in a complementary manner.
Proactive plans to mitigate risk provided tangible improvements to the security
posture of NYC3, but gaps remained. Chapter 3 revealed that, prior to using threat
modeling, compliance programs played a foundational role in how NYC3 and its
security technicians implemented baseline security controls. However, in this study,
participants did not consider security gaps caused by compliance standards into
their threat model. Chapter 4 highlights the insight that organizations, like NYC3,
could benefit from through systematic evaluations of their compliance programs and
understanding how mandated baseline digital security measures may (or may not)
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affect their overall security posture. Additionally, proactive planning through threat
modeling allowed NYC3 security professionals to identify risk and develop mitigation
strategies. Mitigation, however, does not mean organizations are now immune from
attacks, as evident in Section 3.3.5. Once newly-implemented defensive measures
detected on-going exploitation attempts, NYC3 incident responders from the SOC
executed ad hoc remediation efforts — but failed to pre-develop response plans for
likely threats. These findings suggest that the outputs generated from planning
efforts (such as threat modeling) should become mandatory inputs for likely threats
that need to be planned for through incident response playbooks. As Chapter 7
suggests, organizations must adopt mechanisms to support playbook development
(e.g., allocating time, personnel, and requisite resources) as well as organizational
behaviors that reinforce these habits. Section 8.2 expands on this notion below.
Baseline security mechanisms allow organizations to establish minimal security
to perform essential business tasks, but alone are insufficient to protect organizations
from targeted attacks and proper baselining may actually induce their own security
issues. Chapters 4 and 5 revealed particular issues that may arise through perfect
compliance and also several threat models not considered by an exemplar compli-
ance program. This suggests that organizations need to process discovered security
gaps and compliance complications through a planning framework such as threat
modeling to account for newly-identified issues. Additionally, Chapter 7 details the
impact of outdated policies and technical controls and how they can inhibit security
benefits that could be gained from compliance programs and complementary mea-
sures. For this reason, both organizations and compliance authors should employ
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more agile mechanisms that allow for periodic reviews and updates of policies in
ways that promote security and minimize disruption [178].
Proactively implementing security controls and policies through incident re-
sponse playbooks and other complementary measures may provide valuable boosts to
security readiness, but they must be organizationally anchored and focused against
realistic threats. Participants in Chapter 7 discuss the numerous frustrations, wasted
resources, and overall inefficiencies associated with organizational emphasis on se-
curity platforms that do not fulfill actual requirements and siphon needed resources
from other security efforts for support. Similarly, incident response playbooks re-
quire significant organizational change and emphasis to support tailored security
requirements, as seen in Section 6.3.2.3. Organizations should avoid developing
playbooks for low-impact scenarios that are either unlikely or negligible in severity.
Planning frameworks increase the likelihood that complementary measures and in-
cident response playbooks meet actual organizational requirements. Additionally,
organizations must ensure complementary measures (including playbooks) are com-
patible with mandated compliance standards, otherwise conflicting, non-compliant
actions could inadvertently be reinforced (as seen in Section 7.2.4). As further
discussed in Section 8.2 below, organizations should strive to implement security
solutions that enhance usability, provide shared understanding for technicians and
leaders, and allocate time for training and rehearsals. As Chapter 6 shows, play-
books were only able to benefit security technicians of all experience levels after
multiple no-notice events, training sessions, and revision sessions that required ded-
icated emphasis from the SOC.
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Understanding that proactive measures are better when used in harmony
together, Section 8.3 recommends an end-to-end workflow based on observations
throughout this thesis.
8.2 Impacts of organizational culture
This thesis elucidates the required, holistic integration of security within organiza-
tional culture to help ensure proactive measures take hold. This is rooted in founda-
tional knowledge from behavioral psychology and organizational culture [178], and
Chapter 7 anecdotally confirms the sub-optimal consequences of non-integration.
Organizations should reinforce security tasks and habits through peer
collaboration and mentorship programs. Peering, as described in Chapters 3,
6, and 7, allows small teams to challenge one another and assist with task comple-
tion. A clear benefit of peer collaboration is that similarly-experienced employees
can share knowledge, reinforce their own understanding of security tasks, and build
improved bonds within their security team [178]. Similarly, mentorship programs
provide opportunities for junior employees to partner with mid- to senior-level secu-
rity professionals of a similar work role to gain a new perspective on the significance
of task completion (e.g., how failure can affect the organization), learn complemen-
tary skills, and help shape junior professionals’ career goals [178]. Whether peer
collaboration and mentorship programs are informal or part of a formal initiative,
organizations must clearly communicate program expectations to their employees,
preserve time for employees to participate in the program, establish incentives for
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participation, and, when necessary, establish deterrence for non-participation. Part-
nered organizations in Chapters 3 and 6 both integrated peer collaboration and
mentorship into periodic performance reviews and assessments. Monthly and quar-
terly periodic performance reviews allowed supervisors to monitor participation and
nudge closer collaboration before annual assessments; annual assessments served as
“report cards” for program participation as well as overall performance.
Perceived efficacy and perceived ownership shape adoption rates. The
theory of planned behaviour (TPB) should also be considered when implementing
proactive measures, specifically when attempting to improve adoption rates. For
proactive measures to take hold within an organization, they must decrease the
difficulty of performing security tasks and organizations must actively reduce as
many barriers as possible that may impede task accomplishment. These two fac-
tors directly shape employees’ perceived behavioral control and the likelihood they
will continue using the proactive measures [6], as seen in Chapters 3, 6, and 7. In
Chapter 3, participants that used threat modeling reported high levels of perceived
usability: threat modeling improved their job performance, it was easy to use, it
was useful for their job. Additionally, senior leaders at NYC3 deliberately set aside
time for employees to perform threat modeling and established a system for tracking
known security issues derived from threat modeling, which allowed employees to feel
like their recommendations mattered and helped improve the organization’s security.
Employees at NDC had similar sentiments in Chapter 6, understanding that dedicat-
ing time towards refining playbooks would have positive outcomes and allow them
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to accomplish tasks during stressful events more quickly. In Chapter 7, it became
evident that organizations needed to streamline the use of proactive measures for
employees, especially for platforms that required significant financial and/or person-
nel investments. Poorly-managed programs suffered while well-resourced proactive
measures were embraced by employees and organizations alike.
On-boarding training and periodic skill assessments proved to be valuable
for security professionals and organizations. Introducing threat modeling and
playbook development to new employees allowed them to better understand their
role in the organization, their responsibilities, and the impact of failing to perform
their security tasks. Periodic skill assessments, such as live security exercises, al-
lowed employees to reinforce skills learned from on-the-job or formal training means
and allow organizations to evaluate both the effectiveness of their personnel and
training programs [22].
Organizations should be proactive and avoid constant reactive changes.
Quickly realigning security priorities can have severe second- and third-order im-
pacts on organizations. As seen in Chapter 7, participants discussed the varying
ways and reasons that organizations chose to implement complementary measures
after a security incident occurred — often with urgency. Prior research suggests it
is in organizations’ best interests to be as proactive as possible; constant, reactive
realignments in security priorities can negatively impact overall business perfor-
mance [37,82]. Funds have to be reallocated for unforecasted security expenditures
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and may harm daily business operations elsewhere [12, 187]. Embracing proactive
measures and minimizing significant shifts in security priorities may counter these
negative impacts.
Bi-lateral communication between leaders and technicians is key. Dis-
jointed or poorly communicated defensive plans are resented by those that have to
implement them. Chapter 7 shows that uninformed decisions by executives (made
in isolation away from security teams) often result in the implementation of proac-
tive measures that do not adequately address actual requirements or do not sup-
port the usability needs of the workforce that will actually be using the platform.
These observations accord with previous behavioral psychology research and shows
the importance of bidirectional communication with front-line to supervisors [229].
Conversely, open communication and transparency between supervisors and security
professionals lead to trust and the ability to adjust proactive measures to best fit
organizational requirements — thus, enhancing effectiveness [221]. In Chapters 3,
participants’ self-value to the organization improved because their organization in-
corporated their insight into defending New York City. Threat modeling provided an
open-communication model that allowed professionals to identify problems, recom-
mend solutions, and watch with full transparency as their organization implemented
solutions to address the problems. In Chapter 6, playbooks initially provided little
benefit to senior or junior technicians. The organization reviewed failures, imple-
mented internally-recommended changes, and built comprehensive response plans
that met their specific requirements. In Chapter 7, organizations that encouraged
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open-communication were more likely to implement well-fit solutions to meet spe-
cific security requirements; if problems arose, communication between leaders and
technicians allowed the organization to quickly adapt solutions for a better fit.
Cultural reinforcements need to consider how adults learn best. Orga-
nizations should consider best-practices from behavioral psychology and behavioral
change when considering security training. The experiential learning theory outlines
that adults can better learn new concepts by integrating new concepts into existing
ones, experiencing concepts first-hand, reflecting on new behaviors, and repetition of
new concepts [118]. Social learning theory helps explain particular learning practices
in digital security, showing that professionals draw linkages between behaviors and
consequences [122, 208]. Organizations need to maximize this, allowing employees
to understand the direct benefits of new behavior patterns [21] — specifically, that
employing proactive security measures has positive outcomes on their organization
and quality of work. Chapters 3 and 6 highlight the effectiveness of these learning
strategies. Employees at New York City Cyber Command were able to quickly learn
threat-modeling techniques given a short educational intervention and an opportu-
nity to apply their new knowledge in a one-on-one setting. Junior National Defense
Center employees required repeated opportunities to apply new concepts and un-
derstand the positive impacts that quick-response incident response playbooks can
have on their organization. In both instances, tailoring training strategies towards
adult learning helped reinforce security training.
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Figure 8.1: Visualization of the recommended workflow that organizations should
follow to benefit from proactive measures
8.3 Proposed workflows for proactive measures
The anecdotes and observations from Chapter 7, when coupled from lessons
learned from Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6, provide a blueprint for how organizations can
effectively employ proactive measures in a complementary manner. This section
describes the proposed workflow visualized in Figure 8.1 in greater detail.
Upfront, organizations should integrate and emphasize sound security prac-
tices throughout all business operations. Senior organizational leaders, mid-level
managers, and security professionals should all have active roles throughout the
employment of proactive measures.
Organizations must analyze baseline requirements to first understand digital
constraints (the things they cannot do) and restraints (the things they must do).
The analysis of mandatory policies and technical controls should then be used to
inform organizations’ planning efforts.
Next, organizations should execute planning with an emphasis on which threats
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are mitigated by baseline requirements, which threats may be created by baseline re-
quirements, and unaddressed threats. By using planning frameworks such as threat
modeling, organizations can begin to understand their actual security requirements
and develop strategies for improving their overall security posture — as well as how
the organization can best holistically support these strategies.
After prioritizing their security needs with consideration to organizational
goals, organizations can begin implementing security measures that adequately ad-
dress threat exposure. These security measures are meant to mitigate threats and
organizations should have plans in place for when threat actors attack. Incident
response playbooks based on actual threat exposure should be developed to en-
hance readiness. Playbooks help security professionals establish required organiza-
tional support structures and technical systems before they are needed. Readily-
available and well-rehearsed playbooks support security professionals with step-by-
step prompts to help establish momentum during stressful events against threats
that they are likely already familiar with — because they participated in the base-
line analysis and planning process. Organizational leaders are prepared because they
were integrated in the planning and response efforts. Whether the incident was trig-
gered by friendly red teams or actual adversaries, organizations should evaluate the
efficacy of implemented security measures and iteratively integrate that feedback
into follow-on planning efforts. Negative feedback can be helpful in updating threat
models and better tailoring security mechanisms towards the organization’s actual
security requirements.
Proactive measures should not be a “one-and-done” effort. Any changes in key
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factors such as compliance updates, emerging threats, or performance feedback for
proactive measures should trigger a re-evaluation of each factor. Proactive measures,
if adequately supported and emphasized by organizations, should be continual efforts
to enhance the robustness of their security program.
Further research is needed to confirm the overall efficacy of this proposed
workflow. Various factors such as organizational size, budget, and maturity should
be evaluated to determine the effect, if any, on the overall process.
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Chapter 9: Conclusion
Proactive measures can provide organizations with the tools necessary to im-
prove their digital security posture before threats manifest.
As I show in Chapter 3 and 7, organizations — with the best of intentions —
may employ security measures ineffectively without anchoring requirements against
likely threat exposure. Planning frameworks such as threat modeling can provide
much-needed structure when codifying threat exposures and developing methods to
mitigate risk.
In Chapters 4, 6, and 7, I find that organizations may need to dedicate addi-
tional effort towards engineering solutions that adequately address their specific se-
curity requirements. Additionally, organizations that sufficiently allocate resources,
emphasize training, and encourage open communication may have an agile advan-
tage when responding to threats or iteratively improving their security posture.
In this thesis, I establish that organizations that provide essential services
such as utilities or financial transactions have additional hardships placed upon
them. In Chapters 4, 5, and 7, I find that mandatory compliance programs en-
forced by governments or regulatory entities may be outdated, lack sufficient detail
for implementation, offer conflicting information, or may create other sub-optimal
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security conditions when followed “by-the-letter.” Organizations are left to evaluate
the impacts of compliance programs and develop their own strategies for becoming
more secure.
Taken together, these results suggest that proactive measures can be optimized
to provide greater benefits to organizations’ security operations, but conditions are
still far from perfect. Organizations, governments, and regulatory entities all need
to adapt their standard business practices to support relevant, responsive security
programs that adequately protect against the constantly evolving threat landscape.
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Appendix A: Study Instruments
A.1 Survey Questions from Chapter 3
A.1.1 Pre-intervention survey
This survey will ask for information about your current work role and your
personal assessment of IT security. Please be as candid and detailed as possible.
1. Please provide your DoITT email address. We will use a SHA1 hash of
your email address as your unique identifier throughout the study. We will make
every effort to protect your privacy and keep your responses confidential. We will
report data in the aggregate, thus no individual will be identified. (short answer)
2. What division do you work for? [Citywide Cybersecurity, Other DoITT
Division]
3. What is your division’s mission or objective? [long answer]
4. What group do you work for? [OPS, Engineering, Identity Management,
Other within Citywide Cybersecurity, Other within DoITT]
5. What is your group’s mission or objective? [long answer]
6. How many people work in your group? [number answer]
7. What is your position / duty title? [short answer]
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8. What are your responsibilities? [long answer]
9. What technology assets are involved in accomplishing your group’s mission
or objective? An asset can be a device you defend, a system, a service, a tool, or
any form of technology relevant to your work, not just security assets. Please list at
least three. [form-style short answers]
10. Prioritize the importance of these assets in descending order based on your
personal assessment. The #1 item should be the asset you perceive to be the most
important. [drag-and-drop answer]
11. Consider what you ranked as the Top 3 critical assets. How are these three
most critical assets defended? [form-style long answers]
12. Do you feel that the current defensive measures are sufficient for #Loop
Q11 answers# [(Definitely yes) 1-5 (Definitely No)]
13. When building a defense plan, how do you determine how to defend assets?
[long answer]
14. Is there a program/guideline/checklist for assessing your digital security
posture? If yes, please describe these items and describe how frequently they are
used, if relevant.
15. Currently, how effective is Citywide Cybersecurity at defending against,
mitigating, and responding to digital security threats? [(Not effective at all) 1-5
(Extremely effective)]
16. Currently, how effective is your group at defending against, mitigating,
and responding to digital security threats? [(Not effective at all) 1-5 (Extremely
effective)]
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17. Do you feel there are single points of failure for IT defense within DoITT?
[(Definitely yes) 1-5 (Definitely No)]
18. #If yes# Please describe any possible points of failure within DoITT.
[long answer]
19. Please rate your knowledge of center of gravity before this study. [(Ex-
tremely knowledgeable) 1-5 (Not knowledgeable at all)]
20. Please rate how certain you are that you can do the digital security tasks
below by using the sliding bars. Rate your degree of confidence by recording a num-
ber from 0 to 100 using the scale given below [(Cannot do at all) 0-50 (Moderately
can do) 50-100 (Highly certain can do)]: Monitor critical assets, Identify Threats,
Mitigate Threats, Proactively Respond to Intrusions and Eliminate Threats
21. How many years of IT experience do you have in large organizations?
[number answer]
22. How many years of IT experience do you have in small organizations?
[number answer]
23. How many years formal or informal training have you received? This
includes schooling, industry training programs, and work-specific training programs.
[number answer]
24. Do you have any industry certifications? [Yes, Yes but expired, No]
25. # If yes# Which certifications do you currently possess? [long answer]
26. What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest
degree you have received? [Less than high school degree, High school graduate
(high school diploma or equivalent including GED), Some college but no degree,
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Associate degree in college (2-year), Bachelor’s degree in college (4-year), Master’s
degree, Doctoral degree, Professional degree (JD, MD), Prefer not to answer]
27. Please specify the gender with which you most closely identify. [Male,
Female, Other, Prefer not to answer]
28. Please specify your age. [18-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-69, Over 70, Prefer
not to answer]
29. Please specify your ethnicity. [Hispanic or Latino; Black or African Amer-
ican; White; American Indian or Alaska Native; Asian, Native Hawaiian, or Pacific
Islander; Other; Prefer not to answer]
A.1.2 Post-intervention survey
This survey will ask for information about your current work role and will
require you to conduct a threat-based assessment on security using the center of
gravity framework. Please be as candid and detailed as possible.
1. Please provide your DoITT email address. We will use a SHA1 hash of
your email address as your unique identifier throughout the study. We will make
every effort to protect your privacy and keep your responses confidential. We will
report data in the aggregate, thus no individual will be identified. [short answer]
2. What technology assets are involved in accomplishing your group’s mission
or objective? An asset can be a device you defend, a system, a service, a tool, or
any form of technology relevant to your work, not just security assets. Please list at
least three. [form-style short answers]
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3. Based on your list for the previous question, how did the list of technology
assets that accomplish your mission or objective change from the initial survey you
took? [More answers, Same number of answers, Fewer answers, I cannot remember]
4. #If more or less# Why did your answers change? [long answer]
5. Of these previously listed assets, which is your group’s Center of Gravity
(CoG) for accomplishing its mission? As a reminder, the center of gravity is the
hub in which other assets derive their power or capability. [short answer]
6. What are the critical capabilities associated with #COG from Q5#? List
at least three.
7. What are the critical requirements of #Loop Q6 answers#? [form-style
short answers]
8. Please list any critical vulnerabilities or vulnerable conditions associated
with #COG from Q5#. Please use thresholds when appropriate. An example
threshold would be ”packet loss consistently exceeding 50%.” [form-style short an-
swers]
9. What are the critical requirements for an adversary or threat actor to
exploit #Loop Q8 answers#? [form-style short answers]
10. Does Citywide Cybersecurity currently have sufficient active defenses or
sensors defending against #Loop Q8 answers#? [Yes, No, Unsure]
11. Does Citywide Cybersecurity currently have sufficient passive defenses or
sensors defending against #Loop Q8 answers#? [Yes, No, Unsure]
12. #If yes for Q10 or Q11# You indicated #Loop Q8 answers# did not have
a sufficient active or passive defense in place. How would you recommend defending
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against it. [long answer]
13. Did you consider this defense plan before conducting the CoG exercise?
[Yes, No]
14. Think back to your previous assessment of Citywide Cybersecurity’s effec-
tiveness in defending against, mitigating, and responding to digital security threats
from the first survey. After learning about CoG, how effective is Citywide Cyber-
security at defending against, mitigating, and responding to digital security threats
currently? [(Not effective at all) 1-5 (Extremely effective)]
15. Think back to your previous assessment of your group’s effectiveness in
defending against, mitigating, and responding to digital security threats from the
first survey. After learning about CoG, how effective is your group at defending
against, mitigating, and responding to digital security threats currently? [(Not
effective at all) 1-5 (Extremely effective)]
16. The questions in this section will gauge how certain you are that you
currently can perform various digital security tasks. Answer these questions without
applying any concepts of center of gravity. Please rate how certain you are that you
can do the things below by using the sliding bars. Rate your degree of confidence
by recording a number from 0 to 100 using the scale given below [(Cannot do at
all) 0-50 (Moderately can do) 50-100 (Highly certain can do)]: Monitor critical
assets, Identify Threats, Mitigate Threats, Proactively Respond to Intrusions and
Eliminate Threats
17. In general, did your responses about how certain you are that you can
perform various digital security tasks change since the first survey? [Yes, Unsure,
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No]
18. #If yes# Why did your response change after learning about CoG?
19. Please rate your current knowledge of center of gravity. [(Extremely
knowledgeable) 1-5 (Not knowledgeable at all)]
20. The questions in this section will gauge how certain you are that you
can perform various digital security tasks using center of gravity. Answer these
questions as if you completely redesigned, prioritized, and implemented defensive
measures only based on the center of gravity framework. Please rate how certain
you are that you can do the things below by using the sliding bars. Rate your
degree of confidence by recording a number from 0 to 100 using the scale given
below [(Cannot do at all) 0-50 (Moderately can do) 50-100 (Highly certain can do)]:
Monitor critical assets, Identify Threats, Mitigate Threats, Proactively Respond to
Intrusions and Eliminate Threats
21. Please identify the center of gravity node in this undirected graph. [0-10
from image]
22. Identify the center of gravity for US Pacific Theater Forces within the fol-
lowing passage: [US amphibious forces (Marines/transport craft), Logistic resupply
assets, US naval aircraft carrier]
23. Which of the following is an example of a critical capability for a local
area network? [A router, Providing internode connectivity, An administrator]
24. Which of the following is an example of a critical requirement for a local
area network? [Blocking unwanted connections, Providing connections to other
networks, Network interface cards]
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25. Which of the following is an example of a critical vulnerability for a local
area network? [Users without cyber awareness training, Forwarding emails to co-
workers, Loss of network connectivity due to a denial of service attack]
26. To your knowledge, was #COG from Q5# ever targeted during a cyber
attack or intrusion? [Yes, No, Possibly]
27. #If yes# Did this attack or intrusion impact your choice to select #COG
from Q5# as the CoG? Please describe in an UNCLASSIFIED manner. Include
details about attack frequency, impact, or any other applicable details. [long answer]
A.1.3 Follow-up survey
This survey will assess your understanding and integration of Center of Grav-
ity within your work. Please be as candid and detailed as possible.
1. Please provide your DoITT email address. We will use a SHA1 hash of
your email address as your unique identifier throughout the study. We will make
every effort to protect your privacy and keep your responses confidential. We will
report data in the aggregate, thus no individual will be identified. [short answer]
If you would like to access a digital copy of the center of gravity worksheet, it
is available for viewing here: https://goo.gl/icVMLX
2. Please rate your current knowledge of center of gravity. [(Extremely knowl-
edgeable) 1-5 (Not knowledgeable at all)]
3. The questions in this section will gauge how certain you are that you
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can perform various digital security tasks using center of gravity. Answer these
questions as if you completely redesigned, prioritized, and implemented defensive
measures only based on the center of gravity framework. Please rate how certain
you are that you can do the things below by using the sliding bars. Rate your
degree of confidence by recording a number from 0 to 100 using the scale given
below [(Cannot do at all) 0-50 (Moderately can do) 50-100 (Highly certain can do)]:
Monitor critical assets, Identify Threats, Mitigate Threats, Proactively Respond to
Intrusions and Eliminate Threats
4. In general, did your responses about how certain you are that you can
perform various digital security tasks using CoG change since the second survey?
[Yes, No, Unsure]
5. #If yes# Why did your response change after 30 days? [long answer]
6. Have you applied concepts of center of gravity within your work? If yes,
how? If no, why not? [long answer]
7. In Part 2 of this study, you completed a center of gravity worksheet that was
tailored to your specific work role. You identified critical vulnerabilities, potential
threat capabilities against those vulnerabilities, and proposed an ideal defense plan.
Have you used any of the information from this worksheet since completing it? If
yes, how? If no, why not? [long answer]
8. Have you applied concepts from center of gravity anywhere else in your life?
If yes, how? If no, why not? [long answer]
9. Please rate the following statements based on your current understanding of
CoG [Strongly agree Agree, Somewhat agree, Neutral, Somewhat disagree, Disagree,
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Strongly disagree]: Using center of gravity improves the quality of the work I do;
Using center of gravity gives me greater control over my work; Center of gravity
enables me to accomplish tasks more quickly; Center of gravity supports critical
aspects; Center of gravity increases my productivity; Center of gravity improves my
job performance; Center of gravity allows me to accomplish more work than would
otherwise be possible; Center of gravity enhances my effectiveness on the job; Center
of gravity makes it easier to do my job; Overall, I find center of gravity useful in my
job; Center of gravity enhances the way I think about digital security
10. Which of the following is an example of a critical capability for a the center
of gravity website content server? [A database, Providing users with high website
availability, An administrator]
11. Which of the following is an example of a critical requirement for the
critical capability providing communication with partnered agencies? [Email servers,
Enforcing multi-factor authentication, Blocking external access to FTP servers]
12. Which of the following is an example of a critical vulnerability for the
critical requirement local area network connectivity? [Cyber awareness training,
Loss of network connectivity due to a denial of service attack, Forwarding emails to
co-workers]
13. Please identify the center of gravity node in this undirected graph. [0-10
from image]
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A.1.4 NYC leadership panel questions
We asked our panel of NYC3 leaders to answer the following questions for each
participants’ post-training survey results.
1. How likely is the identified asset the critical enabler for the participant’s respon-
sibilities? Please use a scale from 0 to 5, with 0 being “extremely unlikely” and 5
being “extremely likely”
2. How likely would the identified vulnerabilities stop the participant from fulfilling
their responsibilities? Please use a scale from 0 to 5, with 0 being “extremely
unlikely” and 5 being “extremely likely”
3. How likely would the identified threats exploit the vulnerabilities and prevent
mission fulfillment? Please use a scale from 0 to 5, with 0 being “extremely unlikely”
and 5 being “extremely likely”
4. How likely would the plan of action mitigate threats from exploiting the critical
vulnerabilities? Please use a scale from 0 to 5, with 0 being “extremely unlikely”
and 5 being “extremely likely”
5. Is the proposed defense plan sufficiently detailed to implement? Please respond
with yes, no, or unsure.
A.2 Expert Survey from Chapter 4
Participant is presented with consent form; Please check all that apply (you may
choose any number of these statements): I am age 18 or older; I have read this
consent form or had it read to me; I voluntarily agree to participate in this research
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and I want to continue to the survey.
Introduction: This survey will ask for you to assess the validity of an independent
evaluation of [standard name]. Please be as candid and detailed as possible.
For each issue, please confirm:
1. If your organization followed the standard as written and nothing else, would
your organization be vulnerable to this issue? (Yes/No/Possibly)
2. If yes or possibly⇒ In your opinion, what is the likelihood of this vulnerability
being exploited if standard is followed as written and nothing else? (Frequent
- Occurs often, continuously experienced; Likely - Occurs several times; Occa-
sional - Occurs sporadically; Seldom - Unlikely, but could occur at some time;
Unlikely - Can assume it will not occur)
3. If yes or possibly ⇒ In your opinion, what is the severity associated with ex-
ploitation if standard is followed as written and nothing else? (Catastrophic
- Complete system loss, major property damage, full data breach, corruption
of all data; Critical - Major system damage, significant property damage, sig-
nificant data breach, corruption of sensitive data; Moderate - Minor system
damage, minor property damage, partial data breach; Negligible - Minor sys-
tem impairment)
4. If yes or possibly ⇒ Is there past evidence of this vulnerability within your
organization? (Yes/No/Maybe)
5. If yes or possibly ⇒ What would you recommend, based on your experience,
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to remedy this issue? (Open response)
6. If no ⇒ What additional policies, procedures, or defensive techniques does
your organization use to mitigate this issue? (Open response)
End of survey: Does your organization allow waivers to the compliance standard?
If yes, how frequently are they used? If no, does frequently does this create issues
for your organization?
Demographics: What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest
degree you have received? Please estimate the number of years experience you have
in the compliance and information technology fields. Please describe your work role
and your interaction with compliance standards. Please estimate the organization
size that you work in.
A.3 Survey instruments for Chapter 6
A.3.1 Design phase
After using the FRAMEWORK playbook design framework, please answer the
following:
(Matrix of options for Likert scale: Strongly Disagree, Somewhat Disagree, Neutral,
Somewhat Agree, Strongly Agree)
I think that I would like to use this framework frequently.
I found this framework unnecessarily complex.
I thought this framework was easy to use.
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I sufficiently provided all information to complete this step.
I think that I would need assistance to be able to use this framework.
I found the various functions in this framework were well integrated.
I thought there was too much inconsistency in this framework.
I would imagine that most people would learn to use this framework very quickly.
I found this framework very cumbersome/awkward to use.
I felt very confident using this framework.
I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going with this framework.
I think other experts could use this framework easily.
I think other non-experts could understand products from this framework easily.
I think other non-experts could use this framework easily.
Rate each step in order of importance for completing the playbook, with #1
being the most important step. [Drag and drop list of steps based on framework]
Please explain why you ranked [TOP CHOICE] step most important. [open
response]
Please explain why you ranked [LOWEST CHOICE] step least important.
[open response]
Please provide any positive feedback you may have on using the [FRAME-
WORK] playbook design framework.
Please provide any negative feedback you may have on using the [FRAME-
WORK] playbook design framework, especially any parts that you felt were confus-
ing or needed additional information.
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Please provide any neutral feedback you may have on using the [FRAME-
WORK] playbook design framework. Do you feel anything was missing? Anything
that could be better designed?
Demographics:
What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you
have received?
Please estimate the number of years experience you have in the digital security and
information technology fields:
Please indicate which role most accurately reflects your current position:
Please estimate the organization size that you work in:
A.3.2 Evaluation phase
Is this playbook sufficiently detailed to implement and actually detect the
event? [Yes, no, unsure]
How likely is the playbook to adequately respond to the scenario event (with 1 being
least likely)?
Please explain why this playbook would or would not adequately respond to the
event. [open response]
Are there errors in the provided playbook that would hinder response efforts? [Yes,
no, unsure]
Are there critical elements of a response plan missing from the playbook? [open
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response]
Do you have any other feedback for this playbook? Explain. [open response]
Demographics:
What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you
have received?
Please estimate the number of years experience you have in the digital security and
information technology fields:
Please indicate which role most accurately reflects your current position:
Please estimate the organization size that you work in:
A.3.3 Implementation phase
Based on your experiences, please indicate which framework was more useful
for each task:
(Matrix ranging from NIST much better, NIST better, no difference, IACD better,
IACD much better)
Identifying assets at risk:
Identifying required response tasks:
Building a comprehensive plan:
Being easily understandable:
Being easily implementable:
Please provide any positive feedback you may have for NIST with respect to imple-
248
menting a playbook. [open response]
Please provide any negative feedback you may have for NIST with respect to imple-
menting a playbook. [open response]
Please provide any positive feedback you may have for IACD with respect to imple-
menting a playbook. [open response]
Please provide any negative feedback you may have for IACD with respect to im-
plementing a playbook. [open response]
Were there any unexpected modifications you had to make to implement your plan
using NIST? [open response]
Were there any unexpected modifications you had to make to implement your plan
using IACD? [open response]
Please rate the following statements based on your current overall understand-
ing of digital security playbooks:
(Matrix of options for Likert scale: Strongly Disagree, Somewhat Disagree, Neutral,
Somewhat Agree, Strongly Agree)
Using digital security playbooks improves the quality of the work I do.
Using digital security playbooks gives me greater control over my work.
Digital security playbooks enables me to accomplish tasks more quickly.
Digital security playbooks supports critical aspects of my job.
Digital security playbooks increases my productivity.
Digital security playbooks improves my job performance.
Digital security playbooks allows me to accomplish more work than would otherwise
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be possible.
Digital security playbooks enhances my effectiveness on the job.
Digital security playbooks makes it easier to do my job.
Overall, I find digital security playbooks useful in my job.
Digital security playbooks are confusing or unintuitive.
A.3.4 Utilization phase
From intrusion event to detection, how much time do you assess passed? How
did you determine an event occurred? [open response]
Were there any unexpected issues associated with detecting the event? What deci-
sions did you have to make during detecting the event that were not covered in the
playbook? [open response]
From detection to initial response using a playbook, how much time do you assess
passed? [open response]
Were there any unexpected issues associated with initial response? [open response]
What decisions did you have to make during responding to the event that were not
covered in the playbook?[open response]
From initial response to threat neutralization, how much time do you assess passed?
[open response]
How did you determine the event was stabilized/quarantined to a sufficient level?[open
response]
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Were there any unexpected issues associated with threat neutralization?[open re-
sponse]
Please rate the following statements based on your current overall understand-
ing of digital security playbooks:
(Matrix of options for Likert scale: Strongly Disagree, Somewhat Disagree, Neutral,
Somewhat Agree, Strongly Agree)
Using digital security playbooks improves the quality of the work I do.
Using digital security playbooks gives me greater control over my work.
Digital security playbooks enables me to accomplish tasks more quickly.
Digital security playbooks supports critical aspects of my job.
Digital security playbooks increases my productivity.
Digital security playbooks improves my job performance.
Digital security playbooks allows me to accomplish more work than would otherwise
be possible.
Digital security playbooks enhances my effectiveness on the job.
Digital security playbooks makes it easier to do my job.
Overall, I find digital security playbooks useful in my job.
Digital security playbooks are confusing or unintuitive.
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A.4 Interview guide
For each survey response across all phases that required follow-up questions:
In your survey, you indicated [TOPIC]. Could you please explain more information
about [TOPIC]?
For each expert evaluation survey response required follow-up questions:
In your response, you indicated [TOPIC]. Could you please explain more informa-
tion about [TOPIC]? How would you handle this in your organization? Have you
encountered this situation in your organization before? Do you have any insight
that would not necessarily be intuitive for people following playbook frameworks?
For our trusted insider during the utilization phase:
What time did you initiate your attack?
Were there any special considerations when you conducted the attack?
What times did participants report detecting the attack?
How long until they initiated initial response actions?
How long did they take to neutralize the threat?
Were there any observations that stuck out to you?
For each participant during the utilization:
In your survey response, you indicated [TOPIC]. Could you please explain why you
felt [TOPIC] presented a unique challenge? Was there anything that could have
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prepared you more for [TOPIC]?
A.5 Survey instruments for Chapter 7
• Does your organization adhere to any form of mandatory compliance standard
or regulatory controls?
• Which compliance standards does your organization deal with?
• Does your organization believe compliance is sufficient to protect your systems
and data? (Yes, maybe no)
• Does your organization employ proactive security controls to address threats
not covered by compliance programs?
• If yes, please describe unaddressed threats.
• Please select which of the following proactive controls your organization uses
to complement (in addition to) compliance programs. Please do not select con-
trols required by compliance programs that your organization follows. (Mul-
tiple selection options: Vulnerability disclosure or bug bounty programs Ma-
chine learning and other statistical analysis, Threat modeling, Tabletop se-
curity training exercises, Live security training exercises, Threat intelligence,
Threat hunting (regular searches to ascertain the presence of a previously un-
detected adversary or compromise), Endpoint Threat Detection and Response
solutions, Change control reviews/panels, Sandboxing, Zero clients/one-time-
use systems, Integrity review of data and application updates, Periodic access
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review, Multi-factor authentication, Multi-factor physical access, Hands-on
training, On-the-job mentorship security training, On-the-job peer partnering
training, Others: (fill-in-the-blank), None of the above)
• Enter loop for each item:
– Is this security control required by compliance?
– Why did you / your organization decide to implement this control?
– On a scale from 1 to 5, with 5 being the highest rating, how well has this
control worked out for your organization? (1-5)
– What worked (or did not work) well about this control?
– How do you ensure this measure is compatible with compliance controls
(or if not, why not)?
– How often do you reassess this control’s effectiveness? (Daily, Once a
week, One a month, Every few months, Yearly, Never )
• How does your organization prioritize which proactive measures you are going
to invest in? What are the key factors?
• Demographics
– What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest
degree you have received?
– Please select the option that best categorizes your organization (Gov-
ernment/Defense, Entertainment, Financial services (payments, credit
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cards), Consumer services (hotels, retail, sales), Critical services (power,
water, etc), Healthcare, Agriculture/mining, Information technology, Ed-
ucation/Research )
– Please specify the job role that most closely reflects your employment po-
sition (Security Engineer, Security Analyst, Management, Compliance/Governance
SME, Developer )
– Please estimate the number of years experience you have in the compli-
ance and information technology fields.
– Please specify the estimated size of your organization.
– Please specify the estimated size of your constituency or clientele.
– How many organizations do you support?
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Appendix B: Additional Data
B.1 Additional data from Chapter 3
We used the following two scenarios during our educational intervention train-
ing to communicate CoG analysis concepts to participants.
B.1.1 Star Wars walkthrough
The educational intervention instructor guided participants through this sce-
nario, explaining the CoG analysis for the Galactic Empire. The Galactic Empire’s
desired end state is to provide peace and stability throughout the galaxy. To do
this, their objective is to eliminate rebel forces. The Empire has many assets avail-
able for destroying the rebel scum to include: TIE fighters, stormtroopers, Darth
Vader, and the Death Star. Of these assets, we know that the most powerful means
for destroying planets and eradicating sources of rebellion is the Death Star; thus,
it is the CoG analysis for the Empire. Critical capabilities for the Death Star in-
clude the ability to destroy planets. Critical requirements for this capability include
Kyber crystals, engineers, and the superlaser. A critical vulnerability against the
superlaser is accessible via a thermal exhaust port with an exterior opening. Threat
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capabilities include the ability to fire weapons into the exhaust port and threat
requirements include X-wing fighter aircraft. Given this scenario, an actionable de-
fense plan for the Death Star would be concealing the thermal port or installing
anti-aircraft turrets near the opening.
B.1.2 E-commerce scenario
In the second scenario, groups of participants applied CoG analysis without
instructor assistance. The following examples are not exhaustive but include actual
responses from the groups. This scenario was the first and only time participants
completed CoG analysis analysis in a group setting.
We consider a small e-commerce business with the primary objective of max-
imizing profit and secondary objectives of customer satisfaction and website avail-
ability. We focus on defending assets that maximize our profits. The e-commerce
business relies on a front-end webserver, a back-end database, redundant servers
with load balancers, software developers, and a banking institution. Of the pre-
viously identified assets, the back-end database is the CoG analysis it conducts
transactions with customers (the primary means for accomplishing our primary ob-
jective) and because of its interconnectedness with other assets. Critical capabilities
for our business back-end database include (1) conducting atomic, consistent, iso-
lated, and durable transactions, (2) permitting responsive queries from the front-end
webserver, and (3) providing security safeguards for inventories and customer data.
Critical requirements for providing security safeguards for inventories and customer
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data would be (1) encrypted communication between customers, the front-end web-
server, and the database; (2) encrypted sensitive data within the database; and (3)
compliance with regulatory guidelines for business transactions. Examples of critical
vulnerabilities would be continued use of software without periodically checking for
updates and patching, such as continued use of OpenSSL 1.0.1 which is vulnerable
to Heartbleed [176]. Threat capabilities against a vulnerable version of OpenSSL in-
clude conducting reconnaissance and network scans of vulnerable systems. Threat
requirements include a valid exploit and payload against OpenSSL. A simple ac-
tionable defense plan for our running example includes (1) upgrading OpenSSL to
a version that is patched against Heartbleed and (2) validating system performance
post-upgrade.
B.1.3 Participant P17 example
Understand the end state and objective. Participant P17 is a security analyst
who works within the NYC Security Operations Center (SOC). The SOC’s defensive
end state is maintaining an environment that is resilient and responsive to known
and unknown threats. Based on P17’s work role in NYC3, his personal objective is
to defend workstations and respond to threats against the NYC3 environment.
Identify assets. P17 relies on network traffic inspectors, endpoint detection and
response (EDR) solutions, and log aggregators to accomplish his objective. EDRs
are tools for investigating suspicious activities throughout networks, hosts, and other
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endpoints [43].
Identify the CoG. Of the previously identified P17 assets, the EDR is the CoG
analysis because of its inherent ability to thoroughly protect systems across the
enterprise, using input from network traffic inspectors and feeding log aggregators.
Identify critical capabilities (CC). P17’s critical capabilities for EDR include
blocking intrusion attempts, sending alerts, conducting queries, and quarantining
infected systems.
Identify critical requirements (CR). CRs for P17 to block intrusion attempts
include possessing updated indicators of compromise (IOCs) (i.e., threat signatures)
and having the EDR agent installed on workstations.
Identify critical vulnerabilities (CV). P17 examples of critical vulnerabilities
would be corrupted IOCs or workstation operating systems that are incompatible
with a particular EDR application.
Enumerate threat capabilities (TC). With respect to our running example,
representative TCs against corrupted updates include the ability to tamper with or
man-in-the-middle IOC updates.
Enumerate threat requirements (TR). For P17, TRs include physical access
or remote access to an update mechanism.
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Develop an actionable defense plan (ADP). One mitigation strategy in P17’s
ADP verifies the integrity of updates from vendors before applying them to the
EDR.
B.1.4 Visualizing Center of Gravity
Figure B.1: Depiction of CoG analysis tabular method
Each participant received a printed version of the worksheet shown in Fig-
ure B.1 to help guide them through CoG analysis. Numbers indicate the or-
der in which participants completed the form, as described in Section 3.1. Ad-
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Figure B.2: Depiction of P18 visualizing his CoG analysis
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ditionally, we provided participants with a digital version of this worksheet dur-
ing all online surveys. A more detailed version of the worksheet is available at:
https://goo.gl/icVMLX.
Some participants opted to use a whiteboard to visually depict their thought
processes and building heterogeneous, relational linkages between nodes. As shown
in Figure B.2, P18 began by writing his objective to “protect” networks. P18
then mapped how firewalls, EDRs, deep-packet inspection tools, and other defensive
techniques support this objective. The commonality among all of these tools is that
the defender uses cues from alerts to respond to incidents; thus, “alerts” are P18’s
CoG.
B.1.5 CoG Identification Accuracy Regression
Odds
Variable Value Ratio CI p-value
IT Exp. 0-5 yrs – – –
6-10 yrs 0.17 [0, 11.36] 0.408
11-15 yrs 3.82 [0.26, 55.28] 0.325
16-20 yrs 0.74 [0.04, 12.16] 0.83
21-25 yrs 0.39 [0.01, 20.26] 0.643
26+ yrs 0.26 [0, 60.44] 0.626
Edu. Some College – – –
Associates 3.02 [0.03, 289.4] 0.634
Bachelors 3.51 [0.25, 49.43] 0.352
Graduate 4.64 [0.21, 100.14] 0.327
*Significant effect – Base case (OR=1, by definition)
Table B.1: Summary of regression over participants’ accuracy at identifying centers
of gravity with respect to their years of experience and education. McFadden and
Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 measures are given for each regression.
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B.2 Additional data from Chapter 4
B.2.1 Overall risk distribution from Chapter 4
Figure B.3: Distribution of risk estimates by compliance standard
B.2.2 Compliance audit findings from Chapter 4
The following pages include the audit findings for IRS P1075, PCI DSS, NERC
CIP 007-6, and FedRAMP.
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Section Text of concern Concern Issue Probability Severity Impact
1.3.2 Mailbox
The Safeguards Mailbox is a repository for information and communication to the Office 
of Safeguards relative to Safeguarding requirements and Publication 1075. The Mailbox 
is located at SafeguardReports@irs.gov. Below are items that are appropriate for 
submission to the Mailbox:
Safeguards Reports and Extension Requests
45 Day Notifications
Publication 1075 Technical Inquiries
Re-Disclosure Agreements
Mailbox communication permits IRS to receive unencrypted sensitive information. IRS 







Recommendation: Provide PGP public keys, use Keybase, and adopt another secure 
message transmission mode. Require encrypted attachments. data vulnerability  Frequent  Moderate Low
1.4.1 Federal Tax 
Information (FTI)
Safeguarding FTI is critically important to continuously protect taxpayer confidentiality 
as required by IRC 6103. FTI is a term of art and consists of federal tax returns and return 
information (and information derived from it) that is in the agency’s possession or 
control which is covered by the confidentiality protections of the IRC and subject to the 
IRC 6103(p)(4) safeguarding requirements including IRS oversight. FTI is categorized as 
Sensitive But Unclassified information and may contain personally identifiable 
information (PII).
FTI includes return or return information received directly from the IRS or obtained 
through an authorized secondary source, such as Social Security Administration (SSA), 
Federal Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE), Bureau of the Fiscal Service (BFS),or 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), or another entity acting on behalf of 
the IRS pursuant to an IRC 6103(p)(2)(B) Agreement.
FTI includes any information created by the recipient that is derived from federal return 
or return information received from the IRS or obtained through a secondary source.
FTI may not be masked to change the character of information to circumvent IRC 6103 
confidentiality requirements.
As I continue reviewing, I find that the definition of FTI is missing several key items:
1. The definition doesn't specify if or how FTI can lose that designation. At no time will 
information cease to be FTI, as currently defined, but perhaps it should. Should 
protections be relaxed after 50 years? After the person dies?
2. Is there a point at which data be obfuscated and no longer require the FTI protections? 
Is it sufficient, for example, to sanitize 1000 records by removing SSN or giving each record 
a random identifier, and therefore no longer require FTI protections? verbiage issue _Unlikely  Moderate Low
1.4.3 Personanally 
Identifiable Information
FTI may include Personally Identifiable Information (PII). FTI may include the following 
PII elements:







Date and place of birth
Mother’s maiden name
Biometric data (e.g., height, weight, eye color, fingerprints)
Any combination of the above
*Name of a person with respect to whom a return is filed* should be modified to include 
any name of any person associated within tax document. The IRS tends to keep records 
indefinitely and as we've seen with attacks against OPM or Equifax, these records allow 
attackers to derive security content through PII history.
Example:
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.147.2471&rep=rep1&type=pdf
Recommend: Expanding definition of PII to include any named individual in tax 
documents.
data vulnerability  Frequent  Moderate Low
1.4.4 Information Received 
From Taxpayers or Third 
Parties
Copies of tax returns or return information provided to the agency directly by the 
taxpayer or his/her representative (e.g. W-2’s, Form 1040, etc.) or obtained from public 
information files (e.g. federal tax lien on file with the county clerk, Offers in Compromise 
available for public inspection; court records, etc.) is not protected FTI that is subject to 
the safeguarding requirements of IRC 6103(p)(4). If the agency independently verifies FTI 
provided by the IRS or a secondary source with the taxpayer or a third party source, the 
verified information is not FTI as long as the IRS source information is replaced or 
overwritten with the newly provided information.
This section essentially states that the IRS is not responsible for securing information they 
receive from customers or from third-party companies. This is **NOT** okay. data vulnerability  Frequent  Critical Low
1.4.5 Unauthorized Access
*Unauthorized access occurs when an entity or individual knowingly or due to gross 
negligence receives or has access to FTI without authority*
This is excessively wordy. If the entity or individual has access, without authority, then it is 
**unauthorized access**. It should matter if it was done knowingly or due to negligence. verbiage issue  Likely  Moderate Low
1.4.6 Unauthorized 
Disclosure
An unauthorized disclosure occurs when an entity or individual with authorization to 
receive FTI knowingly or with gross negligence discloses FTI to another entity or 
individual who does not have authority, as defined in IRC 6103 and IRC 6104(c).
An unauthorized disclosure has occurred when FTI is knowingly or due to gross 
negligence provided to an individual who does not have the statutory right to have 
access to it under the IRC. Even without willfulness or gross negligence FTI is not to be 
disclosed to entities or individuals who are not authorized by IRC 6103 to have it.
Subject to the disclosure provisions of IRC 6103, agencies may need to disclose FTI to 
outside entities (e.g., for prosecution, appeals, or collection processes) as long as the 
receiving entity has a need-to-know and the individual recipient has authority under IRC 
6103 to receive it. If the individual does not have a need-to-know, this constitutes an 
unauthorized disclosure.
> FTI is knowingly or due to gross negligence provided to an individual
This section does not account for data breaches due to digital system vulnerabilities. insufficient process  Likely  Critical Low
1.4.7 Need to Know
Under need-to-know restrictions, even if an entity or an individual has the authority to 
access FTI, one would not be given access to such information if it were not necessary to 
perform his or her official duties with regard to the purpose for which IRC 6103 provides 
the FTI is to be used.
Limiting access to individuals on a need-to-know basis reduces opportunities to 
“browse” or improperly view FTI. Restricting access to designated personnel minimizes 
improper access or disclosure. When FTI must be provided to clerical, computer 
operators, or others, these should only be provided the FTI that is essential to 
accomplish their official duties
This (and other similar sections) are written as very human centric and do not consider 
machines, automated analyses, or artificial intelligence. Section 2.4 does consider 
"statistical analysis, tax modeling, [and] revenue projections". Maybe this is a non-issue. verbiage issue  Occasional  Negligible Low
1.4.7 Need To Know - 
(Technical Controls)
Under need-to-know restrictions, even if an entity or an individual has the authority to 
access FTI, one would not be given access to such information if it were not necessary to 
perform his or her official duties with regard to the purpose for which IRC 6103 provides 
the FTI is to be used.
Limiting access to individuals on a need-to-know basis reduces opportunities to 
“browse” or improperly view FTI. Restricting access to designated personnel minimizes 
improper access or disclosure. When FTI must be provided to clerical, computer 
operators, or others, these should only be provided the FTI that is essential to 
accomplish their official duties
In section 1.4.7 Pub 1075 mentions only providing information to users with a valid need 
to know. The document does not levy a formal requirement to implement technical 
controls to enforce need to know. The requirement is worded to be a goodwill based 
requirement only. 
If an agency is storing large quantities of FTI in a single system, then I would argue that an 
individual would not typically need access to the entirety of the data-set to perform their 
official job duties. I recommend instituting a formal requirement for receiving agencies to 
implement technical controls with granular entitlements to enforce need-to-know in 
digital systems. data vulnerability  Likely  Moderate Low
12.1 General
> Statistical tabulations prepared at the state level may not be released for cells 
containing data for fewer than 10 returns. Data for geographic areas below the state 
level such as county may not be released with cells containing data from fewer than 20 
returns. In addition for tabular data at the ZIP Code level, additional procedures must be 
employed. Individual ZIP Codes areas with fewer than 100 returns cannot be shown. 
Additionally, any cell in the ZIP Code table based on fewer than 20 returns cannot be 
shown. Finally, individual returns that represent a large percentage of the total of a 
particular cell must be excluded from the data
Requires data to be tracked at an uncommon granular level. Additionally, this provides no 
guarantees that the statistics protect privacy. data vulnerability _Unlikely  Moderate Low
2.3 Secure Data Transfer
Only the following types of documents will be accepted via SDT:
Control File (.txt)
Adobe (.pdf)
Word Document (.doc or .docx)
Excel Document (.xls or.xlsx)
Zipped File (.zip)
Contact the SafeguardReports@irs.gov mailbox for specific details on how to submit 
information via SDT.
The "types of documents [that] will be accepted via SDT" doesn't specify if/how file types 
are validated. It appears that it allow malicious files to be submitted if renamed to an 
allowed type (e.g. rename .exe to .txt). It does not specify if submitted files are virus 
scanned. data vulnerability  Likely  Moderate Low
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2.3 Secure Data Transfer 
ACES Digital Certificates
In addition to installing the SDT software, each agency must also have an IdenTrust 
Certificate installed. After the initial installation, agencies are required to renew the 
IdenTrust Certificate every two years. Refer to the ACES (Access Certificates for 
Electronic Services) IdenTrust website for additional information.
Section 2.3 references IdentTrust as the issuer of digital certificates for data transmission 
to IRS. I briefly visited the IdenTrust website recommended in the documentation and 
discovered that the system allows automated trusted certificate purchase. I reached a 
search page which listed different organizations to choose from when requesting a digital 
certificate. I did not proceed further because at that time I was presented with a warning 
banner: "You have accessed a U.S. Government sponsored computer system. 
Unauthorized use may be punished by fines or imprisonment." 
Once I encountered the warning banner I discontinued use of the website immediately.
I believe this represents a major vulnerability for two reasons:
**1.** It appears to be trivial to request and purchase a digital certificate with a root 
authority that the IRS trusts. As I said, I did not continue further to verification stages due 
to the warning banner.
**2.** The search form can enumerate other agencies that are working directly with the 
IRS. These agencies may present softer targets for malicious actors to exploit. data vulnerability  Occasional  Critical Low
2.7.2 Computer Security 
Review Process
The Office of Safeguards will assess agency compliance with the computer security 
requirements identified in this publication as part of the on-site review process. 
Requirements are assessed as they relate to NIST SP 800-53 security controls as outlined 
in this publication. To ensure a standardized computer security review process, the 
following techniques will be used to evaluate agency policies, procedures, and IT 
equipment that receive, process, store, or transmit FTI: Automated Compliance and 
Vulnerability Assessment Testing
Computer Security Reviewers will use a combination of compliance and vulnerability 
assessment software tools to validate the adequate protection of FTI on agency and 
contractor owned equipment. These automated tools will be launched from either IRS-
issued flash drives or laptop computers. Profiles used with these tools can be 
downloaded from the Office of Safeguards’ website.
SCSEM
Documents and tests hardening requirements for specific technologies used to receive, 
process, store, or transmit FTI. SCSEMs can and should be downloaded from the Office of 
Safeguards’ website.
MOT
Documents will be requested in advance and expected to be provided prior to the 
review process, no later than the opening conference.
Agencies should be prepared for the Computer Security Reviewers to use the preceding 
resources as part of the on-site review. As necessary, agency management approval 
must be obtained prior to the on-site review, if agency policies and procedure contradict 
any of these methods.
I'm uneasy with this section, but need help articulating what feels wrong. The "automated 
compliance and vulnerability assessment testing" seems to ignore testing human 
education. I'm also uncomfortable with "IRS-issued flash drives or laptop computers" 
which is oddly specific. data vulnerability  Likely  Moderate Low
2.9.1 Termination 
Documentation
When an agency no longer requires FTI, notify Safeguards at SafeguardReports@irs.gov 
by providing the following:
1. Copies of notifications to all agencies from which FTI is received, that FTI will no 
longer be requested, and
2. Letter from the Head of Agency certifying that all residual FTI has been destroyed. 
(See Section 8.0 Disposal of FTI – IRC 6103(p)(4)(F))
Once documentation is reviewed, the Office of Safeguards will send an 
acknowledgement of the agency’s termination, instructions on Safeguard reporting and 
on-site review obligations. Instructions for reinstatement will be included in the 
acknowledgement letter.
There is no indication that senders are authorized or validated. It appears that a spoofed 
email could trigger the termination process.
Would recommend a pre-established list of authorizing officials, and email digital 
signatures. data vulnerability  Seldom  Moderate Low
3.2 Electronic and Non-
Electronic FTI Logs
The agency must establish a tracking system to identify and track the location of 
electronic and non-electronic FTI from receipt until it is destroyed. The FTI log may 
include tracking elements, such as:
Taxpayer Name or other identifier*
Tax year(s)
Type of information (e.g., revenue agent reports, Form 1040, work papers)
The reason for the request
Date requested
Date received
Exact location of the FTI
Who has had access to the data
If disposed of, the date and method of disposition
*To the extent possible, do not include FTI in the log. If FTI is used, the log must be 
secured in accordance with all other safeguards requirements.
There is a great deal of emphasis on "location" without defining that term, especially 
granularity. Country? State? Building? Room? Server? 
This issue may be exacerbated with the use of cloud storage where data may be stored in 
more than one location, and constantly being moved. verbiage issue  Seldom  Negligible Low
3.2 Electronic and Non-
Electronic FTI Logs
The agency must establish a tracking system to identify and track the location of 
electronic and non-electronic FTI from receipt until it is destroyed. The FTI log may 
include tracking elements, such as:
Taxpayer Name or other identifier*
Tax year(s)
Type of information (e.g., revenue agent reports, Form 1040, work papers)
The reason for the request
Date requested
Date received
Exact location of the FTI
Who has had access to the data
If disposed of, the date and method of disposition
*To the extent possible, do not include FTI in the log. If FTI is used, the log must be 
secured in accordance with all other safeguards requirements.
Issue: reliance to self-reported transmissions of FTI. Mechanism cannot account for 
undisclosed transmission or access to FTI. 
Recommendation: Tripwire-style file monitoring for electronic systems. 
https://www.raymond.cc/blog/3-portable-tools-monitor-files-folders-changes/ 
Similar input elicitation requirements for physical access -> if FTI is accessed, generate a 
digital ticket that necessitates follow-up information. data vulnerability  Likely  Moderate Low
3.3 Converted Media
Conversion of FTI from paper to electronic media (scanning) or from electronic media to 
paper (print screens or printed reports) also requires tracking from creation to 
destruction of the converted FTI. All converted FTI must be tracked on logs containing 
the fields detailed in Section 3.2, depending upon the current form of the FTI, electronic 
or non-electronic.
Issue: unclear how to track converted instances
Recommendation: treat each conversion of the media as a new, unique instance for 
tracking. insufficient process  Likely  Moderate Low
3.4 Recordkeeping of 
Disclosures to State Auditors
> In instances where auditors read large volumes of records containing FTI, whether in 
paper or electronic format, the state tax agency need only identify bulk records 
examined. This identification will contain the approximate number of taxpayer records, 
the date of inspection, a description of the records, and the name of the individual(s) 
making the inspection.
Issue: unacceptable level of control over bulk record access. Especially with digital access, 
there should be precise means for tracking which records were accessed.
Recommendation: Require precise control over bulk records access. data vulnerability  Likely  Moderate Low
4.2 Minimum Protection 
Standards
> Security Container | A security container is a storage device (e.g., turtle case, 
safe/vault) with a resistance to forced penetration, with a security lock with controlled 
access to keys or combinations.
Issue: no specifics on grade of locks
Recommendation: Specify high-grade locks conducive to protecting moderate-risk data data vulnerability  Seldom  Moderate Low
4.2 Minimum Protection 
Standards
> Badged Employee | During business hours, if authorized personnel serve as the second 
barrier between FTI and unauthorized individuals, the authorized personnel must wear 
picture identification badges or credentials. The badge must be clearly displayed and 
worn above the waist.
Issue: Badges are not a barrier. Enforcement is the barrier.
Recommendation: Require card readers or guards that check badge validity.
> A security guard, custodial services worker, or landlord may have access to a locked 
building or a locked room if FTI is in a locked security container.
Issue: This makes a single barrier. 
Recommendation: Require an escort or CCTV monitoring
data vulnerability  Likely  Moderate Low
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4.2 Minimum Protection 
Standards - Fire Safety
The Perimeter is enclosed by slab-to-slab walls constructed of durable materials and 
supplemented by periodic inspecion. Any lesser-type partition must be supplemented by 
electronic intrustion detection and fire detection systems
This indicates to me that fire detection systems are optional **IF** you are using slab-to-
slab perimeter walls. Is employee safety not a concern? I believe employees working in 
facilities with slab-to-slab walls should still be afforded fire detection systems...
verbiage issue  Seldom  Negligible Low
4.3.1 Use of Authorized 
Access List
To facilitate the entry of employees who have a frequent and continuing need to enter a 
restricted area, but who are not assigned to the area, an Authorized Access List (AAL) 
can be maintained so long as MPS are enforced (see Section 4.2, Minimum Protection 
Standards).
Agency Employees: The AAL must contain the following:
Name of individual
Agency or department name
Name and phone number of agency POC
Address of agency POC
Purpose for access
The AAL for agency employees must be updated at least annually or when employee 
access changes.
Vendors and Non-Agency Personnel: The AAL must contain the following information:
Name of vendor/contractor/non-agency personnel
Name and phone number of agency Point of Contact authorizing access
Name and address of vendor POC
Address of vendor/contractor
Purpose and level of access
Vendors, contractors, and non-agency personnel AAL must be updated monthly.
If there is any doubt of the identity of the individual, the security monitor must verify 
the identity of the vendor/contractor individual against the AAL prior to allowing entry 
into the restricted area.
Issue: No mention of validating AAL.
Recommendation: Monthly auditing AAL for need-to-access. Revoke access before 
transfer or termination. insufficient process  Occasional  Moderate Low
4.4 FTI in Transit
Handling FTI must be such that the FTI does not become misplaced or available to 
unauthorized personnel.
Any time FTI is transported from one location to another, care must be taken to provide 
appropriate safeguards. When FTI is hand-carried by an individual in connection with a 
trip or in the course of daily activities, it must be kept with that individual and protected 
from unauthorized disclosures.
Issue: This section does call out electronic FTI and protects it with documentation and 
double-sealed envelopes. 
Recommended: All electronic records in transit must be encrypted.
data vulnerability  Likely  Moderate Low
4.5 Physical Security of 
Computers, Electronic, and 
Removable Media
Computers and electronic media that receive, process, store, or transmit FTI must be in a 
secure area with restricted access. In situations when requirements of a secure area with 
restricted access cannot be maintained, such as home work sites, remote terminals or 
other office work sites, the equipment must receive the highest level of protection 
practical, including full disk encryption. All computers and mobile devices that contain 
FTI and reside at an alternate work site must employ encryption mechanisms to ensure 
that FTI may not be accessed if the computer is lost or stolen
First paragraph requires full disk encryption for systems that process, store or transmit FTI, 
but do nothing to address the common pitfalls of full disk encryption including:
- Weak users passwords that render full disk encryption practically worthless
- Should provide users with training to lock their machines when stepping away to encrypt 
disk. Files are unencrypted for valid active logon session. data vulnerability  Likely  Moderate Low
4.5 Physical Security of 
Computers, Electronic, and 
Removable Media
> All computers and mobile devices that contain FTI and reside at an alternate work site 
must employ encryption mechanisms to ensure that FTI may not be accessed if the 
computer is lost or stolen
Mobile devices that store FTI should also be configured with a remote wipe mechanism. 
Ideally a mobile device management software suite like Maas 360 should be used, 
allowing IT to remotely disable access if the employee is fired, or if the device is lost. 
Device should be able to be remotely locked and wiped. insufficient process  Likely  Moderate Low
4.7 Telework Locations
"The agency must conduct periodic inspections of alternative work sites during the year 
to ensure that safeguards are adequate."
This seems to include employee homes. I can't think of all the possible concerns here, but 
it seems fraught with possible issues. unenforceable  Frequent  Moderate Low
4.7.3 Other Safeguards
> The agency must provide specialized training in security, disclosure awareness, and 
ethics for all participating employees and managers. This training must cover situations 
that could occur as the result of an interruption of work by family, friends, or other 
sources.
Issue: does not account for vendors / contractors with regular access to FTI. 
> 6.3 Disclosure Awareness Training. Employees and contractors must maintain their 
authorization to access FTI through annual training and recertification. Prior to granting an 
agency employee or contractor access to FTI, each employee or contractor must certify his 
or her understanding of the agencys security policy and procedures for safeguarding IRS 
information.
Recommendation: extend verbiage to consistently include anyone that may access FTI verbiage issue  Seldom  Negligible Low
5.3 Access to FTI via State 
Tax Files or Through Other 
Agencies
> FTI cannot be accessed by agency employees, agents, representatives, or contractors
located offshoreoutside of the United States territories, embassies or military
installations. Further, FTI may not be received, processed, stored, transmitted, or
disposed of by information technology (IT) systems located offshore.
The Internet makes this essentially unenforceable. Recommend at least rewording to 
prefer data be kept in the United States, but requiring strong data protections at rest and 
in transit. unenforceable  Frequent  Moderate Low
5.4.2.2 Consolidated Data 
Centers
Agencies using consolidated data centers must implement appropriate controls to 
ensure the protection of FTI, including a service level agreement (SLA) between the 
agency authorized to receive FTI and the consolidated data center. The SLA must cover 
the following:
The agency with authority to receive FTI is responsible for ensuring the protection of all 
FTI received. The consolidated data center shares responsibility for safeguarding FTI.
The SLA provides written notification to the consolidated data center management that 
they are bound by the provisions of Publication 1075, relative to protecting all FTI within 
their possession or control.
The SLA shall detail the IRS’ right to inspect consolidated data center facilities and 
operations accessing, receiving, storing or processing FTI under this agreement to assess 
compliance with requirements defined in IRS Publication 1075. The SLA shall specify that 
IRS’ right of inspection includes the use of manual and/or automated scanning tools to 
perform compliance and vulnerability assessments of information technology (IT) assets 
that access, store, process or transmit FTI.
The SLA shall detail the consolidated data center’s responsibilities to address corrective 
action recommendations to resolve findings of noncompliance identified by IRS 
inspections.
The agency will conduct an internal inspection of the consolidated data center every 18 
months, as described in Section 6.4, Internal Inspections. Multiple agencies sharing a 
consolidated data center may partner together to conduct a single, comprehensive 
internal inspection. However, care must be taken to ensure agency representatives do 
not gain unauthorized access to other agencies’ FTI during the internal inspection.
SLA should add a provision to physically separate or distinctly label all devices that process 
FTI. Racks should be locked or in a cage and only accessible by people authorized to access 
FTI. data vulnerability  Occasional  Moderate Low
6.1 General
> IRC 6103(p)(4)(D) requires that agencies receiving FTI to provide other safeguard
measures, as appropriate, to ensure the confidentiality of the FTI.
I can't figure out why this is limited to confidentiality and doesn't include integrity. 
Integrity does show up in Section 9 (Computer System Security).
Recommend changing to "...ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the FTI." verbiage issue  Seldom  Moderate Low
6.4.2 Secure Storage
> FTI (including tapes, cartridges, or other removable media) must be stored in a secure 
location, safe from unauthorized access.
This section is simply redundant. It should reference other areas within the document that 
provide specific guidance otherwise it only clarifies that "Secure storage must be secure" data vulnerability  Likely  Moderate Low
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6.5 Plan of Action and 
Milestones
The agency must implement a process for ensuring that a Plan of Action and Milestones 
(POA&M) is developed and monitored. The POA&M must include the corrective actions 
identified during the internal inspections and will identify the actions the agency plans 
to take to resolve these findings.
Issue: no mention of sanctions or action against non-compliant agencies.
Recommendation: revoke access to FTI is non-compliant
EDIT: Exhibit 3 USC Title 26, CFR 301.6103(p)(7)-1 says IRS can terminate or suspend 
access to FTI. There is no enforcement mechanism for making them purge existing FTI. data vulnerability  Likely  Moderate Low
7.1 General
"FTI to report on procedures established and used for ensuring the confidentiality of FTI 
that is received" Recommendations: Introduce language to protect both _confidentiality_ and _integrity_ verbiage issue  Seldom  Moderate Low
7.1.2 Encryption 
Requirements
>Communicate the password or pass phrase with the Office of Safeguards
through a separate email or via a telephone call to your IRS contact person. Do not 
provide the password or passphrase in the same email containing the encrypted 
attachment
Passwords for documents should not be transmitted over the same communications 
mechanism, even if they are sent in a separate correspondence. 
Recommend: Send passwords to attachments in secondary communications mechanism. 
i.e. Phone call or SMS. Better yet, IRS should publish a Public PGP key and all attachment 
should be encrypted using IRS's public key, eliminating the need for password transmittal 
entirely.
data vulnerability  Likely  Moderate Low
7.1.2 Encryption 
Requirements
> The Office of Safeguards recommends that all required reports, when sent to the 
Office of Safeguards via email, be transmitted using IRS-approved encryption methods to 
protect sensitive information. This should not be optional.
Recommend changing "recommends" to "requires". insufficient process  Likely  Moderate Low
7.2.3 Annual SSR Update 
Submission Instructions
_" The agency must updated and submit the SSR **annually** to encompass any 
changes that impact the protection of FTI. Example changes include, but are not limited 
to:"_
- _New Computer equipment, systems or applications (hardware or software)_
This says to me that an organization can have a security assessment and then completely 
change all of their hardware, networking, and software stack and still be good without a 
security review for up to another year. I would argue that any changes to hardware, 
networking, software outside of the evaluated base can introduce serious vulnerabilities 
and should be preformed using strict change management with a well defined threshold 
that would trigger the requirement of a new security assessment. 
insufficient process  Likely  Moderate Low
7.3.1 CAP Submission 
Instructions and Submission 
Dates
When extenuating circumstances exist, agencies may request an extension for no more 
than 30 days. Extension requests should be submitted not later than (NLT) 30 days prior 
to the scheduled CAP due date. Request for extensions will not be considered after the 
scheduled CAP due date. Extension requests should be sent to the Office of Safeguards 
via Secure Data Transfer (SDT) or email to SafeguardReports@irs.gov, with the subject 
CAP extension request and reasons for the request. All extension requests will be 
evaluated on a case by case basis. Safeguards will provide an email response, approving 
or disapproving the request within 5 work days after receipt of the request.
No sanctions or consequences for noncompliance
EDIT: Exhibit 3 USC Title 26, CFR 301.6103(p)(7)-1 says IRS can terminate or suspend 
access to FTI. There is no enforcement mechanism for making them purge existing FTI. insufficient process  Occasional  Moderate Low
7.4.1 Cloud Computing
Receiving, processing, storing, or transmitting FTI in a cloud environment requires prior 
notification to the Office of Safeguards. Refer to Section 9.4.1, Cloud Computing 
Environments, for guidance and details on 45-day notification requirements
Although this is the reporting sections, this may be the place to address cloud computing 
requirements i.e. That all FTI stored on IaaS much be in a US region. insufficient process  Likely  Moderate Low
7.4.8 Virtualization of 
Information Technology 
Systems
> No prior notification is required when an agency is planning to receive, process, store, 
or transmit FTI in virtualized environments.
Most cloud environments use virtualization. This section could therefore contradict 7.4.1 
which states that "Receiving, processing, storing, or transmitting FTI in a cloud 
environment requires prior notification..."
Recommend removing this section. (Maybe someone can figure out how to narrowly 
articulate non-shared non-cloud virtualization) verbiage issue _Unlikely  Negligible Low
8.2 Returning IRS 
Information to the Source
>Agencies electing to return IRS information must use a receipt process and ensure that 
the confidentiality is protected at all times during transport (see Section 4.4, FTI in 
Transit). Recommendations: Add _confidentiality and integrity_ verbiage issue  Likely  Moderate Low
8.3 Destruction and Disposal
> When using either method for destruction, every third piece of physical electronic 
media must be checked to ensure appropriate destruction of FTI.
This doesn't make any sense to me, and sounds excessive. Why every third piece of 
media?
Recommend changing to a percentage of the total amount of data storage being 
destroyed (e.g. check 1GB for every 100GB being destroyed) insufficient process  Likely  Moderate Low
9.3.1.1 Access Control Policy 
and Procedures
_"Review and update the current access control policy every three years (or if there is a 
significant change)_
There is no formal definition of a threshold which indicates a "significant change." This is 
vague and if left up to the subjective view of other agencies, this will be abused. verbiage issue  Likely  Moderate Low
9.3.1.12 Remote Access
_"Authorize and **document** the execution of privileged commands and access to 
security-relevant information via remote access for compelling operational needs only"_
Documenting that an action occurred does not lead to discovery of compromise unless the 
logs are reviewed frequently. The document lays out many requirements like this to 
"document" accesses, but does not formally define requirements for reviewing these logs. 
What good is documenting an event without a system/process formally established to 
review events?
insufficient process  Likely  Moderate Low
9.3.1.14 Access Control for 
Mobile Devices (AC-19)
The agency must:
a. Establish usage restrictions, configuration requirements, connection requirements, 
and implementation guidance for agency-controlled mobile devices
b. Authorize the connection of mobile devices to agency information systems
c. Employ encryption to protect the confidentiality and integrity of information on 
mobile devices (e.g., smartphones and laptop computers) (CE5)
b. Purge/wipe information from mobile devices based on 10 consecutive, unsuccessful 
device logon attempts (e.g., personal digital assistants, smartphones and tablets). Laptop 
computers are excluded from this requirement (AC-7, CE2)
Does not specify logon requirements for the device (e.g. pin, fingerprint, facial recog, 
password, etc)
Additionally, this section is inconsistent with 9.3.1.12 Remote Access (AC-17) without 
mention of MFA when used off prim. data vulnerability  Likely  Moderate Low
9.3.1.15 Use of External 
Information Systems (AC-20)
> The agency may allow the use of personally-owned devices, without notification, only
> for the following purposes:
> a. Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) used to access e-mail, where all requirements
> in Section 9.4.8 Mobile Devices are met
In other sections they stated that FTI can be transferred over email, so this waiver would 
allow FTI to be viewed on a personal device. data vulnerability  Likely  Moderate Low
9.3.1.17 Publicly Accessible 
Content (AC-22)
The agency must:
a. Designate individuals authorized to post information onto a publicly accessible 
information system
b. Train authorized individuals to ensure that publicly accessible information does not 
contain FTI
c. Review the proposed content of information prior to posting onto the publicly 
accessible information system to ensure that FTI is not included
d. Review the content on the publicly accessible information system for FTI, at a 
minimum, quarterly and remove such information, if discovered
Does not specify approval authorities for review or how review should be conducted. Is 




> Notify account managers when accounts are no longer required, when users are 
terminated or transferred, or when individual information system usage or need- to-
know permission changes > Review accounts for compliance with account management 
requirements at a minimum of annually for user accounts and semi-annually for 
privileged accounts
Notifying is wholly insufficient. This should trigger a mandatory revocation of access. 
Otherwise:
They could maintain access for damn-near a year.
_Note: these are taken from 9.3 NIST SP 800-53 Control Requirements_
insufficient process  Occasional  Moderate Low
9.3.1.2 Account 
Management (AC-2) - shared 
accounts
> Establish a process for reissuing shared/group account credentials (if
> deployed) when individuals are removed from the group.
Nope, just nope. While I agree there should be a process for removing accounts from a 
group. There should be **NO** shared account access to FTI, this defeats any auditing 
actions in place. data vulnerability  Frequent  Moderate Low
9.3.1.2 Account 
Management: User 
Monitoring _"Monitor the use of information system accounts"_
Monitor is not well defined here. Are we talking about email monitoring? Keystroke 
logging? Event logs? PCAPS/ Network Monitioring? insufficient process  Likely  Moderate Low
9.3.1.9 Session Lock (AC-11)
> Prevent further access to the system by initiating a session lock after 15 minutes
> of inactivity or upon receiving a request from a user
This is pretty secure, but also pretty unusable. Not really a vulnerability, but could be one 
if users try to develop mechanisms to circumvent this protection. (Remind me to tell you 
about our novel use of a mouse and a clock sometime...) insufficient process  Likely  Moderate Low
9.3.11.5 Access Control for 
Output Devices (PE-5)
> The agency must control physical access to information system output devices to 
prevent unauthorized individuals from obtaining the output. Monitors, printers, copiers, 
scanners, fax machines, and audio devices are examples of information system output 
devices.
What about network taps? Rogue access points? data vulnerability  Seldom  Moderate Low
9.3.11.6 Monitoring Physical 
Access (PE-6) > Review physical access logs annually A yearly review of physical access logs is ineffective. insufficient process  Likely  Negligible Low
9.3.13.3 Personnel Screening 
(PS-3)
The agency must: 
a. Screen individuals prior to authorizing access to the information system 
b. Rescreen individuals according to agency-defined conditions requiring rescreening
> Screen individuals prior to authorizing access to the information system
Screen how? Federal database? Local? insufficient process  Frequent  Critical Low
9.3.13.4 Termination (PS-4) 
[and 9.3.13.5 Personnel 
Transfer (PS-5)]
The agency, upon termination of individual employment must:
a. Disable information system access
b. Terminate/revoke any authenticators/credentials associated with the individual
c. Conduct exit interviews, as needed
d. Retrieve all security-related agency information system–related property
e. Retain access to agency information and information systems formerly controlled by 
the terminated individual
f. Notify agency personnel upon termination of the employee
How is this verified? Where is the check and balance? Additionally, there is no time period 
associated with revocation or transfer. 
Recommendation: Revoke access immediately before notifying employee of termination 
to prevent access to sensitive data. data vulnerability  Likely  Critical Low
9.3.14.3 Vulnerability 
Scanning (RA-5) Remediate legitimate vulnerabilities in accordance with an assessment of risk
No fixed requirement for changing / patching / fixing ID'd vulns
(d.) says "Remediate legitimate vulnerabilities in accordance with an assessment of risk" 
but whose assessment? Without a timeline suspense, this may never get fixed. data vulnerability  Seldom  Moderate Low
9.3.15.4 Acquisition Process 
(SA-4)
The agency must include the following requirements, descriptions, and criteria, explicitly 
or by reference, in the acquisition contract for the information system, system 
component, or information system service in accordance with applicable federal laws, 
Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, guidelines, and agency 
mission/business needs:
a. Security functional requirements
b. Security strength requirements
c. Security assurance requirements
e. Security-related documentation requirements
f. Requirements for protecting security-related documentation
g. Description of the information system development environment and environment in 
which the system is intended to operate
h. Acceptance criteria
When applicable, the agency must require the developer of the information system, 
system component, or information system service to provide a description of the 
functional properties of the security controls to be employed (CE1)








> Track security flaws and flaw resolution within the system, component, or service
> and report findings to designated agency officials
I don't know what this means, but developers shouldn't note security vulnerabilities in the 
systems the same system that's vulnerable. insufficient process  Likely  Negligible Low
9.3.16.5 Boundary 
Protection
> The agency must limit the number of external network connections to the information 
system. (CE3) Recommend that a maximum number or other quantifiable limit be specified. unenforceable  Likely  Negligible Low
9.3.17.3 Malicious Code 
Protection (SI-3)
Malicious code protection includes antivirus software and antimalware and intrusion 
detection systems.
The agency must:
a. Employ malicious code protection mechanisms at information system entry and exit 
points to detect and eradicate malicious code
b. Update malicious code protection mechanisms whenever new releases are available in 
accordance
What happens when the AV is the point of infection? Nowhere is there a forcing function 
for vulns to be fixed in a timely manner. 
Recommendation: Whitelist applications, prevent chained installations of child 
applications from whitelisted apps (e.g., Chrome cannot install anything nor can Norton 
AV) data vulnerability  Occasional  Critical Low
9.3.17.6 Spam Protection (SI-
8)
> Malicious code protection includes antivirus software and antimalware and intrusion 
detection systems.
I don't think that _Spam_ is the issue here. They should be more concerned with phishing 
attacks. verbiage issue  Seldom  Negligible Low
9.3.17.7 Information Input 
Validation (SI-10) The information system must check the validity of information inputs.
Incredibly vague. How is this check performed? Fuzzing? Manual audit? Additionally, if org 
is using a third-party application and a vuln is found through pentesting or fuzzing, what 
then? verbiage issue  Likely  Negligible Low
9.3.2.3 Role-Based Security 
Training (AT-3)
> Note: Training conducted under this section is distinct from Section 6.3, Disclosure
> Awareness, and Section 9.3.2.2, Security Awareness Training (AT-2).
Just to pick a nit. This role based training should encompass the concepts in 9.3.2.2. **DO 
NOT** make this role based training an addendum. It will be seen as punitive and reduces 
the effectiveness, since employees will try everything to reduce their mandatory training 
burden. (<- I know from experience.) insufficient process  Seldom  Negligible Low
9.3.3.2 Audit Events (AU-2)
> a. Determine that the information system is capable, at a minimum, of auditing the 
following event types: > 4. Changes made to an application or database by a batch file
I find the list unsatisfying. What does this mean, and why batch files?
What about printing? Large network transfers? Network connections in general (ie 
netflow)? 
At a minimum, I think the list needs to cover more general areas (user behavior, system 
behavior, data access and modification, data transfer, etc) data vulnerability  Occasional  Moderate Low
9.3.3.5 Response to Audit 
Processing Failures (AU-5)
> Provide a warning when allocated audit record storage volume reaches a
> maximum audit record storage capacity (CE1) Should provide a warning **BEFORE** reaching audit record storage capacity. insufficient process  Likely  Moderate Low
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9.3.3.6 Audit Review, 
Analysis, and Reporting (AU-
6)
> a. Review and analyze information system audit records at least weekly or more 
frequently at the discretion of the information system owner for indications of unusual 
activity related to potential unauthorized FTI access
This isn't horrible, but I'd prefer they do continual monitoring and identify indications of 
unusual activity more frequently than weekly. insufficient process _Unlikely  Moderate Low
9.3.4.2 Security Assessments 
(CA-2)
The agency must:
a. Develop a security assessment plan that describes the scope of the assessment, 
including:
1. Security controls and control enhancements under assessment
2. Assessment procedures to be used to determine security control effectiveness
3. Assessment environment, assessment team, and assessment roles and responsibilities
b. Assess the security controls in the information system and its environment at a 
minimum on an annual basis to determine the extent to which the controls are 
implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with 
respect to meeting established security requirements
Does not specify vuln assessment, pentest, or expectations of scope for annual 
assessment. Wholly insufficient. insufficient process  Seldom  Moderate Low
9.3.4.3 System 
Interconnections (CA-3)
> Authorize connections from the information system to other information systems
> through the use of Interconnection Security Agreements
> Document, for each interconnection, the interface characteristics, security
> requirements, and the nature of the information communicated
This should also require a validation/audit requirement. These connection documents get 
outdated very fast and details are often missed. Need a mechanism to test whether 
systems have additional interconnects not stipulated in the documentation (or that 
currently documented interconnects still exist). insufficient process  Occasional  Moderate Low
9.3.4.4 Plan of Action and 
Milestones (CA-5)
a. Develop a POA&M for the information system to document the agency’s planned 
remedial actions to correct weaknesses or deficiencies noted during the assessment of 
the security controls and to reduce or eliminate known vulnerabilities in the system
b. Update the existing POA&M on a quarterly basis, at a minimum, based on the findings 
from security controls assessments, security impact analyses, and continuous monitoring 
activities
No sanctions or consequence for non-compliance.
EDIT: 9.3.13.8 Personnel Sanctions (PS-8) talks about personnel sanctions, not 
organization sanctions 
EDIT: Exhibit 3 USC Title 26, CFR 301.6103(p)(7)-1 says IRS can terminate or suspend 
access to FTI. There is no enforcement mechanism for making them purge existing FTI. data vulnerability  Likely  Moderate Low
9.3.4.5 Security 
Authorization (CA-6)
> Assign a senior-level executive or manager as the authorizing official for the
> information system No consequences outlined for this individual. insufficient process  Likely  Negligible Low
9.3.5.10 Software Usage 
Restrictions (CM-10)
>Control and document the use of peer-to-peer file sharing technology to ensure
> that this capability is not used for the unauthorized distribution, display,




a. Establish policies governing the installation of software by users
b. Enforce software installation policies through automated methods
c. Monitor policy compliance on a continual basis Don't allow users to install software. Or at least institute application whitelisting. data vulnerability  Likely  Critical Low




a. Develop and document an inventory of information system components that:
1. Accurately reflects the current information system
2. Includes all components that store, process, or transmit FTI
3. Is at the level of granularity deemed necessary for tracking and reporting
4. Includes information deemed necessary to achieve effective information system 
component accountability
b. Review and update the information system component inventory through periodic 
manual inventory checks or a network monitoring tool that automatically maintains the 
inventory
c. Update the inventory of information system components as an integral part of 
component installations, removals, and information system updates (CE1)
No temporal requirement for maintaining updated inventories. This lends itself to rogue 
systems being on the network for an enduring amount of time. Furthermore, the "or" 
statement of manual inspection or automated assessments need to be tied to a ground 
truth --> asset inventory through supply systems ("do we own the devices on our 
network?"). Google SRE talks about this being a core tenet of their security.
Failure to ID ground truth could permit rogue computers to be whitelisted and treated as 
legit systems. data vulnerability  Occasional  Moderate Low
9.3.6.8 Information System 
Recovery and Reconstitution 
(CP-10)
The agency must provide for the recovery and reconstitution of the information system 
to a known state after a disruption, compromise, or failure. Reverting an unpatched system to a previous unpatched state helps nothing. data vulnerability  Likely  Moderate Low
9.3.7.2 Identification and 
Authentication 
(Organizational Users) (IA-2)
The information system must:
a. Uniquely identify and authenticate agency users (or processes acting on behalf of 
agency users)
b. Implement multi-factor authentication for all remote network access to privileged and 
non-privileged accounts for information systems that receive, process, store, or transmit 
FTI. (CE1, CE2)
c. Implement multi-factor authentication for remote access to privileged and non-
privileged accounts such that one of the factors is provided by a device separate from 
the system gaining access. NIST SP 800-63 allows the use of software tokens. (CE11) Why only MFA for a subset of systems? Why not MFA for any system that touches FTI? data vulnerability  Likely  Moderate Low
9.3.7.5 Authenticator 
Management (IA-5)
 g y  g   y   y
a. Verifying, as part of the initial authenticator distribution, the identity of the individual, 
group, role, or device receiving the authenticator
b. Establishing initial authenticator content for authenticators defined by the agency
c. Ensuring that authenticators have sufficient strength of mechanism for their intended 
use
d. Establishing and implementing administrative procedures for initial authenticator 
distribution, for lost/compromised or damaged authenticators, and for revoking 
authenticators
e. Changing default content of authenticators prior to information system installation
f. Establishing minimum and maximum lifetime restrictions and reuse conditions for 
authenticators
g. Changing/refreshing authenticators
h. Protecting authenticator content from unauthorized disclosure and modification
i. Requiring individuals to take, and having devices implement, specific security 
safeguards to protect authenticators
j. Changing authenticators for group/role accounts when membership to those accounts 
changes
The information system must, for password-based authentication:
a. Enforce minimum password complexity of:
1. Eight characters
2. At least one numeric and at least one special character
3. A mixture of at least one uppercase and at least one lowercase letter
4. Storing and transmitting only encrypted representations of passwords
b. Enforce password minimum lifetime restriction of one day
c. Enforce non-privileged account passwords to be changed at least every 90 days
d. Enforce privileged account passwords to be changed at least every 60 days
e. Prohibit password reuse for 24 generations Shitty password change policies that NIST no longer recommends. data vulnerability  Frequent  Moderate Low
9.3.8.3 Incident Response 
Testing (IR-3)
Agencies entrusted with FTI must test the incident response capability at least annually.
a. Agencies must perform tabletop exercises using scenarios that include a breach of FTI 
and should test the agency’s incident response policies and procedures.
b. A subset of all employees and contractors with access to FTI must be included in table 
top exercises.
c. Each tabletop exercise must produce an after-action report to improve existing 
processes, procedures, and policies.
A tabletop exercise is the only requirement? This goes back to [security 
assessments](https://github.com/rstevens70/hackingcompliance/issues/44) being horribly 
defined. You evaluate SOPs and policies through live training against a pentest team. insufficient process  Likely  Moderate Low
9.3.8.4 Incident Handling (IR-
4)
> Implement an incident handling capability for security incidents that includes
> preparation, detection and analysis, containment, eradication, and recovery Does not cover evidence preservation/forensics. insufficient process  Likely  Negligible Low
269
9.3.8.9 Information Spillage 
Response (IR-9)
The agency must respond to information spills by:
a. Identifying the specific information involved in the information system contamination
b. Alerting authorized incident response personnel of the information spill using a 
method of communication not associated with the spill
c. Isolating the contaminated information system or system component
d. Eradicating the information from the contaminated information system or component
e. Identifying other information
This section doesn't say anything about documenting information spillage or providing an 
after-action step to learn from mistakes. insufficient process  Occasional  Moderate Low
9.4.1 Cloud Computing 
Environments > Data is not stored in an agency-managed data center
This is true only of public clouds. Private clouds may reside in an agency-managed data 
center. verbiage issue  Occasional  Negligible Low
9.4.18 Wireless Networks
Requirements
To use FTI in an 802.11 WLAN, the agency must meet the following mandatory 
requirements:
a. The agency should have WLAN management controls that include security policies and 
procedures, a complete inventory of all wireless network components, and standardized 
security configurations for all components.
b. WLAN hardware (access points, servers, routers, switches, firewalls) must be 
physically protected in accordance with the minimum protection standards for physical 
security outlined in Section 4.0, Secure Storage—IRC 6103(p)(4)(B).
c. Each system within the agency’s network that transmits FTI through the WLAN is 
hardened in accordance with the requirements in this publication.
d. The WLAN is architected to provide logical separation between WLANs with different 
security profiles and from the wired LAN.
e. WLAN infrastructure that receives, processes, stores, or transmits FTI must comply 
with the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers 802.11i wireless security 
standard and perform mutual authentication for all access to FTI via 802.1X and 
extensible authentication protocol
f. Vulnerability scanning should be conducted as part of periodic technical security 
assessments for the organization’s WLAN.
g. Wireless intrusion detection is deployed to monitor for unauthorized access, and 
security event logging is enabled on WLAN components in accordance with Section 9.3.3, 
Audit and Accountability.
h. Disposal of allWLAN hardware follows media sanitization and disposal procedures in 
Section 9.3.10.6, Media Sanitization (MP-6), and Section 9.4.7, Media Sanitization.
No mention of rogue access points. No mention of logical segmentation for each user 
session (logical switch vs hub). data vulnerability  Likely  Critical Low
9.4.8 Mobile Devices
> Access to hardware, such as the digital camera, global positioning system
> (GPS), and universal serial bus (USB) interface, must be disabled to the extent
> possible
I disagree with the GPS portion of this statement. Using location data to geo-fence, 
located a device, or perform and out of bounds remote wipe are all strategies that should 
be used for mobile. insufficient process  Likely  Negligible Low
Table 5 - Evidentiary 
Requirements for SSR 
approval before release of 
FTI
AC-17, Remote Access
Screenshot of authentication screens
Document how multi-factor authentication is deployed for all remote network access to 
systems containing FTI and the tokens used for authentication
Section 5.2, Comingling and Labeling
Screenshots of database schemas that show electronic FTI labeling
Sample output (report/notice) that shows how FTI is labeled
The use of screenshots to prove evidentiary requirements feels squishy to me. These 
could be easily forged/photoshopped. They are not strong evidence of safeguards. data vulnerability  Likely  Moderate Low
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Section Text of concern Concern Issue Probability Severity Impact
Network Segmentation
Network segmentation of, or isolating (segmenting), the cardholder data environment from 
the remainder of an entitys network is not a PCI DSS requirement. However, it is strongly 
recommended as a method that may reduce: The scope of the PCI DSS assessment Excluding segments of network outside of CDE from protections puts CDE at risk of VLAN hopping. Could 
allow attackers to use less secure systems to pivot into CDE
data vulnerability Probability Seldom Severity Critical Low
1.1.1.a Examine documented procedures to verify there is a formal process for testing and approval of all:
Does not specify how to safely perform change control... Should recommend a review process or 
something similar. it feels strange to allow someone to makeup their own processes. We don't let them roll 
their own crypto, so why let them roll their own procedures for protecting sensitive data?
insufficient process Probability Frequent Severity Moderate Low





1.3.7.a > Examine firewall and router configurations to verify that methods are in place to prevent 
the disclosure of private IP addresses and routing information from internal networks to the 






Install personal firewall software or equivalent functionality on any portable computing 
devices (including company and/or employee-owned) that connect to the Internet when 
outside the network Do not allow personal systems within CDE. Firewalls can't stop all threats.
data vulnerability Probability Likely Severity Critical Low
2.1.a
Choose a sample of system components, and attempt to log on (with system administrator 
help) to the devices and applications using default vendor-supplied accounts and 
passwords, to verify that ALL default passwords have been changed. Automate a full scan. 1 default account is all it takes.
insufficient process Probability Seldom Severity Moderate Low
3.2.1
For a sample of system components, examine data sources including but not limited to the 
following, and verify that the full contents of any track from the magnetic stripe on the back 
of card or equivalent data on a chip are not stored after authorization:
Do not sample. Develop regex and automate. insufficient process Probability Frequent Severity Moderate Low
3.5.1 Interview responsible personnel and review documentation to verify that a document exists 
to describe the cryptographic architecture, including:
Do not allow home-rolled crypto. Mandate a minimum strength for approved standards insufficient process Probability 
Occasional
Severity Moderate Low
4.1.1 > Weak encryption (for example, WEP, SSL) is not used as a security control for 
authentication or transmission.
Short or easily guessable WPA2 PSK within an unsegmented LAN provides is a danger as well insufficient process Probability 
Occasional
Severity Moderate Low
5.2.a Examine policies and procedures to verify that anti-virus software and definitions are 
required to be kept up to date.
Define periodic. 24 hours and auto install? insufficient process Probability 
Frequent
Severity Moderate Low
Requirement 5: Protect all 
systems against malware 
and regularly update anti-
Requirement 5: Protect all systems against malware and regularly update anti-virus 
software or programs
This entire section relies solely on antivirus to prevent malware infections. This is wholly insufficient and 
should mandate more, such as: application whitelisting, block installations in areas that permit persistence, 
etc
insufficient process Probability Frequent Severity Moderate Low
PCI DSS Applicability 
Information Cardholder data and sensitive authentication data are defined as follows:
Seems to be missing other sensitive authentication data, especially since these are often used when the 
user forgets her username or password:
- Email address
- Password
- Social Security Number
- Date of Birth
data vulnerability Probability Likely Severity Moderate Low
3.6.1.b Observe the procedures for generating keys to verify that strong keys are generated. "Observation" is insufficient for verifying key strength. verbiage Probability Seldom Severity Moderate Low
4.2 Never send unprotected PANs by end- user messaging technologies (for example, e- mail, 
instant messaging, SMS, chat, etc.)
Should similarly apply to passwords. insufficient process Probability Likely Severity Moderate Low
5.1 Deploy anti-virus software on all systems commonly affected by malicious software 
(particularly personal computers and servers).
I don't know what to recommend, but "commonly affected" seems like a bad specification. data vulnerability Probability Likely Severity Moderate Low
Requirement 7: Restrict 
access to cardholder data 
by business need to know
Requirement 7: Restrict access to cardholder data by business need to know This section is missing requirements for re-review of access, and revocation of access. insufficient process Probability Frequent Severity Moderate Low
11.1.c and 11.1.d
> 11.1.c If wireless scanning is utilized, examine output from
recent wireless scans to verify that:
> 11.1.d If automated monitoring is utilized (for example,
wireless IDS/IPS  NAC  etc )
Why have additional provisions for more secure implementations? This might de-incentivize security and 




Review the scan reports and verify that all high risk vulnerabilities are addressed and the 
scan process includes rescans to verify that the high risk vulnerabilities (as defined in PCI 
DSS Requirement 6.1) are resolved.
As written, high-risk vulns can go unaddressed for 11 months as long as they're addressed before an 
inspection. insufficient process
Probability 
Occasional Severity Critical Low
11.3.3 Examine penetration testing results to verify that noted exploitable vulnerabilities were corrected and that repeated testing confirmed the vulnerability was corrected.
How soon after ID?
verbiage Probability Likely Severity Moderate Low
A1.1 All CGI scripts used by an entity must be created and run as the entitys unique user ID. CGI scripts is too narrow, should be "applications" verbiage Probability 
Frequent
Severity Moderate Low
PCI DSS Applicability 
Information
> The primary account number is the defining factor for cardholder data. If cardholder name, 
service code, and/or expiration date are stored, processed or transmitted with the PAN, or 
are otherwise present in the cardholder data environment (CDE), they must be protected in 
accordance with applicable PCI DSS requirements.





1.1.3 > Examine data-flow diagram and interview personnel to verify the diagram: Is kept current and updated as needed upon changes to the environment.
What does kept current mean? how often? right before the inspection or more regularly?
insufficient process Probability Frequent
Severity 
Negligible Low
1.1.5 > Description of groups, roles, and responsibilities for management of network components
what are the minimum set of requirements for responsibilities?
insufficient process Probability Frequent
Severity 
Negligible Low
1.1.6.b > Identify insecure services, protocols, and ports allowed; and verify that security features are documented for each service.
why are insecure services allowed? who is approval authority?
data vulnerability Probability Likely Severity Moderate Low
2.1.1.a > Interview responsible personnel and examine supporting documentation to verify that:
Why is this different than previous section? What not verify technical implementation that creds are 
changed instead of interviewing?
insufficient process Probability Seldom Severity Moderate Low
2.2 > Assure that these standards address all known security vulnerabilities and are consistent with industry-accepted system hardening standards.****
Use current versions. 
verbiage Probability Seldom Severity Negligible Low
2.2.3 > Implement additional security features for any required services, protocols, or daemons that are considered to be insecure. This relies on homebrewed wrappings to secure insecure protocols. Just don't use them if insecure. See 
#8 
data vulnerability Probability Likely Severity Moderate Low
2.4.b > Interview personnel to verify the documented inventory is kept current. Again, what does current mean? Action-based updating? Updated every X days? How are updated 
inventories verified?
See #5 




> For a sample of system components, examine data sources, including but not limited to 
the following, and verify that the three-digit or four-digit card verification code or value 
printed on the front of the card or the signature panel (CVV2, CVC2, CID, CAV2 data) is not 
stored after authorization




> For a sample of system components, examine data sources, including but not limited to 
the following and verify that PINs and encrypted PIN blocks are not stored after 
authorization:





3.6.4.b > Interview personnel to verify that keys are changed at the end of the defined cryptoperiod(s).
Physically verify key change. Do not take someone's word for it. 
insufficient process Probability Seldom Severity Negligible Low
For Assessors: Sampling of 
Business Facilities/System 
Components
> The sample must be large enough to provide the assessor with reasonable assurance that 
all business facilities/system components are configured per the standard processes. A specific confidence level and interval would be better, and would allow assessors to calculate the sample 
size. For example, the standard could say 90% confidence +/- 5%.
verbiage Probability Likely Severity Moderate Low
2.1 > Always change vendor-supplied defaults and remove or disable unnecessary default accounts before installing a system on the network. Change them to new **unique** and **strong** passwords. Maybe password policies come up later in the 
doc?
verbiage Probability Seldom Severity Moderate Low
3.4.1.c > Note: If disk encryption is not used to encrypt removable media, the data stored on this media will need to be rendered unreadable through some other method. This is insufficient. The data should be encrypted, even if disk encryption is not used. "Unreadable" is not 
the same as encrypted, and is unacceptable.
data vulnerability Probability Occasional Severity Moderate Low
Requirement 4: Encrypt 
transmission of cardholder 
data across open, public 
networks
Encrypt transmission of cardholder data across open, public networks I don't understand why this requirement applies only to "open, public networks" and not all networks? verbiage Probability Likely Severity Moderate Low
5.2.d
> Examine anti-virus configurations, including the master installation of the software and a 
sample of system components, to verify that:
Anti-virus software log generation is enabled, and
Logs are retained in accordance with PCI DSS Requirement 10.7.
Missing a requirement to review the logs.
insufficient process Probability Likely Severity Moderate Low
6.1
> Establish a process to identify security vulnerabilities, using reputable outside sources for 
security vulnerability information, and assign a risk ranking (for example, as high, medium, 
or low) to newly discovered security vulnerabilities.
Missing a frequency requirement. Should you review every day? Week? Section 6.2 requires installation of 




> Using strong cryptography, render all authentication credentials (such as 
passwords/phrases) unreadable during transmission and storage on all system 
components.






8.2.3 > Passwords/passphrases must meet the following...
NIST guidance changed in 2017: https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp800-63b.html
insufficient process Probability Likely Severity Moderate Low
9.1
> Observe a system administrators attempt to log into consoles for randomly selected 
systems in the cardholder data environment and verify that they are locked to prevent 
unauthorized use.
Automate. insufficient process Probability Likely Severity Moderate Low
9.4.4.b
> 9.4.4.b Verify that the log contains:
The visitors name,
The firm represented, and
The onsite personnel authorizing physical access.
Missing date and time.
insufficient process Probability Likely Severity Negligible Low
12.7
> Inquire with Human Resource department management and verify that background 
checks are conducted (within the constraints of local laws) prior to hire on potential 
personnel who will have access to cardholder data or the cardholder data environment.
Needs to require correlation between local, state, and federal background checks, to include municipalities 
and states of previous residence. insufficient process Probability Seldom Severity Moderate Low
12.6.2 > Require personnel to acknowledge at least annually that they have read and understood 
the security policy and procedures.
This is good, but perhaps add testing to validate understanding? insufficient process Probability Likely Severity 
Negligible
Low
Appendix A2 > Additional PCI DSS Requirements for Entities using SSL/early TLS
What defines "early TLS"? Version 1.1 and below? Should specify what versions are acceptable.
verbiage Probability Seldom Severity Moderate Low
Compliance Audit Results for PCI DSS
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5.1.1 antivurs programs "Ensure that anti-virus programs are capable of detecting, removing, and protecting against all known types of malicious software..."
"Ensure that anti-virus programs are capable of detecting, removing, and protecting against all known 
types of malicious software..."
I noted that they should also check that AV signatures are updated regularly. Also might want metrics on 
refining false positives...
insufficient process Probability Likely Severity Moderate Low
2.5 Security Policy "Ensure that security policies and operational procedures for managing vendor defaults and other security parameters are documented, in use, and known to all affected parties..."
HITRUST has 2 requirements for policies & procedures that are annoying to audit against but sort of help 
make policies & procedures stronger:
* need annual review of policies; they should be updated as at least reviewed annually
* need the users to acknowledge they received the policies and read them
This control looks for policies & procedures in place, but doesn't have the review/acknowledgment 
enforcement parts in place, which could help make sure the policies aren't written once and forgotten about
insufficient process Probability Seldom Severity Negligible Low
9.3.1.2 Account 
Management (AC-2) - 
shared accounts
> Establish a process for reissuing shared/group account credentials (if
> deployed) when individuals are removed from the group. Nope, just nope. While I agree there should be a process for removing accounts from a group. There 
should be **NO** shared account access to FTI, this defeats any auditing actions in place.




_"Monitor the use of information system accounts"_
Monitor is not well defined here. Are we talking about email monitoring? Keystroke logging? Event logs? 
PCAPS/ Network Monitioring?
insufficient process  Likely  Moderate Low
9.3.1.9 Session Lock (AC-
11)
> Prevent further access to the system by initiating a session lock after 15 minutes
> of inactivity or upon receiving a request from a user This is pretty secure, but also pretty unusable. Not really a vulnerability, but could be one if users try to 
develop mechanisms to circumvent this protection. (Remind me to tell you about our novel use of a mouse 
and a clock sometime )
insufficient process  Likely  Moderate Low
9.3.11.5 Access Control for 
Output Devices (PE-5)
> The agency must control physical access to information system output devices to prevent 
unauthorized individuals from obtaining the output. Monitors, printers, copiers, scanners, fax 
machines, and audio devices are examples of information system output devices. What about network taps? Rogue access points? data vulnerability  Seldom  Moderate Low
9.3.11.6 Monitoring 
Physical Access (PE-6)
> Review physical access logs annually
A yearly review of physical access logs is ineffective. 
insufficient process  Likely  Negligible Low
9.3.13.3 Personnel 
Screening (PS-3)
The agency must: 
a. Screen individuals prior to authorizing access to the information system 
b. Rescreen individuals according to agency-defined conditions requiring rescreening
> Screen individuals prior to authorizing access to the information system
Screen how? Federal database? Local?
insufficient process  Frequent  Critical Low
9.3.13.4 Termination (PS-
4) [and 9.3.13.5 Personnel 
Transfer (PS-5)]
The agency, upon termination of individual employment must:
a. Disable information system access
b. Terminate/revoke any authenticators/credentials associated with the individual
c. Conduct exit interviews, as needed
d. Retrieve all security-related agency information system–related property
e. Retain access to agency information and information systems formerly controlled by the 
terminated individual
f  Notify agency personnel upon termination of the employee
How is this verified? Where is the check and balance? Additionally, there is no time period associated with 
revocation or transfer. 
Recommendation: Revoke access immediately before notifying employee of termination to prevent access 
to sensitive data.
data vulnerability  Likely  Critical Low
9.3.14.3 Vulnerability 
Scanning (RA-5) Remediate legitimate vulnerabilities in accordance with an assessment of risk
No fixed requirement for changing / patching / fixing ID'd vulns
(d.) says "Remediate legitimate vulnerabilities in accordance with an assessment of risk" but whose 
assessment? Without a timeline suspense, this may never get fixed.
data vulnerability  Seldom  Moderate Low
9.3.15.4 Acquisition 
Process (SA-4)
The agency must include the following requirements, descriptions, and criteria, explicitly or 
by reference, in the acquisition contract for the information system, system component, or 
information system service in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, 
directives, policies, regulations, standards, guidelines, and agency mission/business needs:
a. Security functional requirements
b. Security strength requirements
c. Security assurance requirements
e. Security-related documentation requirements
f. Requirements for protecting security-related documentation
g. Description of the information system development environment and environment in 
which the system is intended to operate
h. Acceptance criteria
When applicable, the agency must require the developer of the information system, system 
component, or information system service to provide a description of the functional 
properties of the security controls to be employed (CE1)








> Track security flaws and flaw resolution within the system, component, or service
> and report findings to designated agency officials I don't know what this means, but developers shouldn't note security vulnerabilities in the systems the 
same system that's vulnerable.
insufficient process  Likely  Negligible Low
9.3.16.5 Boundary 
Protection
> The agency must limit the number of external network connections to the information 
system. (CE3)
Recommend that a maximum number or other quantifiable limit be specified.
unenforceable  Likely  Negligible Low
9.3.17.3 Malicious Code 
Protection (SI-3)
Malicious code protection includes antivirus software and antimalware and intrusion 
detection systems.
The agency must:
a. Employ malicious code protection mechanisms at information system entry and exit 
points to detect and eradicate malicious code
b. Update malicious code protection mechanisms whenever new releases are available in 
accordance
What happens when the AV is the point of infection? Nowhere is there a forcing function for vulns to be 
fixed in a timely manner. 
Recommendation: Whitelist applications, prevent chained installations of child applications from whitelisted 
apps (e g  Chrome cannot install anything nor can Norton AV)
data vulnerability  Occasional  Critical Low
9.3.17.6 Spam Protection 
(SI-8)
> Malicious code protection includes antivirus software and antimalware and intrusion 
detection systems.
I don't think that _Spam_ is the issue here. They should be more concerned with phishing attacks. verbiage issue  Seldom  Negligible Low
9.3.17.7 Information Input 
Validation (SI-10)
The information system must check the validity of information inputs. Incredibly vague. How is this check performed? Fuzzing? Manual audit? Additionally, if org is using a third-
party application and a vuln is found through pentesting or fuzzing, what then?
verbiage issue  Likely  Negligible Low
9.3.2.3 Role-Based 
Security Training (AT-3)
> Note: Training conducted under this section is distinct from Section 6.3, Disclosure
> Awareness, and Section 9.3.2.2, Security Awareness Training (AT-2). Just to pick a nit. This role based training should encompass the concepts in 9.3.2.2. **DO NOT** make this role based training an addendum. It will be seen as punitive and reduces the effectiveness, since 
employees will try everything to reduce their mandatory training burden. (<- I know from experience.)
insufficient process  Seldom  Negligible Low
9.3.3.2 Audit Events (AU-2) > a. Determine that the information system is capable, at a minimum, of auditing the following event types: > 4. Changes made to an application or database by a batch file
I find the list unsatisfying. What does this mean, and why batch files?
What about printing? Large network transfers? Network connections in general (ie netflow)? 
At a minimum, I think the list needs to cover more general areas (user behavior, system behavior, data 
access and modification  data transfer  etc)
data vulnerability  Occasional  Moderate Low
9.3.3.5 Response to Audit 
Processing Failures (AU-5)
> Provide a warning when allocated audit record storage volume reaches a
> maximum audit record storage capacity (CE1)
Should provide a warning **BEFORE** reaching audit record storage capacity.
insufficient process  Likely  Moderate Low
9.3.3.6 Audit Review, 
Analysis, and Reporting 
(AU-6)
> a. Review and analyze information system audit records at least weekly or more frequently 
at the discretion of the information system owner for indications of unusual activity related to 
potential unauthorized FTI access This isn't horrible, but I'd prefer they do continual monitoring and identify indications of unusual activity 
more frequently than weekly.




a. Develop a security assessment plan that describes the scope of the assessment, 
including:
1. Security controls and control enhancements under assessment
2. Assessment procedures to be used to determine security control effectiveness
3. Assessment environment, assessment team, and assessment roles and responsibilities
b. Assess the security controls in the information system and its environment at a minimum 
on an annual basis to determine the extent to which the controls are implemented correctly, 
operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting 
established security requirements
Does not specify vuln assessment, pentest, or expectations of scope for annual assessment. Wholly 
insufficient. insufficient process  Seldom  Moderate Low
9.3.4.3 System 
Interconnections (CA-3)
> Authorize connections from the information system to other information systems
> through the use of Interconnection Security Agreements
> Document, for each interconnection, the interface characteristics, security
> requirements, and the nature of the information communicated
This should also require a validation/audit requirement. These connection documents get outdated very 
fast and details are often missed. Need a mechanism to test whether systems have additional 
interconnects not stipulated in the documentation (or that currently documented interconnects still exist).
insufficient process  Occasional  Moderate Low
9.3.4.4 Plan of Action and 
Milestones (CA-5)
a. Develop a POA&M for the information system to document the agency’s planned 
remedial actions to correct weaknesses or deficiencies noted during the assessment of the 
security controls and to reduce or eliminate known vulnerabilities in the system
b. Update the existing POA&M on a quarterly basis, at a minimum, based on the findings 
from security controls assessments, security impact analyses, and continuous monitoring 
activities
No sanctions or consequence for non-compliance.
EDIT: 9.3.13.8 Personnel Sanctions (PS-8) talks about personnel sanctions, not organization sanctions 
EDIT: Exhibit 3 USC Title 26, CFR 301.6103(p)(7)-1 says IRS can terminate or suspend access to FTI. 
There is no enforcement mechanism for making them purge existing FTI.
data vulnerability  Likely  Moderate Low
9.3.4.5 Security 
Authorization (CA-6)
> Assign a senior-level executive or manager as the authorizing official for the
> information system
No consequences outlined for this individual.
insufficient process  Likely  Negligible Low
9.3.5.10 Software Usage 
Restrictions (CM-10)
>Control and document the use of peer-to-peer file sharing technology to ensure
> that this capability is not used for the unauthorized distribution, display,
> performance, or reproduction of copyrighted work Should update to include cloud sharing services (Google Drive, Dropbox, etc.)




a. Establish policies governing the installation of software by users
b. Enforce software installation policies through automated methods
c. Monitor policy compliance on a continual basis
Don't allow users to install software. Or at least institute application whitelisting. data vulnerability  Likely  Critical Low
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a. Develop and document an inventory of information system components that:
1. Accurately reflects the current information system
2. Includes all components that store, process, or transmit FTI
3. Is at the level of granularity deemed necessary for tracking and reporting
4. Includes information deemed necessary to achieve effective information system 
component accountability
b. Review and update the information system component inventory through periodic manual 
inventory checks or a network monitoring tool that automatically maintains the inventory
c. Update the inventory of information system components as an integral part of component 
installations, removals, and information system updates (CE1)
No temporal requirement for maintaining updated inventories. This lends itself to rogue systems being on 
the network for an enduring amount of time. Furthermore, the "or" statement of manual inspection or 
automated assessments need to be tied to a ground truth --> asset inventory through supply systems ("do 
we own the devices on our network?"). Google SRE talks about this being a core tenet of their security.
Failure to ID ground truth could permit rogue computers to be whitelisted and treated as legit systems.
data vulnerability  Occasional  Moderate Low
9.3.6.8 Information System 
Recovery and 
Reconstitution (CP-10)
The agency must provide for the recovery and reconstitution of the information system to a 
known state after a disruption, compromise, or failure. Reverting an unpatched system to a previous unpatched state helps nothing. data vulnerability  Likely  Moderate Low




The information system must:
a. Uniquely identify and authenticate agency users (or processes acting on behalf of agency 
users)
b. Implement multi-factor authentication for all remote network access to privileged and non-
privileged accounts for information systems that receive, process, store, or transmit FTI. 
(CE1, CE2)
c. Implement multi-factor authentication for remote access to privileged and non-privileged 
accounts such that one of the factors is provided by a device separate from the system 
gaining access. NIST SP 800-63 allows the use of software tokens. (CE11)
Why only MFA for a subset of systems? Why not MFA for any system that touches FTI? data vulnerability  Likely  Moderate Low
9.3.7.5 Authenticator 
Management (IA-5)
The agency must manage information system authenticators by:
a. Verifying, as part of the initial authenticator distribution, the identity of the individual, 
group, role, or device receiving the authenticator
b. Establishing initial authenticator content for authenticators defined by the agency
c. Ensuring that authenticators have sufficient strength of mechanism for their intended use
d. Establishing and implementing administrative procedures for initial authenticator 
distribution, for lost/compromised or damaged authenticators, and for revoking 
authenticators
e. Changing default content of authenticators prior to information system installation
f. Establishing minimum and maximum lifetime restrictions and reuse conditions for 
authenticators
g. Changing/refreshing authenticators
h. Protecting authenticator content from unauthorized disclosure and modification
i. Requiring individuals to take, and having devices implement, specific security safeguards 
to protect authenticators
j. Changing authenticators for group/role accounts when membership to those accounts 
changes
The information system must, for password-based authentication:
a. Enforce minimum password complexity of:
1. Eight characters
2. At least one numeric and at least one special character
3. A mixture of at least one uppercase and at least one lowercase letter
4. Storing and transmitting only encrypted representations of passwords
b. Enforce password minimum lifetime restriction of one day
c. Enforce non-privileged account passwords to be changed at least every 90 days
d. Enforce privileged account passwords to be changed at least every 60 days
e. Prohibit password reuse for 24 generations
f. Allow the use of a temporary password for system logon requiring an immediate change to 
a permanent password
g. Password-protect system initialization (boot) settings
Shitty password change policies that NIST no longer recommends. data vulnerability  Frequent  Moderate Low
9.3.8.3 Incident Response 
Testing (IR-3)
Agencies entrusted with FTI must test the incident response capability at least annually.
a. Agencies must perform tabletop exercises using scenarios that include a breach of FTI 
and should test the agency’s incident response policies and procedures.
b. A subset of all employees and contractors with access to FTI must be included in table 
top exercises.
c. Each tabletop exercise must produce an after-action report to improve existing processes, 
procedures, and policies.
A tabletop exercise is the only requirement? This goes back to [security 
assessments](https://github.com/rstevens70/hackingcompliance/issues/44) being horribly defined. You 
evaluate SOPs and policies through live training against a pentest team.
insufficient process  Likely  Moderate Low
9.3.8.4 Incident Handling 
(IR-4)
> Implement an incident handling capability for security incidents that includes
> preparation, detection and analysis, containment, eradication, and recovery
Does not cover evidence preservation/forensics.
insufficient process  Likely  Negligible Low
9.3.8.9 Information Spillage 
Response (IR-9)
The agency must respond to information spills by:
a. Identifying the specific information involved in the information system contamination
b. Alerting authorized incident response personnel of the information spill using a method of 
communication not associated with the spill
c. Isolating the contaminated information system or system component
d. Eradicating the information from the contaminated information system or component
e. Identifying other information
This section doesn't say anything about documenting information spillage or providing an after-action step 
to learn from mistakes. insufficient process  Occasional  Moderate Low
9.4.1 Cloud Computing 
Environments > Data is not stored in an agency-managed data center
This is true only of public clouds. Private clouds may reside in an agency-managed data center.
verbiage issue  Occasional  Negligible Low
9.4.18 Wireless Networks
Requirements
To use FTI in an 802.11 WLAN, the agency must meet the following mandatory 
requirements:
a. The agency should have WLAN management controls that include security policies and 
procedures, a complete inventory of all wireless network components, and standardized 
security configurations for all components.
b. WLAN hardware (access points, servers, routers, switches, firewalls) must be physically 
protected in accordance with the minimum protection standards for physical security 
outlined in Section 4.0, Secure Storage—IRC 6103(p)(4)(B).
c. Each system within the agency’s network that transmits FTI through the WLAN is 
hardened in accordance with the requirements in this publication.
d. The WLAN is architected to provide logical separation between WLANs with different 
security profiles and from the wired LAN.
e. WLAN infrastructure that receives, processes, stores, or transmits FTI must comply with 
the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers 802.11i wireless security standard and 
perform mutual authentication for all access to FTI via 802.1X and extensible authentication 
protocol
f. Vulnerability scanning should be conducted as part of periodic technical security 
assessments for the organization’s WLAN.
g. Wireless intrusion detection is deployed to monitor for unauthorized access, and security 
event logging is enabled on WLAN components in accordance with Section 9.3.3, Audit and 
Accountability.
h. Disposal of allWLAN hardware follows media sanitization and disposal procedures in 
Section 9 3 10 6  Media Sanitization (MP-6)  and Section 9 4 7  Media Sanitization
No mention of rogue access points. No mention of logical segmentation for each user session (logical 
switch vs hub). data vulnerability  Likely  Critical Low
9.4.8 Mobile Devices
> Access to hardware, such as the digital camera, global positioning system
> (GPS), and universal serial bus (USB) interface, must be disabled to the extent
> possible I disagree with the GPS portion of this statement. Using location data to geo-fence, located a device, or perform and out of bounds remote wipe are all strategies that should be used for mobile.
insufficient process  Likely  Negligible Low
Table 5 - Evidentiary 
Requirements for SSR 
approval before release of 
FTI
AC-17, Remote Access
Screenshot of authentication screens
Document how multi-factor authentication is deployed for all remote network access to 
systems containing FTI and the tokens used for authentication
Section 5.2, Comingling and Labeling
Screenshots of database schemas that show electronic FTI labeling
Sample output (report/notice) that shows how FTI is labeled
The use of screenshots to prove evidentiary requirements feels squishy to me. These could be easily 
forged/photoshopped. They are not strong evidence of safeguards. data vulnerability  Likely  Moderate Low
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Section Text of concern Concern Issue Probability Severity Impact
2.1 A patch management process for tracking, evaluating, and installing cyber security patches for applicable Cyber Assets. Recommend a test environment for patching before applying to live system insufficient process
Probability 
Frequent Severity Critical Low
1.1 If a device has no provision for disabling or restricting logical ports on the device then those ports that are open are deemed needed. This document should mandate that hardware facilitates this requirement or remove it from the 
standard completely (because it's essentially a recommendation)
insufficient process Probability Frequent Severity Moderate Low
3.1 > Deploy method(s) to deter, detect, or prevent malicious code. Reference specific procedures like whitelisting, etc. Don't leave it up to the operator to reinvent the wheel. insufficient process
Probability 
Frequent Severity Moderate Low
2.1 / 2.2
The tracking portion shall include the identification of a source or sources that the 
Responsible Entity tracks. 
2.2 references this language in 2.1 as such
> evaluate security patches for applicability that have been released since the last 
evaluation from the source or sources identified in Part 2.1
It appears that this control only applies to sources the Responsible Entity identifies, which opens 
a possible loophole that if the RE doesn't identify any sources, they are not required to do patch 
management. Also, if a security is identified, but does not come from an "source" the RE 
identifies, what is the requirement for patching?
insufficient process Probability Occasional Severity Critical Low
4.3
"_Where technically feasible, retain applicable event logs identified in Part 4.1 for at 
least the last 90 consecutive calendar days except under CIP Exceptional 
Circumstances_" 
Additionally, section 1.2 under compliance states the following:
"_Each Responsible Entity shall retain evidence of each requirement in this 
standard for three calendar years_"
Dwell time for adversaries without detection is usually much longer than 90 days. I know of 
several public compromises of high profile companies where the only way the mechanisms of 
compromise were determined were through forensic evaluation of months of event log data. 
Event log data should be retained and backed up / duplicated frequently. 
Acceptable retention periods can vary, but I would recommend keeping event log data in an index-
able, easily accessible location for up to a year with 2 to 5 year of long term storage. This data will 
be critical to your response team in the event of a compromise.
1.2 seems a bit hypocritical... RE's are responsible for keeping proof of their compliance for 3 
years, yet we are rolling all of the useful event log data after 90 days...
insufficient process Probability Frequent Severity Moderate Low
5.4
> Documentation in system manuals or other vendor documents showing default 
vendor passwords were generated pseudo-randomly and are thereby unique to the 
device.
> Documentation in system manuals or other vendor documents showing default vendor 
passwords were generated pseudo-randomly and are thereby unique to the device.
Psuedorandom algo might be predictable. Do not rely on vendors to set your pws.
insufficient process Probability Seldom Severity Moderate Low
5.5.1. > Password length that is, at least, the lesser of eight characters or the maximum length supported by the Cyber Asset
> Password length that is, at least, the lesser of eight characters or the maximum length 
supported by the Cyber Asset
Pin code devices are easy to brute and should not be allowed
insufficient process Probability Occasional Severity Moderate Low
5.1 > Have a method(s) to enforce authentication of interactive user access, where technically feasible. This should be a hardware/software requirement. "Feasible" would allow obsolete things to remain indef
data vulnerability Probability Likely Severity Moderate Low
5.7
> Where technically feasible, either: Limit the number of unsuccessful 
authentication attempts; or Generate alerts after a threshold of unsuccessful 
authentication attempts.
> Where technically feasible, either: Limit the number of unsuccessful authentication attempts; or 
Generate alerts after a threshold of unsuccessful authentication attempts.
additionally, alert abnormalities like 2am logins or logins from foreign nations
insufficient process Probability Frequent Severity Negligible Low
3.3
> For those methods identified in Part 3.1 that use signatures or patterns, have a 
process for the update of the signatures or patterns. The process must address 
testing and installing the signatures or patterns.
> For those methods identified in Part 3.1 that use signatures or patterns, have a process for the 
update of the signatures or patterns. The process must address testing and installing the 
signatures or patterns.
What are the timeframe requirements?
insufficient process Probability Occasional Severity Negligible Low
4.1.X
Log events at the BES Cyber System
level (per BES Cyber System capability)
or at the Cyber Asset level (per Cyber
Asset capability) for identification of,
and after-the-fact investigations of,
Cyber Security Incidents that includes,
as a minimum, each of the following
types of events:
Although likely covered in general as 4.1.1 'log all access logins', specific logging should be 
applied to any accounts elevating privs or switching users. It's possible that this information is 
logged if the log includes enough information on the source of the login attempt/access
insufficient process Probability Likely Severity Negligible Low
1.2 > Protect against the use of unnecessary physical input/output ports used for network connectivity, console commands, or Removable Media. what constitutes necessary? should reference explicit guidance insufficient process
Probability 
Occasional Severity Negligible Low
2.4
> For each mitigation plan created or revised in Part 2.3, implement the plan within 
the timeframe specified in the plan, unless a revision to the plan or an extension to 
the timeframe specified in Part 2.3 is approved by the CIP Senior Manager or 
delegate.
> For each mitigation plan created or revised in Part 2.3, implement the plan within the timeframe 
specified in the plan, unless a revision to the plan or an extension to the timeframe specified in 
Part 2.3 is approved by the CIP Senior Manager or delegate.
Specify guidelines for implementation relative to risk (critical --> immediate, negligible --> 30 
days)
insufficient process Probability Occasional Severity Negligible Low
3.2
> Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to: Records of response 
processes for malicious code detection. Records of the performance of these 
processes when malicious code is detected.
> Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to: Records of response processes
for malicious code detection. Records of the performance of these processes when malicious 
code is detected.
What specifics should technicians record? Playbook creation? time to ID, time to quarantine? 
what metrics? why?
insufficient process Probability Occasional Severity Negligible Low
3.3
> For those methods identified in Part 3.1 that use signatures or patterns, have a 
process for the update of the signatures or patterns. The process must address 
testing and installing the signatures or patterns.
> For those methods identified in Part 3.1 that use signatures or patterns, have a process for the 
update of the signatures or patterns. The process must address testing and installing the 
signatures or patterns.
What about sharing those IOCs across organizations?
insufficient process Probability Occasional Severity Negligible Low
4 Log events at the BES Cyber System level (per BES Cyber System capability) or at the Cyber Asset level (per Cyber Asset capability)
This session specifies many low level event that require logging, but does not specify a minimum 
set of criteria to include in those logs. 
Define the minimum telemetry (datetime, system identifier, event time, event risk classification, 
event severity, etc.)
insufficient process Probability Likely Severity Negligible Low
5.5.2
>Minimum password complexity that is the lesser of 
three or more different types of characters (e.g., 
uppercase alphabetic, lowercase alphabetic, numeric, 
non- alphanumeric) or the maximum complexity 
supported by the Cyber Asset.
Passwords should have high entropy, but enforcing the above standards have proven to be 
ineffective. 
insufficient process Probability Likely Severity Negligible Low
5.3 > Identify individuals who have authorized access to shared accounts.
> Identify individuals who have authorized access to shared accounts.
Don't share accounts!!!
insufficient process Probability Likely Severity Moderate Low
5.6
> Where technically feasible, for password-only authentication for interactive user 
access, either technically or procedurally enforce password changes or an 
obligation to change the password at least once every 15 calendar months.
> Where technically feasible, for password-only authentication for interactive user access, either 
technically or procedurally enforce password changes or an obligation to change the password at 
least once every 15 calendar months.
Obsolete practice. change on by-need basis
insufficient process Probability Frequent Severity Negligible Low
4
Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented process(es) that 
collectively include each of the
applicable requirement parts in CIP-007-6 Table R4
Maybe I missed it, but I don't see anything on network security monitoring. Security posture 
should include both host and network oriented security monitoring, and prevention. insufficient process Probability Likely Severity Moderate Low
2.2
"_At least once every 35 calendar days, evaluate security patches for applicability 
that have been released since the last evaluation from the source or sources 
identified in part 2.1_"
This does not provide a provision for frequency of patch evaluation based on severity of risk. I 
believe if there is a very severe vulnerability discovered, then there should be a system for 
immediate patch validation without waiting the specified 35 calendar days.
insufficient process Probability Likely Severity Moderate Low
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Section Text of concern Concern Issue Probability Severity Impact
AC-17 (2)
The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect the confidentiality 
and integrity of remote access sessions.
Supplemental Guidance: The encryption strength of mechanism is selected based on the 
security categorization of the information. Related controls: SC-8, SC-12, SC-13.
Does not specify storage location or 
protection mechanisms for keys; could 
be in adversarial control; No 
specifications for minimum 
cryptographic mechanisms
Risk to Data Frequent Critical Extremely High
AC-18 (1)
The information system protects wireless access to the system using authentication of 
[Selection
(one or more): users; devices] and encryption.
Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: SC-8, SC-13.
should disallow weak passwords and 
encryption algos
Ambiguous 
Specification Likely Critical High
AC-4
The information system enforces approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information 
within the system and between interconnected systems based on [Assignment: organization-
defined information flow control policies].
Supplemental Guidance: Information flow control regulates where information is allowed to 
travel within an information system and between information systems (as opposed to who is 
allowed to access the information) and without explicit regard to subsequent accesses to that 
information. Flow control restrictions include, for example, keeping export-controlled 
information from being transmitted in the clear to the Internet, blocking outside traffic that 
claims to be from within the organization, restricting web requests to the Internet that are not 
from the internal web proxy server, and limiting information transfers between organizations 
based on data structures and content. Transferring information between information systems 
representing different security domains with different security policies introduces risk that such 
transfers violate one or more domain security policies. In such situations, information 
owners/stewards provide guidance at designated policy enforcement points between 
interconnected systems. Organizations consider mandating specific architectural solutions 
when required to enforce specific security policies. Enforcement includes, for example: (i) 
prohibiting information transfers between interconnected systems (i.e., allowing access only); 
(ii) employing hardware mechanisms to enforce one-way information flows; and (iii) 
implementing trustworthy regarding mechanisms to reassign security attributes and security 
labels.
Organizations commonly employ information flow control policies and enforcement 
mechanisms to control the flow of information between designated sources and destinations 
(e.g., networks, individuals, and devices) within information systems and between 
interconnected systems. Flow control is based on the characteristics of the information and/or 
the information path. Enforcement occurs, for example, in boundary protection devices (e.g., 
gateways, routers, guards, encrypted tunnels, firewalls) that employ rule sets or establish 
configuration settings that restrict information system services, provide a packet-filtering 
capability based on header information, or message- filtering capability based on message 
content (e.g., implementing key word searches or using document characteristics). 
Organizations also consider the trustworthiness of filtering/inspection mechanisms (i.e., 
hardware, firmware, and software components) that are critical to information flow enforcement. 
Control enhancements 3 through 22 primarily address cross-domain solution needs which 
focus on more advanced filtering techniques, in-depth analysis, and stronger flow enforcement 
mechanisms implemented in cross-domain products, for example, high-assurance guards. 
Such capabilities are generally not available in commercial off-the-shelf information technology 
products. Related controls: AC-3, AC-17, AC-19, AC-21, CM-6, CM-7, SA-8, SC-2, SC-5, SC-7, 
SC-18.
References: None.
makes provisions for unencrypted 
transmission of controlled information 
via intranet -- does not account for 
insider threats
Risk to Data Likely Critical High
AC-1
The organization:
a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or 
roles]:
1. An access control policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, 
management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and
2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the access control policy and associated 
access controls; and
b. Reviews and updates the current:
1. Access control policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and
2. Access control procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].
Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures 
for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the 
AC family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, 
regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at 
the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures 
unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for 
organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex 
nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in 
general and for particular information systems, if needed. 
The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and 
procedures. Related control: PM-9.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-100.
Does not require any level of training, 
certification, or responsible role for 
creating/managing ACs.
Ambiguous 
Specification Unlikely Critical Low
AC-2 (1)
The organization employs automated mechanisms to support the management of information 
system accounts.
Supplemental Guidance: The use of automated mechanisms can include, for example: using 
email or text messaging to automatically notify account managers when users are terminated 
or transferred; using the information system to monitor account usage; and using telephonic 
notification to report atypical system account usage.
The supplemental guidance propose 
insecure mechanisms, including email 
and text messaging.
Ambiguous 
Specification Occasional Moderate Low
AC-2 (2)
The information system automatically [Selection: removes; disables] temporary and emergency 
accounts after [Assignment: organization-defined time period for each type of account].
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement requires the removal of both temporary 
and emergency accounts automatically after a predefined period of time has elapsed, rather 
than at the convenience of the systems administrator.
Needs maximum time. Organization 
shouldn't get to pick outrageous time 
periods.
Ambiguous 
Specification Occasional Moderate Low
AC-2 (3) The information system automatically disables inactive accounts after [Assignment: organization-defined time period].
Needs maximum time. Organization 
shouldn't get to pick outrageous time 
periods.
Ambiguous 
Specification Occasional Moderate Low
AC-2 (5)
The organization requires that users log out when [Assignment: organization-defined time-
period of expected inactivity or description of when to log out].
Supplemental Guidance: Related control: SC-23.
Needs maximum time. Organization 
shouldn't get to pick outrageous time 
periods.
Ambiguous 
Specification Occasional Moderate Low
Compliance Audit Results for FedRAMP
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AC-6 (9)
The information system audits the execution of privileged functions.
Supplemental Guidance: Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally 
by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised information 
system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts 
on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse, 
and in doing so, help mitigate the risk from insider threats and the advanced persistent threat 
(APT). Related control: AU-2.
Who and how often are audits 
reviewed?
Ambiguous 
Specification Occasional Moderate Low
AC-17 (9)
The organization provides the capability to expeditiously disconnect or disable remote access 
to the information system within [Assignment: organization-defined time period].
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement requires organizations to have the 
capability to rapidly disconnect current users remotely accessing the information system and/or 
disable further remote access. The speed of disconnect or disablement varies based on the 
criticality of missions/business functions and the need to eliminate immediate or future remote 
access to organizational information systems.
No maximum time period since 
organization can define.
Ambiguous 
Specification Occasional Negligible Low
AC-18
The organization:
a. Establishes usage restrictions, configuration/connection requirements, and implementation 
guidance for wireless access; and
b. Authorizes wireless access to the information system prior to allowing such connections.
Supplemental Guidance: Wireless technologies include, for example, microwave, packet radio 
(UHF/VHF), 802.11x, and Bluetooth. Wireless networks use authentication protocols (e.g., 
EAP/TLS, PEAP), which provide credential protection and mutual authentication. Related 
controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-17, AC-19, CA-3, CA-7, CM-8, IA-2, IA-3, IA-8, PL-4, SI-4.
References: NIST Special Publications 800-48, 800-94, 800-97.
WCE: This would allow for wifi access 
within data centers to things like AWS 
host machines. Thankfully, I don't 
imagine any cloud providers actually 
allow datacenter hosts to access wifi, 
but you could and it would be 
compliant
Ambiguous 
Specification Seldom Moderate Low
AC-2 (12)
The organization:
(a) Monitors information system accounts for [Assignment: organization-defined atypical use]; 
and
(b) Reports atypical usage of information system accounts to [Assignment: organization-
defined personnel or roles].
Supplemental Guidance: Atypical usage includes, for example, accessing information systems 
at certain times of the day and from locations that are not consistent with the normal usage 
patterns of individuals working in organizations. Related control: CA-7.
required follow-up action? Ambiguous Specification Likely Moderate Medium
AC-3
The information system enforces approved authorizations for logical access to information and 
system resources in accordance with applicable access control policies.
Supplemental Guidance: Access control policies (e.g., identity-based policies, role-based 
policies, attribute-based policies) and access enforcement mechanisms (e.g., access control 
lists, access control matrices, cryptography) control access between active entities or subjects 
(i.e., users or processes acting on behalf of users) and passive entities or objects (e.g., 
devices, files, records, domains) in information systems. In addition to enforcing authorized 
access at the information system level and recognizing that information systems can host 
many applications and services in support of organizational missions and business operations, 
access enforcement mechanisms can also be employed at the application and service level to 
provide increased information security. Related controls: AC-2, AC-4, AC-5, AC-6, AC-16, AC-
17, AC-18, AC-19, AC-20, AC-21, AC-22, AU-9, CM-5, CM-6, CM-11, MA-3, MA-4, MA-5, PE-3.
References: None.
Who approves authorizations and 
how?
Ambiguous 
Specification Likely Moderate Medium
AC-4
The information system enforces approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information 
within the system and between interconnected systems based on [Assignment: organization-
defined information flow control policies].
Supplemental Guidance: Information flow control regulates where information is allowed to 
travel within an information system and between information systems (as opposed to who is 
allowed to access the information) and without explicit regard to subsequent accesses to that 
information. Flow control restrictions include, for example, keeping export-controlled 
information from being transmitted in the clear to the Internet, blocking outside traffic that 
claims to be from within the organization, restricting web requests to the Internet that are not 
from the internal web proxy server, and limiting information transfers between organizations 
based on data structures and content. Transferring information between information systems 
representing different security domains with different security policies introduces risk that such 
transfers violate one or more domain security policies. In such situations, information 
owners/stewards provide guidance at designated policy enforcement points between 
interconnected systems. Organizations consider mandating specific architectural solutions 
when required to enforce specific security policies. Enforcement includes, for example: (i) 
prohibiting information transfers between interconnected systems (i.e., allowing access only); 
(ii) employing hardware mechanisms to enforce one-way information flows; and (iii) 
implementing trustworthy regarding mechanisms to reassign security attributes and security 
labels. 
Organizations commonly employ information flow control policies and enforcement 
mechanisms to control the flow of information between designated sources and destinations 
(e.g., networks, individuals, and devices) within information systems and between 
interconnected systems. Flow control is based on the characteristics of the information and/or 
the information path. Enforcement occurs, for example, in boundary protection devices (e.g., 
gateways, routers, guards, encrypted tunnels, firewalls) that employ rule sets or establish 
configuration settings that restrict information system services, provide a packet-filtering 
capability based on header information, or message- filtering capability based on message 
content (e.g., implementing key word searches or using document characteristics). 
Organizations also consider the trustworthiness of filtering/inspection mechanisms (i.e., 
hardware, firmware, and software components) that are critical to information flow enforcement. 
Control enhancements 3 through 22 primarily address cross-domain solution needs which 
focus on more advanced filtering techniques, in-depth analysis, and stronger flow enforcement 
mechanisms implemented in cross-domain products, for example, high-assurance guards. 
Such capabilities are generally not available in commercial off-the-shelf information technology 
products. Related controls: AC-3, AC-17, AC-19, AC-21, CM-6, CM-7, SA-8, SC-2, SC-5, SC-7, 
SC-18.
WCE: there are some examples given 
in the supplemental guiance, but this 
is wide open for the interpretation of 
the implementor. As long as you do 
some sort of restriction of information 
from your FedRAMP system into 
"interconnected" systems, you're 
probably compliant here. Often there 
are pretty weak data classification 
policies, and they just say "don't copy 
files with confidential data out of this 
datastore to employee workstations" 
without a lot of technical controls to 
prevent that.
Ambiguous 
Specification Likely Moderate Medium
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AC-6
The organization employs the principle of least privilege, allowing only authorized accesses for 
users (or processes acting on behalf of users) which are necessary to accomplish assigned 
tasks in accordance with organizational missions and business functions.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations employ least privilege for specific duties and 
information systems. The principle of least privilege is also applied to information system 
processes, ensuring that the processes operate at privilege levels no higher than necessary to 
accomplish required organizational missions/business functions. Organizations consider the 
creation of additional processes, roles, and information system accounts as necessary, to 
achieve least privilege. Organizations also apply least privilege to the development, 
implementation, and operation of organizational information systems. Related controls: AC-2, 
AC-3, AC-5, CM-6, CM-7, PL-2.
References: None.
does not specify review period Ambiguous Specification Likely Moderate Medium
AC-7
The information system:
a. Enforces a limit of [Assignment: organization-defined number] consecutive invalid logon 
attempts by a user during a [Assignment: organization-defined time period]; and
b. Automatically [Selection: locks the account/node for an [Assignment: organization-defined 
time period]; locks the account/node until released by an administrator; delays next logon 
prompt according to [Assignment: organization-defined delay algorithm]] when the maximum 
number of unsuccessful attempts is exceeded.
Supplemental Guidance: This control applies regardless of whether the logon occurs via a 
local or network connection. Due to the potential for denial of service, automatic lockouts 
initiated by information systems are usually temporary and automatically release after a 
predetermined time period established by organizations. If a delay algorithm is selected, 
organizations may choose to employ different algorithms for different information system 
components based on the capabilities of those components. Responses to unsuccessful logon 
attempts may be implemented at both the operating system and the application levels. Related 
controls: AC-2, AC-9, AC-14, IA-5.
References: None.
does not discuss implications across 
enterprise (cred spraying), MITRE 
ATT&CK would agree this is 
insufficient; does not discuss alerting 
mechanisms or response mechanisms 
(AU-5 is for audit failures, not attack 
detection)
WCE: the "lock accounts after N 
unsuccessful attempts" control can be 
dangerous, because you can fuzz the 
admin accounts, get them locked, then 
go do something while they can't log 
in.
Ambiguous 
Specification Likely Moderate Medium
AC-2 (9) The organization only permits the use of shared/group accounts that meet [Assignment: organization-defined conditions for establishing shared/group accounts].
Use aliases or distro lists instead; do 
not share accounts period
WCE: Shared accounts should not be 
used. Service accounts that can't get 
an interactive shell and have 
restrictive permissions, maybe. But 
should use AWS Security groups (or 
unix groups, or AD roles) instead of a 
shared login if something like this is 
needed.
Risk to Data Likely Moderate Medium
AU-6 (1)
The organization employs automated mechanisms to integrate audit review, analysis, and 
reporting processes to support organizational processes for investigation and response to 
suspicious activities.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizational processes benefiting from integrated audit review, 
analysis, and reporting include, for example, incident response, continuous monitoring, 
contingency planning, and Inspector General audits. Related controls: AU-12, PM-7.
no time period specified (CA-5 only 
makes provisions for security 
assessments, not real attacks)
Ambiguous 
Specification Occasional Critical High
IA-5 (1)
The information system, for password-based authentication:
(a) Enforces minimum password complexity of [Assignment: organization-defined requirements 
for case sensitivity, number of characters, mix of upper-case letters, lower-case letters, 
numbers, and special characters, including minimum requirements for each type];
(b) Enforces at least the following number of changed characters when new passwords are 
created: [Assignment: organization-defined number];
(c) Stores and transmits only encrypted representations of passwords;
(d) Enforces password minimum and maximum lifetime restrictions of [Assignment: 
organization- defined numbers for lifetime minimum, lifetime maximum];
(e) Prohibits password reuse for [Assignment: organization-defined number] generations; and
(f) Allows the use of a temporary password for system logons with an immediate change to a 
permanent password.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies to single-factor authentication of 
individuals using passwords as individual or group authenticators, and in a similar manner, 
when passwords are part of multifactor authenticators. This control enhancement does not 
apply when passwords are used to unlock hardware authenticators (e.g., Personal Identity 
Verification cards). The implementation of such password mechanisms may not meet all of the 
requirements in the enhancement. Encrypted representations of passwords include, for 
example, encrypted versions of passwords and one-way cryptographic hashes of passwords. 
The number of changed characters refers to the number of changes required with respect to 
the total number of positions in the current password. Password lifetime restrictions do not 
apply to temporary passwords. Related control: IA-6.
Not current with NIST 800-63 Obsolete Reference frequent moderate High
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IA-5
The organization manages information system authenticators by:
a. Verifying, as part of the initial authenticator distribution, the identity of the individual, group, 
role, or device receiving the authenticator;
b. Establishing initial authenticator content for authenticators defined by the organization;
c. Ensuring that authenticators have sufficient strength of mechanism for their intended use;
d. Establishing and implementing administrative procedures for initial authenticator distribution, 
for lost/compromised or damaged authenticators, and for revoking authenticators;
e. Changing default content of authenticators prior to information system installation;
f. Establishing minimum and maximum lifetime restrictions and reuse conditions for 
authenticators;
g. Changing/refreshing authenticators [Assignment: organization-defined time period by 
authenticator type];
h. Protecting authenticator content from unauthorized disclosure and modification;
i. Requiring individuals to take, and having devices implement, specific security safeguards to 
protect authenticators; and
j. Changing authenticators for group/role accounts when membership to those accounts 
changes.
Supplemental Guidance: Individual authenticators include, for example, passwords, tokens, 
biometrics, PKI certificates, and key cards. Initial authenticator content is the actual content 
(e.g., the initial password) as opposed to requirements about authenticator content (e.g., 
minimum password length). In many cases, developers ship information system components 
with factory default authentication credentials to allow for initial installation and configuration. 
Default authentication credentials are often well known, easily discoverable, and present a 
significant security risk. The requirement to protect individual authenticators may be 
implemented via control PL-4 or PS-6 for authenticators in the possession of individuals and 
by controls AC-3, AC-6, and SC-28 for authenticators stored within organizational information 
systems (e.g., passwords stored in hashed or encrypted formats, files containing encrypted or 
hashed passwords accessible with administrator privileges). Information systems support 
individual authenticator management by organization-defined settings and restrictions for 
various authenticator characteristics including, for example, minimum password length, 
password composition, validation time window for time synchronous one-time tokens, and 
number of allowed rejections during the verification stage of biometric authentication. Specific 
actions that can be taken to safeguard authenticators include, for example, maintaining 
possession of individual authenticators, not loaning or sharing individual authenticators with 
others, and reporting lost, stolen, or compromised authenticators immediately. Authenticator 
management includes issuing and revoking, when no longer needed, authenticators for 
temporary access such as that required for remote maintenance. Device authenticators 
include, for example, certificates and passwords. Related controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-6, CM-6, IA-
2, IA-4, IA-8, PL-4, PS-5, PS-6, SC-12, SC-13, SC-17, SC-28.
References: OMB Memoranda 04-04, 11-11; FIPS Publication 201; NIST Special Publications 
800-73, 800-63, 800-76, 800-78; FICAM Roadmap and Implementation Guidance
RAS: does not specific control 
mechanisms for authenticators. Can it 
be replicated? How are seeds 
protected? Who has access to seed 
data?
WCE: doesn't directly require enough 
complexity/length. The password 
"password" could be used & would 
meet the requirements
Ambiguous 
Specification Unlikely Critical Low
IA-5 (4)
The organization employs automated tools to determine if password authenticators are 
sufficiently strong to satisfy [Assignment: organization-defined requirements].
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement focuses on the creation of strong 
passwords and the characteristics of such passwords (e.g., complexity) prior to use, the 
enforcement of which is carried out by organizational information systems in IA-5 (1). Related 
controls: CA-2, CA-7, RA-5.
RAS: does not consider previous 
password breaches associated with 
username or most common passwords 
from OWASP Top XX
Ambiguous 
Specification Occasional Moderate Low
IA-5 (2)
The information system, for PKI-based authentication:
(a) Validates certifications by constructing and verifying a certification path to an accepted trust 
anchor including checking certificate status information;
(b) Enforces authorized access to the corresponding private key;
(c) Maps the authenticated identity to the account of the individual or group; and
(d) Implements a local cache of revocation data to support path discovery and validation in 
case of inability to access revocation information via the network.
Supplemental Guidance: Status information for certification paths includes, for example, 
certificate revocation lists or certificate status protocol responses. For PIV cards, validation of 
certifications involves the construction and verification of a certification path to the Common 
Policy Root trust anchor including certificate policy processing. Related control: IA-6.
RAS: does not consider access control 
to PKI keys Risk to Data Unlikely Critical Low
IA-2 (1)
The information system implements multifactor authentication for network access to privileged 
accounts. 
Supplemental Guidance: Related control: AC-6.
WCE: Allows for less secure methods 
of mutlifactor authentication, like SMS, 
instead of more secure ones, like 
Yubikeys or use of an authenicator 
app.
Ambiguous 
Specification Frequent Negligible Medium
IA-2 (2) The information system implements multifactor authentication for network access to non- privileged accounts.
WCE: Similar to IA-02 (01); Allows for 
less secure methods of mutlifactor 
authentication, like SMS, instead of 
more secure ones, like Yubikeys or 
use of an authenicator app.
Ambiguous 
Specification Frequent Negligible Medium
IA-2 (3)
The information system implements multifactor authentication for local access to privileged 
accounts.
Supplemental Guidance: Related control: AC-6.
WCE: Similar to IA-02 (01); Allows for 
less secure methods of mutlifactor 
authentication, like SMS, instead of 
more secure ones, like Yubikeys or 
use of an authenicator app.
Ambiguous 




a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or 
roles]:
1. An incident response policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, 
management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and
2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the incident response policy and associated 
incident response controls; and
b. Reviews and updates the current:
1. Incident response policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and
2. Incident response procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].
Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures 
for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the 
IR family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, 
regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at 
the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures 
unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for 
organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex 
nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in 
general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management 
strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures. Related control: PM-9.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-61, 800-83, 800-100.
RAS: does not specify how 
controls/procedures are developed or 
improved (no feedback loop). should 
be derived from best practices and 
improved upon from exercising 
controls
Ambiguous 
Specification Likely Moderate Medium
MP-7
The organization [Selection: restricts; prohibits] the use of [Assignment: organization- defined 
types of information system media] on [Assignment: organization-defined information systems 
or system components] using [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards].
Supplemental Guidance: Information system media includes both digital and non-digital media. 
Digital media includes, for example, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external/removable hard disk 
drives, flash drives, compact disks, and digital video disks. Non-digital media includes, for 
example, paper and microfilm. This control also applies to mobile devices with information 
storage capability (e.g., smart phones, tablets, E-readers). In contrast to MP-2, which restricts 
user access to media, this control restricts the use of certain types of media on information 
systems, for example, restricting/prohibiting the use of flash drives or external hard disk drives. 
Organizations can employ technical and nontechnical safeguards (e.g., policies, procedures, 
rules of behavior) to restrict the use of information system media. Organizations may restrict 
the use of portable storage devices, for example, by using physical cages on workstations to 
prohibit access to certain external ports, or disabling/removing the ability to insert, read or write 
to such devices. Organizations may also limit the use of portable storage devices to only 
approved devices including, for example, devices provided by the organization, devices 
provided by other approved organizations, and devices that are not personally owned. Finally, 
organizations may restrict the use of portable storage devices based on the type of device, for 
example, prohibiting the use of writeable, portable storage devices, and implementing this 
restriction by disabling or removing the capability to write to such devices. Related controls: AC-
19, PL-4.
References: None.
Organization shouldn't get to define 
the safeguards
Ambiguous 
Specification occasional moderate Low
MP-5 (4)
The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect the confidentiality 
and integrity of information stored on digital media during transport outside of controlled areas.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies to both portable storage devices 
(e.g., USB memory sticks, compact disks, digital video disks, external/removable hard disk 
drives) and mobile devices with storage capability (e.g., smart phones, tablets, E-readers). 
Related control: MP-2.
References: FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publication 800-60.
RAS: controls access to the physical 
device and encrypts data, but does not 
protect keys/passwords used to 
protect data
Risk to Data Unlikely Critical Low
PE-13 (3) The organization employs an automatic fire suppression capability for the information system when the facility is not staffed on a continuous basis.
RAS: who pentests the automated 
protection? a server room flood would 
be an enormous loss
Ambiguous 




a. Conducts an assessment of risk, including the likelihood and magnitude of harm, from the 
unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of the information 
system and the information it processes, stores, or transmits;
b. Documents risk assessment results in [Selection: security plan; risk assessment report; 
[Assignment: organization-defined document]];
c. Reviews risk assessment results [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];
d. Disseminates risk assessment results to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or 
roles]; and
e. Updates the risk assessment [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] or whenever 
there are significant changes to the information system or environment of operation (including 
the identification of new threats and vulnerabilities), or other conditions that may impact the 
security state of the system.
Supplemental Guidance: Clearly defined authorization boundaries are a prerequisite for 
effective risk assessments. Risk assessments take into account threats, vulnerabilities, 
likelihood, and impact to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, 
and the Nation based on the operation and use of information systems. Risk assessments also 
take into account risk from external parties (e.g., service providers, contractors operating 
information systems on behalf of the organization, individuals accessing organizational 
information systems, outsourcing
entities). In accordance with OMB policy and related E-authentication initiatives, authentication 
of public users accessing federal information systems may also be required to protect 
nonpublic or privacy-related information. As such, organizational assessments of risk also 
address public access to federal information systems.
Risk assessments (either formal or informal) can be conducted at all three tiers in the risk 
management hierarchy (i.e., organization level, mission/business process level, or information 
system level) and at any phase in the system development life cycle. Risk assessments can 
also be conducted at various steps in the Risk Management Framework, including 
categorization, security control selection, security control implementation, security control 
assessment, information
system authorization, and security control monitoring. RA-3 is noteworthy in that the control 
must be partially implemented prior to the implementation of other controls in order to complete 
the
first two steps in the Risk Management Framework. Risk assessments can play an important 
role in security control selection processes, particularly during the application of tailoring 
guidance, which includes security control supplementation. Related controls: RA-2, PM-9.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: OMB Memorandum 04-04; NIST Special Publication 800-30, 800-39; 
Web:idmanagement.gov.
No requirement to remediate or 
otherwise inform prioritization based 
on results of risk assessment.
Ambiguous 
Specification occasional moderate Low
RA-5 (1)
The organization employs vulnerability scanning tools that include the capability to readily 
update the information system vulnerabilities to be scanned.
Supplemental Guidance: The vulnerabilities to be scanned need to be readily updated as new 
vulnerabilities are discovered, announced, and scanning methods developed. This updating 
process helps to ensure that potential vulnerabilities in the information system are identified 
and addressed as quickly as possible. Related controls: SI-3, SI-7.
RAS: should require continual security 
assessment of scanning products Risk to Data Unlikely Critical Low
CA-8
The organization conducts penetration testing [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] on 
[Assignment: organization-defined information systems or system components].
Supplemental Guidance: Penetration testing is a specialized type of assessment conducted on 
information systems or individual system components to identify vulnerabilities that could be 
exploited by adversaries. Such testing can be used to either validate vulnerabilities or 
determine the degree of resistance organizational information systems have to adversaries 
within a set of specified constraints (e.g., time, resources, and/or skills). Penetration testing 
attempts to duplicate
the actions of adversaries in carrying out hostile cyber attacks against organizations and 
provides a more in-depth analysis of security-related weaknesses/deficiencies. Organizations 
can also use the results of vulnerability analyses to support penetration testing activities. 
Penetration testing can be conducted on the hardware, software, or firmware components of an 
information system and can exercise both physical and technical security controls. A standard 
method for penetration testing includes, for example: (i) pretest analysis based on full 
knowledge of the target system; (ii) pretest identification of potential vulnerabilities based on 
pretest analysis; and (iii) testing designed to determine exploitability of identified 
vulnerabilities. All parties agree to the rules of engagement before the commencement of 
penetration testing scenarios. Organizations correlate the penetration testing rules of 
engagement with the tools, techniques, and procedures that are anticipated to be employed by 
adversaries carrying out attacks. Organizational risk assessments guide decisions on the level 
of independence required for personnel conducting penetration testing. Related control: SA-12.
References: None.
WCE: Requires a pen test, but the 
ODV is defined here, I believe by the 
organization, so it can be infrequent.
There also aren't requirements to give 
the pen test firm access to source 
code and configurations, or what type 
of accounts to provision them (i.e. 
grant them a privileged user account 
and test see what a malicious insider 
could do with leaving audit trails or 
other traces).
Ambiguous 
Specification Occasional Moderate Low
SC-7 (5)
The information system at managed interfaces denies network communications traffic by 
default and allows network communications traffic by exception (i.e., deny all, permit by 
exception).
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies to both inbound and outbound 
network communications traffic. A deny-all, permit-by-exception network communications 
traffic policy ensures that only those connections which are essential and approved are 
allowed.
RAS: whitelisted comms should be 
continually re-assessed
WCE: bit of a meta SI comment... 
CSPs define where integrity needs to 
be monitored (SI-7), where input 
validation needs to be done (SI-10), 
and what memory protection needs to 
be used (SI-16). These are all up to 
the provider to define; they can define 
weak protections here.
Ambiguous 
Specification Occasional Moderate Low
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SC-8
The information system protects the [Selection (one or more): confidentiality; integrity] of 
transmitted information.
Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to both internal and external networks and all 
types of information system components from which information can be transmitted (e.g., 
servers, mobile devices, notebook computers, printers, copiers, scanners, facsimile 
machines). Communication paths outside the physical protection of a controlled boundary are 
exposed to the possibility of interception and modification. Protecting the confidentiality and/or 
integrity of organizational information can be accomplished by physical means (e.g., by 
employing physical distribution systems) or by logical means (e.g., employing encryption 
techniques). Organizations relying on commercial providers offering transmission services as 
commodity services rather than as fully dedicated services (i.e., services which can be highly 
specialized to individual customer needs), may find it difficult to obtain the necessary 
assurances regarding the implementation of needed security controls for transmission 
confidentiality/integrity. In such situations, organizations determine what types of 
confidentiality/integrity services are available in standard, commercial telecommunication 
service packages. If it is infeasible or impractical to obtain the necessary security controls and 
assurances of control effectiveness through appropriate contracting vehicles, organizations 
implement appropriate compensating security controls or explicitly accept the additional risk. 
Related controls: AC-17, PE-4.
References: FIPS Publications 140-2, 197; NIST Special Publications 800-52, 800-77, 800-81, 
800-113; CNSS Policy 15; NSTISSI No. 7003.
Both confidentiality and integrity 
should be mandatory, not an option.
Ambiguous 
Specification Occasional Moderate Low
SC-12
The organization establishes and manages cryptographic keys for required cryptography 
employed within the information system in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined 
requirements for key generation, distribution, storage, access, and destruction].
Supplemental Guidance: Cryptographic key management and establishment can be performed 
using manual procedures or automated mechanisms with supporting manual procedures. 
Organizations define key management requirements in accordance with applicable federal 
laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance, specifying 
appropriate options, levels, and parameters. Organizations manage trust stores to ensure that 
only approved trust anchors are in such trust stores. This includes certificates with visibility 
external to organizational information systems and certificates related to the internal operations 
of systems. Related controls: SC-13, SC-17.
References: NIST Special Publications 800-56, 800-57.
If organizaiton has to establish 
cryptographic keys then they probably 
cannot but SSL certs (since that entity 
establishes the key).
Ambiguous 
Specification Occasional Moderate Low
SC-28
The information system protects the [Selection (one or more): confidentiality; integrity] of 
[Assignment: organization-defined information at rest].
Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the confidentiality and integrity of information 
at rest and covers user information and system information. Information at rest refers to the 
state of information when it is located on storage devices as specific components of 
information systems. System-related information requiring protection includes, for example, 
configurations or rule sets for firewalls, gateways, intrusion detection/prevention systems, 
filtering routers, and authenticator content. Organizations may employ different mechanisms to 
achieve confidentiality and integrity protections, including the use of cryptographic 
mechanisms and file share scanning. Integrity protection can be achieved, for example, by 
implementing Write-Once-Read-Many (WORM) technologies. Organizations may also employ 
other security controls including, for example, secure off-line storage in lieu of online storage 
when adequate protection of information at rest cannot otherwise be achieved and/or 
continuous monitoring to identify malicious code at rest. Related controls: AC-3, AC-6, CA-7, 
CM-3, CM-5, CM-6, PE-3, SC-8, SC-13, SI-3, SI-7.
References: NIST Special Publications 800-56, 800-57, 800-111.
Require both confidentiality and 
integrity, not an option.
Ambiguous 
Specification Occasional Moderate Low
SC-8 (1)
The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to [Selection (one or more): 
prevent unauthorized disclosure of information; detect changes to information] during 
transmission unless otherwise protected by [Assignment: organization-defined alternative 
physical safeguards].
Supplemental Guidance: Encrypting information for transmission protects information from 
unauthorized disclosure and modification. Cryptographic mechanisms implemented to protect 
information integrity include, for example, cryptographic hash functions which have common 
application in digital signatures, checksums, and message authentication codes. Alternative 
physical security safeguards include, for example, protected distribution systems. Related 
control: SC-13.
RAS: no protection for protection 
mechanisms; JD: should not allow OR, 
needs to be both
Risk to Data Unlikely Critical Low
SC-12 (2) The organization produces, controls, and distributes symmetric cryptographic keys using [Selection: NIST FIPS-compliant; NSA-approved] key management technology and processes.
Necessary but insufficient. "Controls" 
is a weak requirement. Allows even 
intentionally giving to adversary.
Risk to Data Unlikely Critical Low
SC-12 (3)
The organization produces, controls, and distributes asymmetric cryptographic keys using 
[Selection: NSA-approved key management technology and processes; approved PKI Class 3 
certificates or prepositioned keying material; approved PKI Class 3 or Class 4 certificates and 
hardware security tokens that protect the user’s private key].
Does not limit control over who can 
access keys (giving access to foreign 
adversary)




a. Identifies, reports, and corrects information system flaws;
b. Tests software and firmware updates related to flaw remediation for effectiveness and 
potential side effects before installation;
c. Installs security-relevant software and firmware updates within [Assignment: organization- 
defined time period] of the release of the updates; and
d. Incorporates flaw remediation into the organizational configuration management process.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations identify information systems affected by announced 
software flaws including potential vulnerabilities resulting from those flaws, and report this 
information to designated organizational personnel with information security responsibilities. 
Security-relevant software updates include, for example, patches, service packs, hot fixes, and 
anti-virus signatures. Organizations also address flaws discovered during security 
assessments, continuous monitoring, incident response activities, and system error handling. 
Organizations take advantage of available resources such as the Common Weakness 
Enumeration (CWE) or Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) databases in 
remediating flaws discovered in organizational information systems. By incorporating flaw 
remediation into ongoing configuration management processes, required/anticipated 
remediation actions can be tracked and verified. Flaw remediation actions that can be tracked 
and verified include, for example, determining whether organizations follow US-CERT 
guidance and Information Assurance Vulnerability Alerts. Organization-defined time periods for 
updating security-relevant software and firmware may vary based on a variety of factors 
including, for example, the security category of the information system or the criticality of the 
update (i.e., severity of the vulnerability related to the discovered flaw). Some types of flaw 
remediation may require more testing than other types. Organizations determine the degree 
and type of testing needed for the specific type of flaw remediation activity under consideration 
and also the types of changes that are to be configuration-managed. In some situations, 
organizations may determine that the testing of software and/or firmware updates is not 
necessary or practical,
for example, when implementing simple anti-virus signature updates. Organizations may also 
consider in testing decisions, whether security-relevant software or firmware updates are 
obtained from authorized sources with appropriate digital signatures. Related controls: CA-2, 
CA-7, CM-3, CM-5, CM-8, MA-2, IR-4, RA-5, SA-10, SA-11, SI-11.
No maximum time period since 
organization can define.
Ambiguous 
Specification Occasional Moderate Low
SI-3
The organization:
a. Employs malicious code protection mechanisms at information system entry and exit points 
to detect and eradicate malicious code;
b. Updates malicious code protection mechanisms whenever new releases are available in 
accordance with organizational configuration management policy and procedures;
c. Configures malicious code protection mechanisms to:
1. Perform periodic scans of the information system [Assignment: organization-defined 
frequency] and real-time scans of files from external sources at [Selection (one or more); 
endpoint; network entry/exit points] as the files are downloaded, opened, or executed in 
accordance with organizational security policy; and
2. [Selection (one or more): block malicious code; quarantine malicious code; send alert to 
administrator; [Assignment: organization-defined action]] in response to malicious code 
detection; and
d. Addresses the receipt of false positives during malicious code detection and eradication and 
the resulting potential impact on the availability of the information system.
Supplemental Guidance: Information system entry and exit points include, for example, 
firewalls, electronic mail servers, web servers, proxy servers, remote-access servers, 
workstations, notebook computers, and mobile devices. Malicious code includes, for example, 
viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and spyware. Malicious code can also be encoded in various 
formats (e.g., UUENCODE, Unicode), contained within compressed or hidden files, or hidden 
in files using steganography. Malicious code can be transported by different means including, 
for example, web accesses, electronic mail, electronic mail attachments, and portable storage 
devices. Malicious code insertions occur through the exploitation of information system 
vulnerabilities. Malicious code protection mechanisms include, for example, anti-virus 
signature definitions and reputation-based technologies. A variety of technologies and 
methods exist to limit or eliminate the effects of malicious code. Pervasive configuration 
management and comprehensive software integrity controls may be effective in preventing 
execution of unauthorized code. In addition to commercial off-the-shelf software, malicious 
code may also be present in custom-built software. This could include, for example, logic 
bombs, back doors, and other types of cyber attacks that could affect organizational 
missions/business functions. Traditional malicious code protection mechanisms cannot always 
detect such code. In these situations, organizations rely instead on other safeguards including, 
for example, secure coding practices, configuration management and control, trusted 
procurement processes, and monitoring practices to help ensure that software does not 
perform functions other than the functions intended. Organizations may determine that in 
response to the detection of malicious code, different actions may be warranted. For example, 
organizations can define actions in response to malicious code detection during periodic 
scans, actions in response to detection of malicious downloads, and/or actions in response to 
detection of maliciousness when attempting to open or execute files. Related controls: CM-3, 
MP-2, SA-4, SA-8, SA-12, SA-13,
SC-7, SC-26, SC-44, SI-2, SI-4, SI-7.
References: NIST Special Publication 800-83.
RAS: no protection from protection 
mechanisms
WCE: this control often causes issues 
with developer workstations, as most 
commercially available solutions will 
trip over the new software code that 
devs build and execute on their 
workstations. There aren't clear 
directions here for how to use malware 
protection and actively develop new 
software on the same environment.
Risk to Data Unlikely Critical Low
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SA-4
The organization includes the following requirements, descriptions, and criteria, explicitly or by 
reference, in the acquisition contract for the information system, system component, or 
information system service in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, 
directives, policies, regulations, standards, guidelines, and organizational mission/business 
needs:
a. Security functional requirements;
b. Security strength requirements;
c. Security assurance requirements;
d. Security-related documentation requirements;
e. Requirements for protecting security-related documentation;
f. Description of the information system development environment and environment in which 
the system is intended to operate; and
g. Acceptance criteria.
Supplemental Guidance: Information system components are discrete, identifiable information 
technology assets (e.g., hardware, software, or firmware) that represent the building blocks of 
an information system. Information system components include commercial information 
technology products. Security functional requirements include security capabilities, security 
functions, and security mechanisms. Security strength requirements associated with such 
capabilities, functions, and mechanisms include degree of correctness, completeness, 
resistance to direct attack, and resistance to tampering or bypass. Security assurance 
requirements include: (i) development processes, procedures, practices, and methodologies; 
and (ii) evidence from development and assessment activities providing grounds for 
confidence that the required security functionality has been implemented and the required 
security strength has been achieved. Security documentation requirements address all phases 
of the system development life cycle.
Security functionality, assurance, and documentation requirements are expressed in terms of 
security controls and control enhancements that have been selected through the tailoring 
process. The security control tailoring process includes, for example, the specification of 
parameter values through the use of assignment and selection statements and the 
specification of platform dependencies and implementation information. Security 
documentation provides user and administrator guidance regarding the implementation and 
operation of security controls. The level of detail required in security documentation is based 
on the security category or classification level of the information system and the degree to 
which organizations depend on the stated security capability, functions, or mechanisms to 
meet overall risk response expectations (as defined in the organizational risk management 
strategy). Security requirements can also include organizationally mandated configuration 
settings specifying allowed functions, ports, protocols, and services. Acceptance criteria for 
information systems, information system components, and information system services are 
defined in the same manner as such criteria for any organizational acquisition or procurement. 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Section 7.103 contains information security 
requirements from FISMA. Related controls: CM-6, PL-2, PS-7, SA-3, SA-5, SA-8, SA-11, SA-
12.
RAS: for multi-national corps, this 
needs to explicitly consider 
access/control from foreign govs
Risk to Data Unlikely Critical Low
SA-10 (1)
The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or 
information system service to enable integrity verification of software and firmware 
components.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement allows organizations to detect 
unauthorized changes to software and firmware components through the use of tools, 
techniques, and/or mechanisms provided by developers. Integrity checking mechanisms can 
also address counterfeiting of software and firmware components. Organizations verify the 
integrity of software and firmware components, for example, through secure one-way hashes 
provided by developers. Delivered software and firmware components also include any 
updates to such components. Related control: SI-7.
RAS: should also consider backdoored 
updates where adversary co-opts legit 
update to inject own code; checksum 
would not detect. should continually 
monitor communications of security 
devices
Risk to Data Unlikely Critical Low
SA-4 (2)
The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or 
information system service to provide design and implementation information for the security 
controls to be employed that includes: [Selection (one or more): security-relevant external 
system interfaces; high-level design; low-level design; source code or hardware schematics; 
[Assignment: organization-defined design/implementation information]] at [Assignment: 
organization-defined level of detail].
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may require different levels of detail in design and 
implementation documentation for security controls employed in organizational information 
systems, system components, or information system services based on mission/business 
requirements, requirements for trustworthiness/resiliency, and requirements for analysis and 
testing. Information systems can be partitioned into multiple subsystems. Each subsystem 
within the system can contain one or more modules. The high-level design for the system is 
expressed in terms of multiple subsystems and the interfaces between subsystems providing 
security-relevant functionality. The low-level design for the system is expressed in terms of 
modules with particular emphasis on software and firmware (but not excluding hardware) and 
the interfaces between modules providing security-relevant functionality. Source code and 
hardware schematics are typically referred to as the implementation representation of the 
information system. Related control: SA-5.
RAS: what standardized things are you 
looking for here and who is trained to 
look for it? this should not be left up to 
organizations. tons of previous work 
about how difficult it is to detect 
backdoors even with source code
Risk to Data Seldom Critical Medium
All FedRAMP allows for variable security controls: high, moderate, low Security controls for US Gov should not be variable
Ambiguous 
Specification Frequent Negligible Medium
All FIPS Publications 140-2 140-3 replaced 140-2 Obsolete Reference Frequent Negligible Medium
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B.3 Additional data from Chapter 6
B.4 Playbook examples
Figure B.4: Participant P4’s IACD playbook for brute force login attempts.
B.5 Additional data from Chapter 7
B.5.1 Quantitative analysis
Factor Type Description Baseline
Category Fixed Measure groups Passive Defense
ID Random Participant ID –
Table B.2: Factors used in creating the Cumulative Link Mixed Model.
Our Cumulative Link Mixed Model took into account fixed and random effects
(Table B.2). The fixed effect was the set of all complementary measure categories
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Figure B.5: A sample of Participant P11’s NIST playbook for credential misuse
attempt.
Figure B.6: A visualization of the common issue novice defenders had using play-
books. Despite alerts being present, the defender failed to recognize the significance
of the alerts and failed to enact the follow-on steps described in the playbooks.
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and the random effect was the participant set, forming the mixed effect input. The
random effect includes duplicate identification numbers since different participants
could choose the same measure. We compared each proactive control to the baseline
that we selected.
Contrast Estimate p-value
Passive Def - Continually Evolving Def 2.170 ¡.0001*
Passive Def - Training and Exercises 1.807 0.0046*
Passive Def - Human-focused Reviews 1.679 0.0068*
Continually Evolving Def - Training and Exercises -0.363 0.8321
Continually Evolving Def - Human-focused Reviews -0.491 0.6279
Training and Exercises - Human-focused Reviews -0.128 0.9934
*Statistically significant
Table B.3: Contrasts and estimates between combinations of proactive control
groups
In Table B.3, we provide contrast values between all combinations of control
groups that shows the satisfaction level difference estimates between the control
groups and the associated p-value that indicates significance.
B.5.2 Reported measures
Table B.4 lists all the complementary measures reported by our participants,
organized according to the four high-level categories.
B.5.3 List of reported compliance standards




Table B.6 details the collected demographics of each participant. Clientele
size (C/S) indicates the number of supported customers, whereas the number of
reported supported organizations (S/O) indicates how many external organizations




Category Code Explanation Example
unaddressed_threat Untrained_auditors Concern about how auditors conduct
their assessments
"Compliance is a patchwork and it is often interpreted and enforced "trib-
ally" or locally – the person deciding whether you meet the requirements
is an outsider who often has no security background. The configuration
they approve may be useless for preventing the threat that the control is
intended to stop. Many compliance controls are put in place to satisfy the




guidelines only up to an acceptable
threshold
" Frameworks are a baseline to ensure you’re thinking about controls in
many domains at a minimal/moderate. Very often even the baseline controls





measures is not enough for protection
"Compliance doesn’t fully address any threat."
unaddressed_threat Rely_on_ext_experts
_for_understanding
Relying on external party recommen-
dations for complete protection





Compliance provides only basic level
protection
"I can’t get into specifics, but in general we believe compliance mechanisms




Threat and non-compliance mitiga-
tion based on employee self-reports
We encourage self-reported cases of employee negligence or failure to
adopt and employ standard operating procedures within our company with
amnesty.
unaddressed_threat 0day_emerging_threats Previously unknown threats "We allow full scope pentests against our network to ID all emerging
threats."
unaddressed_threat Insider_threats Threats that originate from people
within the organization
"Foreign state actors. Insiders."
unaddressed_threat Phishing Maliciously obtaining sensitive infor-
mation in the disguise of a trustwor-
thy party
"Insider Threats, Phishing, Denial of Service attacks."
unaddressed_threat Nation_state Highly sophisticated and state-
sponsored adversaries
"Nation state actors (APTs)"
unaddressed_threat DoS Rendering a resource unavailable for
legitimate users
"Insider Threats, Phishing, Denial of Service attacks."
unaddressed_threat Operational_Security
_Threats
Comprehensive analysis of assets and
infrastructure from an adversary’s
perspective
"Operational security threats not covered by compliance frameworks."
what_worked_well PNTA_No_answer The participant did not respond. N/A
what_worked_well Time_to_implement
_or_use
Ability to implement or use a comple-
mentary measure in a time-efficient
manner
"We struggle to quickly integrate paid vendor intel into our analysis sys-
tems."
what_worked_well Valuable_outcomes whether the complementary measure
provided benefits or not




Following best practices and an edu-
cated approach to security
"The ability to focus resources has allowed us to take a deeper and more
methodical approach to our security implementation."
what_worked_well Reduces_attack_vector Mitigation of a certain attack types "Able to get bugs identified and submitted, seems like patches were applied
as well."
what_worked_well Reduce_Cost Reducing overall security-based
spending of the organization
"Able to forecast budgets and resources for future threats."
what_worked_well Time_to_replace Time spent to replace an already de-
ployed complementary measure
"Authenticator apps can cause issues when employees break or lose their




Implementing a complementary mea-
sure by following its guidelines or in a
well-established and planned manner
"It’s not done as periodically as the policy says it should be."
what_worked_well Embracing_Modern
_Techniques
Replacing obsolete techniques with
modern and up-to-date approaches
"We do it improperly and based off of old policies and intelligence."
what_worked_well Convincing
_Departmental_Entities
Ability to talk departmental entities to
embrace or acquire a complementary
measure
"Legal liability and permissions are difficult to overcome."
what_worked_well Scalability The ability to handle a growing
amount of work
"Initial roll outs of two-factor authentication can be time consuming with
lots of user misunderstandings and/or errors."
Table 1: Codebook
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what_worked_well Availability The measure of accessibility "EDR is one of the best ways to prevent multiple types of attacks from
impacting our organization and does not bog down the endpoints resources."
what_worked_well Good_Management Skilled, educated, and competentman-
agement
"Improper understanding by senior leadership limits its potential. Leader-
ship approaches threat hunting as ’vacuum up everyones data and search
it as big data’ vs hunting on specific organizations networks."
what_worked_well Having_Skilled
_Employees
Having employees who are skilled
and successful at what they do in their
daily work routine
"Not convinced we brought in the right hunters."
what_worked_well Validation Accuracy checking "Nice to reassess security gaps frequently"
what_worked_well Reliability The degree of trustworthiness "Being able to get intel, comb the environment and incorporate the new
intel in searches has worked well."
what_worked_well Convincing_Users_or
_Employees
Convincing the users and employees
to embrace a complementary measure
"Developing the program was great... informing everyone of its existence
has been a struggle."
what_worked_well Sentiment Overall feeling or opinion regarding
a complementary measure
"Being able to get intel, comb the environment and incorporate the new
intel in searches has worked well."
why_implement N/A The participant responded with
"N/A."
Not applicable.
why_implement Support_customers To better protect clients or providing
the ability to protect themselves bet-
ter




Information on how to properly im-
plement a complementary measure
"Password-based protection alone is insufficient, we needed another layer."
why_implement Best_practice Well-known, established, and proven
methods
"This is a best practice something you have and something you know."
why_implement Support_other_defense Indirectly supporting the security of
other parts of the system while pro-
viding security to a certain part of the
system while
"It is imperative that additional layers of security are implemented where
necessary. Multi-factor authentication provides an additional level of se-
curity that assists in reducing the occurrence of gaining access to critical
systems."
why_implement Better_than_compliance_rec The complementary measure pro-
vides better security compared to the
compliance recommendations
"simple signature based AV is dead. EDR tooling gives a much richer vision
of process execution that his valuable for both detection and forensics."
why_implement Expert_recommendation Getting advice from external parties "Third party vendor recommended it to help monitor key systems."
why_implement Security_incident_or_frequency Protection for previously happened
or highly frequently happening inci-
dents
"We have the most attacked network in the world."
why_implement Skill_Shortage The shortage of knowledgeable indi-
viduals who are also working in the
security field
"Humans do not scale and are in short supply, and security data is growing
exponentially. Automation has to be employed."
why_implement Reduce_costs/Cost-Benefit Same effectiveness and quality, but
cheaper solutions
"We needed to economize and focus our efforts."
why_implement Support_Employees Solutions that help employees to be
better at tasks that they do in their
daily routine
"Threat intelligence can not only educate our organization on new or
continuing threats, but can help us understand how they might impact us."
why_implement Situational_Awareness Improving the adequate knowledge
of the potential threats, the environ-
ment, and the organization’s mission
"To discuss process/methodologies for response to various potential events."
why_implement Effort_Prioritization Prioritizing efforts based on several
factors, such as budget limitations
"We needed to economize and focus our efforts."
why_implement Organization_Req Organizational requirements or rules
that must be followed
"Required as individuals come in and out of organizations."
why_implement Compliance_is_Insufficient Compliance without complementary
measures is not enough for protection
"AV is just flatly insufficient. attackers often use "living off the land" tools,
this helps to detect and prevent normal tools used in bad ways."
why_implement Vendor_or_App_Reputation Purchasing and deploying a comple-
mentary measure based on previous
facts regarding an application or ven-
dor
"We leverage the campus FireEye system. It has good ratings based upon
what I have read, it was approved by security, and it is free."
compatible PTNA The participant did not respond.
compatible N/A The participant responded with
"N/A".
Not applicable.
compatible Do_not_check Not checking if the complementary
measure is compatible with enforced
compliance programs
"We don’t bother and I cannot understand why."
compatible Not_covered_in_compliance the complementary measure is not
covered in the enforced compliance
programs
"above and beyond"
Table 2: Codebook - cont.
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compatible Helps_streamline Making compliance more efficient "TI can help us understand if the control we have in place will be effective
against threats."
compatible "Bonus_points" Implementing a complementary con-
trol for a better (extra) image
"Most compliance regimes allow for an organization to "get credit" for
additional controls in the front matter by describing them in a narrative."
compatible Out-of-the-box_compliance Uncommon, but effective ways to
make complementary controls com-
patible with enforced compliance pro-
grams




A complementary measure satisfying
a part of an enforced compliance pro-
gram
"Most of our compliance regimes expect MFA.We take credit for it wherever
it applies."
compatible Legal_Review Making sure that a complementary
measure is compatible with enforced
compliance programs by conducting
legal reviews
"Lots of legal review."
compatible Dictated_by_compliance Already a requirement of enforced
compliance programs
"We defer to the compliance controls, even if the threat model has changed
and would better serve us."
compatible Proper_Design_/Implementation Making sure that a complementary
measure is implemented by following
its guidelines or in a well-established
and planned manner
"Strict scoping, bounded timelines and user registration."
compatible Incremental_Improvement Slowly, but surely improvement over
time
"Incremental improvement over time."
compatible Testing Testing if a complementary measure
is compatible with the enforced com-
pliance programs or not
"PCI evaluations show it was compatible."
compatible Knowledgeable_Decision
Makers
Having skilled and knowledgeable
decision-makers that understand how
enforced compliance programs work
and how to be compatible with them
"By having personnel that understand the compliance standards and the
strategy of the organization."
compatible Identifying_Gaps Making sure that a complementary
measure is compatible with enforced
compliance programs by identifying
gaps
"We probe whether we have the controls or not, and if we do not, we work
to remediate them."
compatible Keeping_up_With_Tech Being up-to-date with new develop-
ments and technology
"Integration into systems throughout the lifecycle with initial focus on end
point authorization and access controls."
compatible Continuous_Education Contentious knowledge and aware-
ness improvement
"Continuous education against common threats."
compatible Documentation Recording events and incidents "Document how, where, when an issue was found. Show proof of mitiga-
tion."
compatible Managed_by_third_party Requirements of an enforced compli-
ance programmanaged by third-party
experts
"This isn’t really required, but is useful to have as a way for external parties
to report security issues so that they aren’t lost in Customer Service queues."
key_factors No_Response The participant did not respond. N/A
key_factors Directed_security_(internal) The quality of "Operations are king. Once it is determined what product is wanted security
is brought in to assess, which is slightly backwards."
key_factors Expert_recommendation Importance of recommendations from
experts
"Third party companies evaluate our systems and make recommendations."
key_factors Budget Spending power "Attempted self assessments and then prioritize bang/buck."
key_factors Current_threats Current threats to the organization "Yes. Threat intelligence, regulations, and quantitative risk assessments
server to help prioritize."
key_factors Business_goals Importance of the organization’s mis-
sion
"Business needs, client requests."
key_factors Inter-
departmental_collaboration
The degree of communication and col-
laboration between different parties
in the same organization
"Allowing our red team to do their jobs. they find the gaps, and we fix based
on threat levels."
key_factors Reputable_Vendors Previous facts regarding a vendor " We also have to spend a good bit of time finding vendors with truly useful
technologies and not just well marketed snake oil."
key_factors Established_programs The degree of previous success regard-
ing a program
"Vendor sales pitches and entrenched constituencies."
key_factors Time_Saving Being able to spend less time "Look for low cost and items can easily implement."
key_factors Automation Automating repetitive manual labor "Possibility of automation."
key_factors Regulatory_Requests Requests that come from compliance
regulators
"Typically this is related to regulatory requests."
Table 3: Codebook - cont.
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key_factors Applicability Integration difficulty or compatibility "The applicability to our systems and threat models."
key_factors Potential_Benefits Valuable outcomes "Value/ROI, efficacy, lifecycle and management overhead."
key_factors User_Feedback User experiences and feedback on a
complementary measure
"Depends on if someone is asking for new tool or explains why they can’t
see something malicious."
key_factors Capability_/Features Feature-rich solutions "We also have to spend a good bit of time finding vendors with truly useful
technologies."
key_factors Necessity Current needs for better protecting
the organization
"We invest in solutions that meet our highest priority needs."
key_factors Implementation_Difficulty The degree of difficulty in implement-
ing a complementary measure
"Look for low cost and items can easily implement."
key_factors Compliance_Support Supporting an existing or a part of a
compliance
"Cost, threats, whether part of compliance or not."









Internal phishing exercises* 1
Human-focused reviews












Endpoint detection and response 26
Threat hunting 20
Threat intelligence 19
Vulnerability disclosure / bug bounty 14
Physical access barriers 13
Machine learning 10
Dogfooding* 1
Table B.4: All complementary measures reported by our participants, organized into




HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) 17
PCI DSS (Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard) 14
FISMA (Federal Information Security Management Act) 12
NIST Cybersecurity Framework 33
IRS Publication 1075 1
NERC CIP (Critical Infrastructure Protection) 2
FedRAMP 10
FERPA (The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974) 8
COPPA (Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule) 4
ISO (International Organization for Standardization) 12
CIS Controls (Center for Internet Security Controls) 8
SOX (Sarbanes-Oxley Act) 2
GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation) 9
CCPA (California Consumer Privacy Act) 4
DoD Instruction 8510.01* 4
Genome data protection guidelines* 1
NY Department of Financial Services Regulation* 1
Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria “Orange Book”* 1
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Standards* 1
University IT standards* 2
Other financial regulations* 1
Table B.5: Reported compliance standards used by study participants. Standards
provided by participants in the ‘other’ field are marked with *̂.
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ID Sec Job Deg Size C/S S/O Exp
P01 Consumer services Compliance/Governance SME Graduate Deg 151-500 1-500 1-3 15
P02 Consumer services Management Graduate Deg 0-50 10k-100k 1-3 2
P03 Consumer services Security Analyst Bachelors Deg 151-500 100k+ 1-3 10
P04 Education Compliance/Governance SME Graduate Deg 1000+ 10k-100k 1-3 20
P05 Education Management Graduate Deg 1000+ 1-500 1-3 4
P06 Education Management Graduate Deg 1000+ 501-5000 1-3 25
P07 Education Management Graduate Deg 1000+ 10k-100k 1-3 21
P08 Education Management Graduate Deg 0-50 501-5000 1-3 22
P09 Education Management Graduate Deg 501-1000 5001-10k 1-3 20
P10 Education Security Analyst Bachelors Deg 1000+ 501-5000 1-3 5
P11 Financial services Management Graduate Deg 1000+ 10k-100k 1-3 27
P12 Government Developer Bachelors Deg 151-500 501-5000 4-10 10
P13 Government Developer Bachelors Deg 1000+ 100k+ 51+ 10
P14 Government Developer Graduate Deg 1000+ 1-500 1-3 11
P15 Government Management Graduate Deg 1000+ 10k-100k 51+ 14
P16 Government Management Bachelors Deg 1000+ 100k+ 51+ 24
P17 Government Management Graduate Deg 501-1000 501-5000 1-3 15
P18 Government Management Graduate Deg 1000+ 100k+ 51+ 10
P19 Government Management Graduate Deg 1000+ 100k+ 51+ 16
P20 Government Management Graduate Deg 151-500 10k-100k 11-50 20
P21 Government Management Graduate Deg 51-150 1-500 11-50 15
P22 Government Management Graduate Deg 1000+ 100k+ 1-3 21
P23 Government Management Graduate Deg 51-150 501-5000 1-3 22
P24 Government Management Graduate Deg 1000+ 501-5000 1-3 9
P25 Government Security Analyst Graduate Deg 1000+ 100k+ 51+ 19
P26 Healthcare Management Graduate Deg 501-1000 501-5000 1-3 20
P27 Healthcare Management Graduate Deg 1000+ 100k+ 51+ 26
P28 Healthcare Management Bachelors Deg 1000+ 100k+ 4-10 15
P29 Healthcare Security Analyst Bachelors Deg 1000+ 100k+ 1-3 5
P30 Info Tech Compliance/Governance SME Bachelors Deg 151-500 10k-100k 51+ 8
P31 Info Tech Compliance/Governance SME Associates Deg 151-500 1-500 11-50 12
P32 Info Tech Compliance/Governance SME Graduate Deg 151-500 5001-10k 1-3 3
P33 Info Tech Compliance/Governance SME PNTA 1000+ 100k+ 51+ 25
P34 Info Tech Developer Graduate Deg 151-500 10k-100k 1-3 10
P35 Info Tech Management Graduate Deg 0-50 100k+ 51+ 25
P36 Info Tech Management Bachelors Deg 0-50 501-5000 4-10 12
P37 Info Tech Security Analyst Graduate Deg 151-500 10k-100k 11-50 25
P38 Info Tech Security Analyst Bachelors Deg 51-150 501-5000 1-3 10
P39 Info Tech Security Engineer Graduate Deg 1000+ 100k+ 51+ 10
P40 Info Tech Security Engineer Graduate Deg 0-50 1-500 11-50 20
Table B.6: Participant Demographics. The columns show: participant identifiers,
business sector, job role, educational degree, organization’s size of hired employees,
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